Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against an intimation suspending and proposing cancellation of GST registration when the registered person had not filed pending returns, replied to the notice, or pursued the remedies available before the Proper Officer.

Analysis: The intimation required filing of returns under Section 39 or submission of a reply within thirty days, and stated that suspension would be lifted upon filing the returns. Rule 21A(4) provides for revocation of suspension upon completion of proceedings under Rule 22. Under Rule 22(4), proceedings must be dropped where the reply is satisfactory; in applicable cases, filing all pending returns and payment of tax dues, interest and late fee also requires the Proper Officer to drop the proceedings. The available course before the Proper Officer had not been pursued.

Conclusion: The challenge was declined for non-exhaustion of the available statutory recourse, leaving the petitioner to approach the Proper Officer under the impugned intimation.

Issues: Whether a penalty under Section 129 could be imposed where goods were transported with a tax invoice, e-way bill and lorry receipt, but the mandatory e-invoice with IRN/QR code had not been generated before commencement of movement.

Analysis: Rule 48(4) mandates e-invoicing for notified registered persons, while Section 129 governs detention and penalty for goods in transit. The record established an initial breach because the e-invoice was generated after interception. However, the consignment was accompanied by a tax invoice, e-way bill and lorry receipt identifying the supplier, recipient, goods, value and tax liability. No discrepancy in the goods, quantity, value, consignor, consignee or e-way bill was established. The subsequently generated e-invoice corresponded to the same transaction, and there was no material showing concealment, falsification, undervaluation or an intention to evade tax. A procedural e-invoicing lapse, without evidence of tax evasion or substantive defect in the transaction, did not justify the penal consequence under Section 129.

Conclusion: The Section 129 penalty was unsustainable in the absence of material establishing an intention to evade tax.

Issues: (i) Whether the Rs. 11 lakh cheque credit received during negotiations for transfer of property could be assessed as unexplained money under section 69A; and (ii) Whether Rs. 3.83 crore was proved to have been received in cash during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2020-21 and was assessable under section 69A.

Issue (i): Whether the Rs. 11 lakh cheque credit received during negotiations for transfer of property could be assessed as unexplained money under section 69A.

Analysis: Section 69A requires that the assessee be found to be owner of money whose nature and source remain unexplained. The banking inquiry identified the payer and cheque, and the proposed purchaser and her spouse confirmed that the amount was paid by cheque as an advance during negotiations. The payer, banking source and nature of the credit were therefore established. Any later treatment of an advance retained in connection with transfer of a capital asset falls for consideration under section 51 in the relevant year and does not render the original cheque credit unexplained.

Conclusion: The Rs. 11 lakh credit could not be assessed as unexplained money under section 69A; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Rs. 3.83 crore was proved to have been received in cash during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 2020-21 and was assessable under section 69A.

Analysis: The purported agreement was not reliably shown to be mutually executed and contained payment particulars inconsistent with the established banking record. The broker's accounts of total consideration and cash payment were inconsistent, and no particulars traced any cash delivery, dates of payment, intermediary, or receipt by the assessee. The electronic message relied upon for Rs. 3.83 crore was sent after the relevant previous year; its acknowledged authorship did not prove actual payment in that year. The remaining communication was explained as an estimate, and the proposed purchasers denied making cash payment. The subsequent registered sale to another purchaser supported the inference that the earlier proposed transaction had not culminated in a conveyance, though it was not treated as conclusive by itself.

Conclusion: Receipt or ownership of Rs. 3.83 crore in cash during the relevant previous year was not established for section 69A purposes; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The identified cheque advance had an established source and character, while the alleged cash consideration lacked reliable evidence of actual receipt in the relevant previous year; neither amount was taxable as unexplained money.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained money requires reliable evidence that the precise sum was received or owned by the assessee in the relevant previous year and that its source and nature remain unexplained; inconsistent statements and uncorroborated electronic material do not, without proof of actual payment, satisfy that requirement.

Issues: Whether an applicant could be treated as not being a fit and proper person for enrolment as an insolvency professional solely because disciplinary proceedings were pending, when the appellate authority had stayed the punishment removing the applicant's name from the register of members.

Analysis: Clause 4(1)(g) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016 requires an applicant to be a fit and proper person. Although professional misconduct had been found and removal from the register had been ordered, the appellate authority had kept that punishment in abeyance pending appeal. The applicant's name therefore remained on the register and the applicant continued to be permitted to perform professional duties. The distinction that the stay of punishment did not stay the disciplinary proceedings did not justify treating the applicant as unfit.

Conclusion: The rejection of enrolment on the ground of pending disciplinary proceedings was unsustainable. The rejection letter was set aside and the authorities were required to make a fresh determination without being influenced by the pendency of the appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 7 application was barred under Section 10A because Form I stated default as 01.11.2020, and whether the date could be corrected to 06.03.2018; (ii) Whether curable defects in the Section 7 application made it non-maintainable; (iii) Whether the corporate debtor's asserted viability warranted refusal of CIRP admission; (iv) Whether the admission order was non-reasoned.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 7 application was barred under Section 10A because Form I stated default as 01.11.2020, and whether the date could be corrected to 06.03.2018.

Analysis: Section 7 requires establishment of financial debt and default, while Section 10A bars applications founded on defaults occurring during the specified suspension period. The stated date of 01.11.2020 represented non-payment of an instalment under the One-Time Settlement, which did not reschedule or create a fresh default in respect of the original debt. Failure of the settlement restored the original position. The debt recovery certificate dated 06.03.2018 was the relevant date of default, and written acknowledgments of debt rendered the application timely. The erroneous entry in Form I was a rectifiable procedural error.

Conclusion: The application was not barred by Section 10A, and correction of the date of default to 06.03.2018 was permissible. Against the Appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether curable defects in the Section 7 application made it non-maintainable.

Analysis: Procedural defects that are capable of rectification do not require rejection unless the governing statute mandates that consequence, the defect remains unrectified despite opportunity, or rectification affects merits or jurisdiction. The defects in the application were capable of cure, and additional documents could validly be taken on record.

Conclusion: The curable defects did not render the Section 7 application non-maintainable. Against the Appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the corporate debtor's asserted viability warranted refusal of CIRP admission.

Analysis: The admission-stage enquiry under Section 7 is confined to the existence of debt and default and the completeness of the application. No credible material established that the corporate debtor was solvent or commercially viable. Its prior inability to meet obligations, implement the settlement, or secure investment distinguished the matter from a case involving recoverable receivables that could realistically discharge the debt.

Conclusion: The asserted commercial viability did not warrant refusal of CIRP admission. Against the Appellant.

Issue (iv): Whether the admission order was non-reasoned.

Analysis: The admission order recorded the lending documents, restructuring, NPA classification, recovery proceedings, debt recovery certificate, failed settlement, acknowledgments, and the existence of default exceeding the statutory threshold. It provided reasons for admitting the Section 7 application.

Conclusion: The admission order was reasoned and valid. Against the Appellant.

Final Conclusion: The admission of the corporate debtor into CIRP stands sustained because financial debt and a qualifying pre-suspension default were established, notwithstanding the rectifiable Form I error and the unsupported claim of viability.

Ratio Decidendi: A failed One-Time Settlement does not create a fresh date of default or displace an earlier established default; consequently, a curable erroneous default entry in a Section 7 application cannot invoke the Section 10A bar where the actual default preceded the suspension period.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to avail the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons; (ii) Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects; (iii) Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance; and (iv) Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the original adjudication was vitiated by denial of the requested personal hearing and absence of adequate reasons.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires a meaningful hearing where it is requested in writing or where an adverse decision is contemplated. Section 75(6) requires the order to state relevant facts and the basis of decision. The requested post-reply hearing was not afforded, and the order merely treated the explanation as unsatisfactory without addressing the asserted single supply, duplicate generation, or evidentiary basis for an additional taxable transaction. The statutory audi alteram partem requirement and duty to give reasons were therefore not met.

Conclusion: The original adjudication was vitiated by breach of Sections 75(4) and 75(6), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether subsequent appellate hearings cured the original procedural defects.

Analysis: A statutory hearing denied at the original adjudicatory stage is not automatically cured by hearings before appellate forums. The original-stage hearing was material because disputed factual questions required evaluation of the explanation, primary records, and departmental data by the proper officer in the first instance.

Conclusion: The subsequent hearings did not cure the original denial of statutory hearing, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cancellation mechanism under Rule 138(9) created a new charge or had evidentiary significance.

Analysis: The existing notice was founded on duplicate e-way bills against the same invoice and the alleged unpaid tax on an additional transaction. Rule 138(9) was relevant to assess the defence that one e-way bill did not represent actual movement; it did not introduce a new charge. Non-cancellation is a material circumstance, but does not alone establish an additional supply. The issue requires a cumulative assessment of evidence, including the burden of proof and any adverse inference arising from non-production of primary records.

Conclusion: Rule 138(9) does not create a new charge, and non-cancellation is relevant but not conclusive; the issue is partly against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the disputed demand required final merits determination or limited fresh adjudication.

Analysis: Section 113(1) permits referral for fresh adjudication where necessary. The duplicate e-way bills, the unexplained invoice discrepancy, the asserted technical or clerical causes, and the absence of primary invoice, return, books, and transport records left disputed factual matters unresolved. The demand could neither be annulled solely on unsupported assertions nor sustained through appellate fact-finding in substitution of the denied original hearing.

Conclusion: Fresh adjudication confined to the existing notice, after production of relevant evidence, a meaningful personal hearing, and a reasoned speaking order, is required; this procedural relief is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned determination concerning the surviving transaction cannot stand without compliance with statutory hearing and reasoned-decision requirements; whether any additional taxable supply occurred remains open for determination on the evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Denial of a requested statutory personal hearing and failure to give adequate reasons at the original adjudicatory stage are not automatically cured by later appellate hearings where disputed factual evidence requires first-instance determination.

Issues: (i) Whether, for FY 2018-19, ITC could be denied merely because invoices were absent from GSTR-2A and the role of Sections 16 and 155 and Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST; (ii) Whether the appellant established eligibility for ITC on the three supplier invoices and explained the residual IGST difference; (iii) Whether the alleged CGST/SGST credit shortfall could be set off against excess IGST credit; (iv) Whether the alleged non-consideration of evidence required interference or remand; (v) Whether interest and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether, for FY 2018-19, ITC could be denied merely because invoices were absent from GSTR-2A and the role of Sections 16 and 155 and Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST.

Analysis: Section 16(2)(aa) was not applicable to FY 2018-19. A GSTR-2A mismatch was a trigger for verification and not an independent basis for denial; however, the Substantive Conditions for Input Tax Credit under Section 16 and the Burden of Proof under Section 155 remained applicable. Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST applied in principle to invoices bearing a registered recipient's GSTIN but wrongly reported as B2C, but a supplier certificate under the Circular was evidentiary material and not conclusive proof.

Conclusion: ITC could not be denied solely because of non-reflection in GSTR-2A, in favour of the assessee on that legal proposition; eligibility nevertheless remained dependent on proof of the statutory conditions.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellant established eligibility for ITC on the three supplier invoices and explained the residual IGST difference.

Analysis: The invoices, ledger and transport material supported the existence of commercial transactions and movement of goods, but did not sufficiently establish the asserted supplier-side B2C reporting error or payment of tax through the supplier's GSTR-3B. The later supplier certificate lacked objective return-level corroboration, particularly for the high-value invoice capable of invoice-wise B2CL reporting. The three invoices also accounted for only part of the disputed IGST, leaving the balance unsupported by any identified invoice or reconciliation.

Conclusion: The claimed ITC was not established for the three invoices, and the residual IGST difference remained unexplained, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged CGST/SGST credit shortfall could be set off against excess IGST credit.

Analysis: IGST, CGST and SGST are distinct tax heads governed by the statutory utilisation mechanism. No transaction-level reconciliation showed that the apparent short-availment under CGST or SGST arose from the same transactions or constituted a legally permissible Cross-Head Set-Off.

Conclusion: The alleged CGST/SGST shortfall could not be netted against excess IGST credit, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether the alleged non-consideration of evidence required interference or remand.

Analysis: The material relied upon had not been tendered before the adjudicating authority, while the first appellate forum afforded two hearing opportunities that were not used. The available material was assessed on merits, and Rule 45 restricted the Admission of Additional Evidence before the Tribunal. The statutory bar on remand by the first appellate authority and the discretionary remand power of the Tribunal did not warrant another factual inquiry after repeated opportunities had been provided.

Conclusion: No breach of Natural Justice or basis for Discretionary Remand was established, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (v): Whether interest and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: Utilisation of the disputed credit was undisputed, and no specific challenge to the interest period or computation was made. Interest on Wrongly Availed and Utilised Input Tax Credit followed under Section 50(3) read with Rule 88B(3). The penalty represented the statutory minimum under Section 73(9) after the principal tax demand was sustained.

Conclusion: The interest and penalty were sustainable, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The historical Input Tax Credit Mismatch was tested against substantive proof requirements rather than resolved mechanically from return reflection; the record supplied no basis for the claimed credit, cross-head adjustment, or further fact-finding.

Ratio Decidendi: For FY 2018-19, non-reflection of ITC in GSTR-2A cannot alone justify denial, but the claimant must prove eligibility under Section 16 and discharge the burden under Section 155; a supplier certificate under Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST is not conclusive where the asserted reporting error and tax-payment explanation remain inadequately substantiated.

Issues: Whether an interlocutory application seeking stay and priority listing could be substantively considered before the appeal completed scrutiny and was registered.

Analysis: Rule 29 permits interlocutory relief in a pending matter. As the appeal remained under scrutiny and had not been registered, consideration of the substantive relief was deferred until registration. The urgency shown warranted expeditious completion of scrutiny.

Outcome: The Registry was directed to expedite scrutiny, register the appeal if no deficiency was found, and place the interlocutory application before the Bench after registration.

Issues: Whether additional court fee under Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is payable on a first GST appeal filed before the Kerala State GST appellate authority under Section 107 of the CGST/KGST Acts.

Analysis: Section 107(6) of the CGST/KGST Acts prescribes the payments required for maintaining a GST appeal. However, the State court-fee levy separately applies to appeals filed before the Kerala State GST appellate authority. The settled position recognising the validity and applicability of the levy under Section 76 binds the State GST authorities and appellants filing appeals before them. The later notification relied upon by the appellant did not negate the existing liability to pay the applicable additional court fee.

Conclusion: Additional court fee under Section 76 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 is payable for the first GST appeal; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether limited input tax credit relief based on amended GST records could be sustained despite retrospective cancellation of the supplier's registration, in the absence of transaction-specific evidence establishing ineligibility.

Analysis: Sections 16(2), 16(2)(c) and 155 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require ITC eligibility and the claimant's burden to be assessed with reference to the facts and evidence relating to particular transactions. Retrospective cancellation of a supplier's registration, without specific material showing that the invoices were fictitious, supplies were not received, or the limited credit was otherwise inadmissible, was insufficient to displace relief granted after examination of identified GST-record amendments. Discrepancies in return figures likewise did not establish inadmissibility of the specific credit. Section 75(7) of the respective Acts also confined the demand to the grounds forming the basis of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The limited ITC relief of Rs. 76,750.20 was sustained.

Issues: Whether rejection of the application for keeping tax-recovery proceedings in abeyance solely because an appeal was pending and 20% of the disputed demand had not been paid was sustainable.

Analysis: The CBDT stay-demand guidelines require the assessing authority to apply its discretion after considering the relevant facts and merits of the request. Payment of 20% of the disputed demand cannot be imposed as a per se precondition for considering a stay application. The impugned order relied only on pendency of the appeal and non-payment of 20%, without recording any assessment of the merits or other relevant circumstances.

Conclusion: The impugned refusal to keep recovery proceedings in abeyance was unsustainable and was set aside for fresh determination.

Issues: (i) Whether the Rs. 10 crore bank credit was properly treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961; and (ii) whether the documents claimed to be newly discovered justified review of the earlier judgment.

Issue (i): Whether the Rs. 10 crore bank credit was properly treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 68 places the burden of proof on the assessee to establish the identity of the creditor, the creditor's creditworthiness, and the genuineness of the transaction. The receipt of Rs. 10 crore in the assessee's personal bank account was undisputed. The accommodation-entry explanation and the alleged onward transfer of Rs. 9.97 crore were unsupported and did not discharge that burden.

Conclusion: The Rs. 10 crore credit was validly treated as unexplained cash credit; decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the documents claimed to be newly discovered justified review of the earlier judgment.

Analysis: Review under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires proof that new and important evidence could not, despite due diligence, have been produced earlier. The sale deeds of 2007 and tribunal order of 2015 were available in public records during the original proceedings, and due diligence was not established. Reconsideration of the factual explanation on those materials would amount to an impermissible rehearing in review jurisdiction. No error apparent on the face of the record was shown.

Conclusion: The asserted new material did not establish a valid ground for review; decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The unexplained-credit addition remains legally sustainable, and review jurisdiction cannot be used to reopen settled factual findings on material that was available with due diligence.

Ratio Decidendi: A review based on newly discovered evidence is unavailable where the evidence was obtainable with due diligence in the original proceedings, and review cannot be used to rehear factual findings.

Issues: (i) Whether drawback could be denied and recovered where export proceeds were remitted by RBI under the rupee trade scheme and the goods allegedly did not reach the intended destination; (ii) Whether goods already exported were liable to confiscation under Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed.

Issue (i): Whether drawback could be denied and recovered where export proceeds were remitted by RBI under the rupee trade scheme and the goods allegedly did not reach the intended destination

Analysis: Rule 16 of the Customs and Central Excise Duties Drawback Rules, 1995 concerns erroneous or excess drawback, whereas Rule 16A provides for recovery where export sale proceeds remain unrealised within the stipulated foreign-exchange period. The export proceeds were remitted through the RBI mechanism applicable to rupee exports to Russia, and no material showed that RBI had treated the remittances as unrelated to the exports or reversed them. Customs authorities could not disregard remittances made under that mechanism without an RBI determination.

Analysis: Drawback under Section 75 of the Customs Act, 1962 is linked to completion of export. Export stands completed when the goods leave Indian territorial waters and title passes to the buyer; subsequent non-arrival at the intended foreign destination does not, by itself, negate drawback entitlement. The destination of the goods does not determine the drawback rate or eligibility.

Conclusion: Drawback was admissible and its denial and recovery were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether goods already exported were liable to confiscation under Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalties under Section 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed

Analysis: Section 2(19) of the Customs Act, 1962 defines export goods as goods which are to be taken out of India. Section 113 applies to such export goods and not to goods that have already been exported. During the relevant period, the Customs Act did not have extra-territorial jurisdiction over goods outside India. Since the goods could not be treated as liable to confiscation under Section 113, the foundational requirement for penalties under Section 114 was absent.

Conclusion: The exported goods were not liable to confiscation, and the related penalties were unsustainable in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery, confiscation basis, interest demand, and associated personal penalties lacked legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Duty drawback accrues upon completion of export when goods leave Indian territorial waters and title passes to the buyer, and is not defeated by subsequent non-arrival at the intended destination where export proceeds stand realised through the applicable RBI mechanism.

Issues: Whether continued detention of the seized machines and spare parts was lawful where no notice was issued within the period prescribed for seizure and no provisional-release order covered those goods.

Analysis: Section 110(2) mandates return of seized goods where notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within six months, subject only to a valid extension for a further period not exceeding six months. The statutory consequence remains operative notwithstanding provisional release under Section 110A. The machines and spare parts were not covered by the provisional-release order, and the notice issued on 21.02.2025 was beyond one year from their seizure on 15.09.2022.

Conclusion: Detention of the 14 machines and spare parts beyond 15.09.2023 was illegal and unsustainable. Their release was directed upon execution of a bond equivalent to their value.

Issues: Whether the penalty for alleged abetment of gold smuggling was sustainable on the statements, electronic communications, and the alleged failure to act at airport screening.

Analysis: A statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon in adjudication only after compliance with the procedure under Section 138B, including examination of the maker, a determination of admissibility, and an effective opportunity of cross-examination, unless a statutory exception applied. Those safeguards were not followed for the appellant's statement or the material witness statements. The call records and WhatsApp chats also lacked the certification required for electronic evidence. The DFMD was faulty, the appellant was not assigned screening duties as a proper officer, and no independent corroborative evidence connected the appellant with possession, handling, or dealing with the smuggled gold.

Conclusion: The statements and electronic material could not validly sustain the allegation, and the penalty under Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether a successful liquidation-auction bidder who failed to pay the balance sale consideration within the stipulated period was entitled to refund of the deposited amount despite an express forfeiture clause in the auction notice and the ceiling on earnest money deposit under Schedule I.

Analysis: Schedule I of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 limited the earnest money deposit to 10% of the reserve price but did not displace an express auction condition permitting forfeiture of the entire amount deposited upon a successful bidder's failure to pay the balance consideration. The bidder accepted the sale on an as-is-where-is basis, with prior disclosure of the title-related issue, and voluntarily deposited the stipulated amount comprising the earnest money deposit and part of the sale consideration. The asserted need for prior title deeds arose only near the payment deadline and could not justify non-payment. The triple test did not assist the bidder: repeated assurances did not establish financial capacity, and the proceedings initiated by another entity did not constitute an extraneous impediment preventing payment. The allegation of unequal treatment was raised belatedly and without supporting material.

Conclusion: The forfeiture of the entire deposited amount, including the earnest money deposit and part sale consideration, was valid, and no refund was due.

Issues: (i) Whether an OTS between a personal guarantor and the sole financial creditor can bring the corporate debtor out of liquidation; (ii) Whether forfeited earnest money deposit previously received by the financial creditor must revert to the liquidation estate after its debt is settled; (iii) Whether payment of remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate is valid; and (iv) Whether the admitted operational creditor is entitled to distribution and the personal guarantor can claim priority as a financial creditor.

Issue (i): Whether an OTS between a personal guarantor and the sole financial creditor can bring the corporate debtor out of liquidation.

Analysis: A bilateral settlement with a financial creditor does not displace the statutory liquidation process. Exit from liquidation is available only through the legally recognised routes, including a scheme under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013, or sale of the corporate debtor as a going concern. The separately ratified transfer of assets, treated as a private sale after unsuccessful auctions and on value-maximisation considerations, was left undisturbed.

Conclusion: The OTS did not terminate or alter the liquidation process, and no interference was warranted with the ratified asset transfer.

Issue (ii): Whether forfeited earnest money deposit previously received by the financial creditor must revert to the liquidation estate after its debt is settled.

Analysis: The forfeited earnest money deposit constituted an asset of the liquidation estate. Once the financial creditor accepted the OTS amount and issued an account-closure certificate, its claim stood satisfied and it retained no entitlement to the forfeited amount. The amount was consequently required to be restored to the liquidation estate for distribution under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The forfeited earnest money deposit was required to be returned to the liquidation estate and could not be retained by the financial creditor.

Issue (iii): Whether payment of remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate is valid.

Analysis: The erstwhile liquidator had undertaken claim processing, conducted auctions, pursued applications, and represented the corporate debtor in connected proceedings. The monthly remuneration had been fixed during the insolvency process and continued during liquidation; the reduced amount allowed was supported by the unchallenged computation and work performed.

Conclusion: Payment of the approved remuneration to the erstwhile liquidator from the liquidation estate was valid.

Issue (iv): Whether the admitted operational creditor is entitled to distribution and the personal guarantor can claim priority as a financial creditor.

Analysis: The operational creditor's claim had been lodged during the insolvency process, updated after liquidation commenced, admitted by the liquidator, and reported to the relevant authorities. Payment by the personal guarantor to settle the financial creditor's dues did not effect an assignment of debt or substitute the guarantor as a financial creditor. As purchaser of assets or promoter, the guarantor had no priority claim over the liquidation estate and could receive any surplus only after statutory claims were satisfied under Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: The admitted operational creditor was entitled to distribution under the statutory waterfall, and the personal guarantor had no priority entitlement as a financial creditor.

Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate, including forfeited earnest money deposit, remains available for settlement of liquidation costs and admitted stakeholder claims in accordance with the statutory waterfall.

Ratio Decidendi: A personal guarantor who settles the corporate debtor's financial debt under an OTS does not, absent assignment or substitution, become a financial creditor entitled to liquidation-estate proceeds, which must be distributed under the statutory waterfall after the financial creditor's claim is satisfied.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of service tax could be invoked for the period 2015-16.

Analysis: Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 permits invocation of the extended limitation period only where suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud or like conduct is established. The relevant receipts and taxable transactions had been disclosed through VAT returns and ST-3 returns, and the original adjudicating authority had evaluated those records while dropping the proposed demand. The material did not establish suppression of facts, wilful misstatement or fraud. Therefore, any demand could only fall within the normal limitation period. The show cause notice dated 24.12.2020 for the period 2015-16 was wholly time-barred.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the service tax demand was barred by limitation.