2001 (9) TMI 991 - SC - Companies Law

Special Court's power to grant accomplice pardon under CrPC ss. 306-307 upheld; bid to revoke pardon dismissed

The dominant issue was whether a Special Court constituted under a special statute lacks jurisdiction to tender pardon under ss. 306-307 CrPC. The SC held ... Special Court powers - nature of power of pardon u/s 306 or 307 - lack of the jurisdiction of the Special Court to grant pardon - Whether the power to grant pardon has been specifically denied to the Special Court established by the Act? Held that:- Neither section 9(2) nor section 13 nor any other provision in the Act expressly exclude the applicability of sections 306 and 307 to the proceedings before the Special Court. There is no provision in the Act which negates the power of the Special Court to grant pardon. The Special Court has power to grant pardon at any stage of the proceedings. The power under section 307 cannot be denied merely because no commitment of the case is made to the Special Court. The learned Solicitor General, in our view, rightly contends that the other statutes are only an external aid to the interpretation and to rely upon the omission of a provision which is contained in another different enactment, it has to be shown that two acts are similar which is not the position here. The scheme of two acts is substantially different as has been earlier noticed by us. It is also evident from Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes’s case [1967 (9) TMI 154 - SUPREME COURT] as well. The fact that there is no commitment to the Special Court only shows that section will apply to the extent applicable but that does not lead to exclusion of the power of the Special Court to grant pardon. Section 6 does away with the procedure of commitment of a case to the Sessions Court. It is the Special Court which is to take cognizance of the case instituted before it or transferred to it. Another deviation is provided in section 7 which stipulates that any prosecution of any offence relating to transactions in securities shall be instituted only in Special Court. Provisions of the Code not inconsistent with the Act shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court (section 9(2)). The power to tender pardon is not controlled by sub-sections (4) or (5) of section 306. These sub-sections deal with the matters pertaining to post-pardon stage. These provisions only show that where there is no commitment, sub-section (5) of section 306 will not apply. But this does not take away the power of pardon as provided in sub-section (1) of section 306. It only means that these provisions will apply to the extent applicable. It seems evident that the power to tender pardon stands alone and others are matter of procedure. If in such situation, the matters of procedure are not applicable, it would not negate the power to grant pardon. In so far as procedural matters are concerned, it would only mean that the same apply to the extent applicable. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that there was any implied repeal. It is also not possible to accept that it was intended by necessary implication that the Special Court under the Act shall not have the power to grant pardon. All powers of sections 306 to 308 to the extent applicable and can be complied are available to the Special Court under the Act. The provision of the Act and the Code can stand together. There is no inconsistency. The two statutory provisions can harmoniously operate without causing any confusion or resulting in absurd consequences and the scheme of Code can, without any difficulty, fit in the scheme of the Act. In the end, we may also note that jurisdiction to try a case is conferred on the Special Court not by committal but by the statute which has established that court. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Special Court established under the Act is a court of exclusive jurisdiction. Sections 6 and 7 confer on that court wide powers. It is a court of original criminal jurisdiction and has all the powers of such a court under the Code including those of sections 306 to 308. Thus, we are of the opinion that the learned Special Court rightly rejected the application of the appellants for revocation of the order of pardon. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The intervention applications are also dismissed. Issues Involved:1. Jurisdiction and powers of the Special Court under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992.2. Applicability of sections 306 and 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Special Court.3. Interpretation of section 9 of the Special Court Act.4. Validity of the pardon granted by the Special Court.5. The doctrine of implied repeal and its applicability.Detailed Analysis:1. Jurisdiction and Powers of the Special Court:The Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, was enacted to address large-scale irregularities in securities transactions. The Act establishes a Special Court with exclusive jurisdiction over specific offences. Section 6 of the Act provides for the establishment of the Special Court, which is manned by a sitting judge of the High Court. Section 7 stipulates that any prosecution related to securities transactions must be instituted only in the Special Court, making it a court of exclusive jurisdiction for such offences.2. Applicability of Sections 306 and 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure:Sections 306 and 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) deal with the tender of pardon to accomplices. The main question was whether these sections apply to the proceedings before the Special Court under the Act. The judgment discusses that the power to grant pardon is substantive and must be specifically conferred. Section 9(2) of the Act incorporates the provisions of the CrPC, making the Special Court a Court of Session with all associated powers, unless specifically excluded by the Act.3. Interpretation of Section 9 of the Special Court Act:Section 9(2) of the Act states that the provisions of the CrPC apply to the proceedings before the Special Court, and for these purposes, the Special Court is deemed to be a Court of Session. The judgment emphasizes that this incorporation by reference means that the Special Court has the powers of a Court of Session, including the power to grant pardon under sections 306 and 307 of the CrPC. The Special Court is not explicitly denied the power to grant pardon, and thus, it retains this power.4. Validity of the Pardon Granted by the Special Court:The Special Court granted pardon to two accused, Prabhu and Choudhury, which was later challenged on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The applications for revocation of the pardon were dismissed by the Special Court, and this dismissal was upheld by the Supreme Court. The judgment clarifies that the Special Court has the authority to grant pardon, and the orders granting pardon were within its jurisdiction.5. Doctrine of Implied Repeal:The doctrine of implied repeal suggests that a later law repeals an earlier law if the two are irreconcilably inconsistent. The judgment rejects the application of this doctrine, stating that the provisions of the Act and the CrPC can coexist harmoniously. The Act does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability of sections 306 and 307 of the CrPC. Therefore, the power to grant pardon is not negated by the Act.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the Special Court under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, is a court of exclusive jurisdiction with all the powers of a Court of Session, including the power to grant pardon under sections 306 and 307 of the CrPC. The applications for revocation of the pardon were rightly dismissed by the Special Court, and the appeals were accordingly dismissed.