Special Court's power to tender pardon under the Criminal Procedure Code upheld where not excluded by special statute

A Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 was treated as a court of original criminal jurisdiction, so it could exercise the Code of Criminal Procedure powers available to such a court unless expressly or necessarily excluded by the special statute. The power to tender pardon was held to be a substantive power, not an inherent procedural one, but sections 306 to 308 of the Code applied because the Act did not expressly bar them and its provisions could operate harmoniously with the Code. The pardon orders were therefore within jurisdiction.

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Issues: Whether the Special Court established under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 had power to tender pardon under sections 306 to 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Act created a Special Court of exclusive jurisdiction for offences connected with securities transactions and, by section 9(2), applied the provisions of the Code to proceedings before it so far as they were not inconsistent with the Act. The power to tender pardon is a substantive power, not an inherent procedural power, and section 9(4) did not itself confer that power. The Court held, however, that the Special Court is a court of original criminal jurisdiction and, following the doctrine of legislation by incorporation and the principle in A.R. Antulay, it enjoys all powers of such a court under the Code except those specifically conferred or specifically denied. There was no express exclusion of sections 306 to 308, and the absence of a special provision akin to section 8(2) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 did not imply a legislative intent to deny pardon powers. The provisions of the Act and the Code were capable of operating harmoniously, and the procedural parts of section 306 could apply only to the extent applicable.

Conclusion: The Special Court had power to grant pardon under sections 306 to 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the pardon orders were not without jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A Special Court created as a court of original criminal jurisdiction will have the powers of that court under the Code, including the power to tender pardon, unless such power is expressly or necessarily excluded by the special statute.

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