Substantive pre-emption rights remain protected in pending appeals unless retrospective intent is expressly stated or necessarily implied.

A substituted pre-emption provision did not defeat a co-sharer's vested right where the trial court had already decreed the suit and the purchase money had been deposited. The appellate court was to assess the decree on the rights existing when the suit was adjudicated, unless later legislation clearly displaced those rights. The amending Act was treated as prospective because it contained no express retrospective language or necessary implication, and it was not merely declaratory. Accordingly, the later substitution of Section 15 could not extinguish rights already crystallised and adjudicated in a pending pre-emption appeal.

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Issues: (i) Whether the substitution of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act by the Haryana Amendment Act, 1995 defeated a co-sharer's pre-emption right and pending appeal in a pre-emption suit; (ii) Whether the amending Act operated retrospectively or as a declaratory enactment so as to affect substantive rights already adjudicated by the trial court.

Issue (i): Whether the substitution of Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act by the Haryana Amendment Act, 1995 defeated a co-sharer's pre-emption right and pending appeal in a pre-emption suit.

Analysis: The pre-emption right of a co-sharer was treated as a substantive and vested right once the decree of the first court was passed and the purchase money was deposited in terms of Order 20 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellate court was required to test the correctness of the decree on the basis of the rights existing when the trial court adjudicated the suit, unless the later legislation clearly displaced those rights. The substituted provision did not, by its language, destroy rights already crystallised by the decree of the first court.

Conclusion: The pending appeal was not defeated merely because the co-sharer's statutory pre-emption right was taken away by the substituted provision during the pendency of the appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the amending Act operated retrospectively or as a declaratory enactment so as to affect substantive rights already adjudicated by the trial court.

Analysis: A statute affecting substantive rights is presumed to be prospective unless retrospective operation is expressed or necessarily implied. The substituted Section 15 contained no express words or necessary intendment making it retrospective, and it did not merely regulate procedure. It also was not a declaratory measure, because the earlier provision was neither doubtful nor incomplete. The rule of benevolent construction could not be used to re-legislate the provision or to add retrospectivity where none was provided.

Conclusion: The amending Act was prospective and non-declaratory, and it did not apply to extinguish rights that had already accrued and been adjudicated in the pre-emption suit.

Final Conclusion: The settled law in favour of preserving the decree-holder's vested pre-emption right on the date of trial was affirmed, and the later statutory change was held incapable of upsetting that adjudication in pending appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: An amending statute that affects substantive rights will not apply to pending pre-emption appeals to defeat rights already adjudicated by the trial court unless retrospectivity is stated expressly or arises by necessary implication.

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