Information utility records are not the exclusive proof of default under insolvency law, and a tribunal cannot impose that condition.

The Tribunal could not, by procedural or inherent powers, require all section 7 insolvency applications to be supported only by an information utility default record. The statutory scheme under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the application rules permits alternative modes of proving default, so section 7(3)(a) is not limited to information utility records alone and section 215 does not make submission to an information utility mandatory in every case. A direction imposing that requirement also could not operate retrospectively to pending applications absent express statutory authority. The challenged order was therefore beyond jurisdiction and inconsistent with the parent statute and delegated legislation.

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Issues: (i) Whether the National Company Law Tribunal had power, under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, to issue an order directing all new and pending section 7 applications to be accompanied only by a default record from an information utility; (ii) Whether such direction could validly operate retrospectively to affect pending and pre-existing section 7 applications; (iii) Whether section 7(3)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes information utility records the exclusive mode of proving default; (iv) Whether section 215 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes submission of financial information to the information utility mandatory for financial creditors; and (v) Whether the National Company Law Tribunal could rely on its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 to sustain the impugned direction.

Issue (i): Whether the National Company Law Tribunal had power, under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, to issue an order directing all new and pending section 7 applications to be accompanied only by a default record from an information utility.

Analysis: The power of the Tribunal to regulate its own procedure under section 424 of the Companies Act, 2013 is subject to the parent statute, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the rules made thereunder, and the principles of natural justice. A tribunal cannot, by procedural order, override substantive statutory provisions or delegated legislation. The impugned direction had no identifiable enabling source and conflicted with the statutory scheme governing proof of default.

Conclusion: The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to issue the impugned direction and the order was ultra vires.

Issue (ii): Whether such direction could validly operate retrospectively to affect pending and pre-existing section 7 applications.

Analysis: A delegated or subordinate legislative measure is prospective unless the parent statute expressly authorises retrospective operation. The impugned direction imposed a new disability on creditors with pending applications and altered the legal position after applications had already been filed. No statutory authority conferred retrospective power on the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The retrospective application of the impugned direction was invalid.

Issue (iii): Whether section 7(3)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes information utility records the exclusive mode of proving default.

Analysis: Section 7(3)(a) is disjunctive and recognises three alternative categories: a record of default with the information utility, such other record, or evidence of default as may be specified. Read with the application rules, the CIRP Regulations and the Supreme Court authorities referred to, the statutory scheme permits proof of default by multiple modes and does not confine proof to information utility records alone.

Conclusion: Information utility records are not the exclusive mode of proof under section 7(3)(a).

Issue (iv): Whether section 215 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 makes submission of financial information to the information utility mandatory for financial creditors.

Analysis: The structure and language of section 215, read harmoniously with section 7, the application rules and the regulations, indicate that submission to the information utility is not mandatory in every case. The statutory framework contemplates other permissible evidentiary sources for establishing financial debt and default.

Conclusion: Section 215 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is not mandatory in the sense asserted by the impugned order.

Issue (v): Whether the National Company Law Tribunal could rely on its inherent powers under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 to sustain the impugned direction.

Analysis: Inherent powers are ancillary and cannot be used to defeat the parent statute or override rules and regulations made under it. A tribunal's inherent powers remain subordinate to the statutory scheme and cannot be invoked to impose a new mandatory condition inconsistent with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Conclusion: Rule 11 could not justify the impugned direction.

Final Conclusion: The challenged order was held to be beyond jurisdiction, inconsistent with the statutory framework governing proof of default under the insolvency law regime, and incapable of being sustained either prospectively or retrospectively.

Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal may regulate only its procedure and cannot, through inherent or administrative directions, impose conditions that are inconsistent with the parent statute, the delegated legislation made under it, or the statutory scheme that allows alternative modes of proving default.

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