Minimum qualifying service under judicial pension law cannot be rewritten to extend enhanced pension beyond the statutory scheme.

The pension scheme for High Court Judges requires seven completed years of service for eligibility under paragraph 2 of Part I of the First Schedule, while paragraph 9 provides the fixed pension for judges who do not meet that condition. The text states that this minimum qualifying service is part of the statutory scheme and cannot be reduced by judicial reading down to extend enhanced pension to a judge with less than seven years' service. It also notes that the additional one month and thirteen days of service was retained only for gratuity and family pension, because the sanction adding that period was expressly subject to the final decision and did not alter pension entitlement.

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Issues: (i) whether the minimum qualifying service condition in paragraph 2 of Part I of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 could be read down so as to reduce the prescribed period of seven years and grant enhanced pension to a Judge who had not completed seven years of service; and (ii) whether the addition of one month and thirteen days to the Judge's service could be sustained for the limited purpose of gratuity and family pension.

Issue (i): whether the minimum qualifying service condition in paragraph 2 of Part I of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 could be read down so as to reduce the prescribed period of seven years and grant enhanced pension to a Judge who had not completed seven years of service.

Analysis: The pension scheme under Part I of the First Schedule prescribed seven completed years of service as a condition of eligibility for pension under paragraph 2, while paragraph 9 provided a fixed pension for Judges who were not otherwise eligible. The Court held that the prescribed minimum service requirement formed part of the scheme itself and was a qualification for eligibility, not a discriminatory classification. It further held that courts cannot add words to a statute, rewrite the legislative scheme, or confer benefits on persons not covered by the provision merely to avoid perceived inequality. The High Court's attempt to substitute a different minimum qualifying period amounted to rewriting the statute and exceeded judicial power.

Conclusion: The reading down adopted by the High Court was impermissible, and the respondent was not entitled to enhanced pension under paragraph 2; pension had to be determined under paragraph 9.

Issue (ii): whether the addition of one month and thirteen days to the Judge's service could be sustained for the limited purpose of gratuity and family pension.

Analysis: The Court noted that the presidential sanction adding the shortfall in service was expressly made subject to the final decision in the appeal. Since the addition did not affect the pension payable, its practical relevance remained only for gratuity and family pension. In the circumstances, and without reopening the earlier rejection on merits, the Court considered it to retain the addition for those limited purposes alone.

Conclusion: The addition of service was allowed to stand only for calculating gratuity and family pension, not for pension.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in setting aside the High Court's enhancement of pension, while preserving the limited benefit of the added service for gratuity and family pension.

Ratio Decidendi: A court cannot rewrite an unambiguous pension statute by lowering the statutory minimum qualifying service to extend pensionary benefits; the prescribed minimum service requirement is a condition of eligibility, not an arbitrary classification.

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