Statutory powers of suspension must be express; a board cannot imply authority where the special Act exhausts dismissal and suspension.

A special statute that exhaustively regulates dismissal and suspension does not permit a board to suspend its secretary unless that power is expressly provided. Sections 71 and 90 of the U.P. District Boards Act were construed strictly: section 71 required dismissal by special resolution subject to the appeal process, while section 90 covered only suspension as punishment or suspension in cases involving sanction by another authority. Because the dismissal here depended on an appeal, not prior sanction, the suspension resolution fell outside the statutory scheme. Section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act could not enlarge those powers, and the suspension was ultra vires and invalid.

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Issues: Whether the Board had power under sections 71 and 90 of the U.P. District Boards Act, X of 1922 to suspend its secretary after passing a resolution for his dismissal and pending the disposal of his appeal to the Government.

Analysis: The statutory scheme conferred on the Board only the powers expressly provided by sections 71 and 90. Section 71, as amended, required a special resolution for dismissal and postponed its operation until the appeal period expired or the Government decided the appeal. Section 90 dealt with suspension as punishment and suspension pending inquiry or pending orders where dismissal was subject to the sanction of another authority. The case before the Court did not fall within that class, because dismissal under section 71 depended on an appeal and not on prior governmental sanction. The Court held that section 16 of the U.P. General Clauses Act of 1904 could not be used to enlarge the Board's powers where the special Act showed a different intention, and a court could not fill a legislative omission by liberal construction.

Conclusion: The Board had no power to pass the suspension resolution, which was therefore ultra vires and invalid.

Final Conclusion: The dismissal resolution could not be supported by the accompanying suspension order, and the decree in favour of the plaintiff had to be restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute exhaustively defines the powers of dismissal and suspension, those powers cannot be enlarged by implication or by resort to a general clauses statute, and a suspension not authorised by the express statutory scheme is ultra vires.

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