Territorial jurisdiction over sand ramps controls competence, while valid clarificatory orders may implement the existing regulatory scheme.

Under a district-wise regulatory scheme for sand quarrying, the competent authority to permit new ramps is the Assistant Director having territorial jurisdiction over the ramp location, so permission for ramps in another district was ultra vires and void. A Government clarificatory memo issued to identify the correct competent authority was valid under the Rules and Article 166 because it merely implemented the existing framework and did not create new policy or disturb any vested right arising from a void order. The Director could also regulate transportation through unauthorized ramps under the power to control quarrying operations, including transportation integral to quarrying. An earlier unreasoned admission-stage order was treated as sub silentio and not binding precedent.

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Issues: (i) whether the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had jurisdiction to permit the Society to use additional ramps situated in Krishna District under Rule 9-N; (ii) whether the Government's clarificatory memo under Rule 9-K(3) and the consequential restraint on use of the additional ramps were within jurisdiction and valid under Article 166; (iii) whether the Director of Mines and Geology could regulate transportation of sand through the additional ramps under Rule 11(2)(c); and (iv) whether the earlier order relied on by the Society constituted a binding precedent.

Issue (i): whether the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had jurisdiction to permit the Society to use additional ramps situated in Krishna District under Rule 9-N.

Analysis: Rule 4(a) defines the Assistant Director as the Assistant Director in charge of the District. Rule 9-I(2) and Rule 9-N must be read with that definition. The power under Rule 9-N is to permit opening of new ramps or paths, and the competent authority is the Assistant Director having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the ramp is to be opened. Existing ramps in another District, especially ramps already notified for other reaches, are not covered by a construction that treats the Assistant Director who executed the lease as competent in all situations. A literal reading preserves the district-wise scheme of the Rules and avoids rendering Rule 4(a) redundant.

Conclusion: The Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur had no jurisdiction to grant permission for the additional ramps in Krishna District; the impugned permission was without authority and was void.

Issue (ii): whether the Government's clarificatory memo under Rule 9-K(3) and the consequential restraint on use of the additional ramps were within jurisdiction and valid under Article 166.

Analysis: Rule 9-K(3) authorises the Government to issue orders or clarifications for implementation of the Rules in matters not specifically mentioned. The memo merely clarified which Assistant Director was competent under Rule 9-N and did not create a new policy. Article 166 and the Business Rules are directory, and substantial compliance was shown by ministerial approval. The clarification was not retrospective in substance, because it operated from the date of issuance and did not divest any validly vested right arising from the earlier void permission. The Director's consequential restraint also did not suffer from illegality on this ground.

Conclusion: The clarificatory memo and the consequential restraint were valid and were not ultra vires Rule 9-K(3) or Article 166.

Issue (iii): whether the Director of Mines and Geology could regulate transportation of sand through the additional ramps under Rule 11(2)(c).

Analysis: Rule 11(2)(c) empowers the Director to close quarries, prohibit quarrying operations, reserve land, and regulate quarrying operations according to law. Quarrying operations include extraction and transportation of sand, because transportation through ramps is integral to lawful quarrying. The power to regulate quarrying therefore extends to preventing use of unauthorized ramps and to ensuring compliance with Rule 9-N. The Director's order was supported by reasons and was not a mere mechanical act at the Government's dictation.

Conclusion: The Director had power under Rule 11(2)(c) to prevent transportation of sand through the additional ramps and the order was not issued under dictation.

Issue (iv): whether the earlier order relied on by the Society constituted a binding precedent.

Analysis: The earlier order was passed at the admission stage without analysis of Rule 4(a) or a reasoned construction of Rule 9-N. A conclusion reached without discussion of the crucial statutory provisions and without reasons does not lay down binding law. It was therefore treated as an order rendered sub silentio and not as a precedent binding on the Court.

Conclusion: The earlier order did not constitute a binding precedent.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the permission granted for use of the additional ramps succeeded, while the challenges to the Government's clarificatory memo and the Director's consequential order failed; the batch was therefore disposed of with only the writ petition relating to the original grant of additional ramps being allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under a district-wise statutory scheme, the authority competent to permit opening or use of ramps is the Assistant Director having territorial jurisdiction over the ramp location, and an administrative clarification issued to enforce that statutory allocation of power is valid when it merely implements the Rules and does not create a new policy.

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