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Issues: (i) Whether the expression "any new member society" in the first proviso to Section 27(3) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 applied only to societies admitted after the amendment or also to societies already admitted before the amendment. (ii) Whether the Maharashtra Ordinance No. X of 2001 was invalid on the ground of legislative malice or impermissible use of the ordinance-making power.
Issue (i): Whether the expression "any new member society" in the first proviso to Section 27(3) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 applied only to societies admitted after the amendment or also to societies already admitted before the amendment.
Analysis: The expression had to be construed according to its plain, ordinary and grammatical meaning. On that construction, the word "new" qualified societies that became member societies after the amendment and did not include societies already admitted as members of the federal society before the commencement of the amendment. The Court held that where the statutory language is clear, no external aid is required, and the proviso could not be read in a manner that would exclude existing member societies from voting rights already accrued to them prior to the amendment.
Conclusion: The restriction in the first proviso applied only to societies that became member societies after 23 August 2000, and not to societies that had already become members earlier.
Issue (ii): Whether the Maharashtra Ordinance No. X of 2001 was invalid on the ground of legislative malice or impermissible use of the ordinance-making power.
Analysis: The ordinance-making power under Article 213 is a legislative power exercisable when the constitutional conditions are satisfied. The motive of the legislature or executive in promulgating legislation is not ordinarily justiciable, and legislative malice was held to be beyond judicial scrutiny in the absence of constitutional invalidity. The Ordinance was treated as clarificatory, retrospectively operative, and consistent with the amended scheme, and no constitutional infirmity was established.
Conclusion: The Ordinance was upheld and the plea of legislative malice was rejected.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the proviso was construed in favour of existing member societies and the later Ordinance removed any residual doubt; the High Court's view was sustained.
Ratio Decidendi: When the language of a statutory proviso is clear, courts must give it its ordinary meaning and cannot rely on extrinsic material to alter that meaning; legislative motive in promulgating an ordinance is not a ground of invalidity absent constitutional infirmity.