Consent orders are not binding precedent when they conflict with statute; mandamus cannot compel unauthorized encroachment relief.

A consent direction expressly stated not to be a precedent could not be treated as binding authority, because only the ratio decidendi of a decided question has precedential value. A direction made without full consideration of the controlling statute, or without argument on the precise issue, cannot override the governing legal framework. The municipal scheme prohibiting encroachment on public streets and empowering removal of unauthorized stalls also barred any writ compelling rehabilitation or continuation of an unlawful occupation. The Court therefore held that mandamus could not be used to regularize an encroachment contrary to statute, and the earlier direction could not support the relief granted.

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Issues: (i) Whether a consent direction made in an earlier matter, expressly stated not to be a precedent, could be treated as binding authority for requiring the municipal authorities to construct or provide a stall to a pavement squatter. (ii) Whether, in the face of the statutory prohibition on encroachment and the municipal power to remove such encroachment, the High Court could issue a writ or direction restraining eviction and compelling rehabilitation contrary to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and the final decree inter partes.

Issue (i): Whether a consent direction made in an earlier matter, expressly stated not to be a precedent, could be treated as binding authority for requiring the municipal authorities to construct or provide a stall to a pavement squatter.

Analysis: A decision made by consent does not ordinarily determine rights as a contested adjudication does, and a statement expressly reserving that it shall not operate as a precedent cannot be elevated into binding law. Only the ratio decidendi of a decided question has precedential value. Pronouncements made without argument, without examination of the controlling statute, and without consideration of the precise legal point do not bind later courts and may pass sub silentio or be regarded as per incuriam if rendered in ignorance of the statute.

Conclusion: The earlier consent direction could not be treated as a binding precedent or as a legal basis for the relief granted by the High Court.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the face of the statutory prohibition on encroachment and the municipal power to remove such encroachment, the High Court could issue a writ or direction restraining eviction and compelling rehabilitation contrary to the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and the final decree inter partes.

Analysis: The statutory scheme prohibited unauthorized booths, stalls, and similar structures on public streets and conferred power on the municipal authority to remove encroachments from public places meant for pedestrians. The respondent's rights had also crystallized under the final decree in the suit, which governed the parties. In that setting, a mandamus could not be issued to compel an unlawful occupation or to override the municipal powers recognized by the Act. The broader considerations of livelihood and rehabilitation did not displace the statutory framework in the proceedings before the Court.

Conclusion: The High Court's direction was unsustainable and had to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the writ petition was dismissed, and the municipal authorities were required to act consistently with the final civil decree governing the parties.

Ratio Decidendi: A consent order, especially one expressly declared not to be a precedent, cannot override the governing statute or create a binding rule for future cases; a writ of mandamus cannot compel a municipal authority to regularize or continue an unauthorized encroachment contrary to express statutory prohibition and removal powers.

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