Right to choose medium of instruction limits State compulsion in recognised schools and protects parental choice.

The right to choose the medium of instruction at the primary level was treated as a fundamental right flowing from the right to education, freedom of speech and expression, and the rights of parents, citizens, and educational institutions to receive and impart knowledge through a chosen medium. The State may regulate educational standards, curriculum, and affiliation, but it cannot compel recognised schools or parents to adopt only the mother tongue or regional language as the medium of instruction. Policy provisions that cross from regulation into compulsion were held invalid to that extent, while the broader language policy was sustained where it did not infringe constitutional rights.

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Issues: (i) Whether the right to choose the medium of instruction at the primary level is a fundamental right under the Constitution; (ii) Whether the State can compel students and recognised educational institutions to adopt mother tongue or the regional language as the medium of instruction.

Issue (i): Whether the right to choose the medium of instruction at the primary level is a fundamental right under the Constitution.

Analysis: The Court held that the right to education, read with freedom of speech and expression, carries with it the right to receive and impart knowledge through a medium of one's choice. It further held that the freedom to carry on an occupation and the rights of religious denominations and linguistic or religious minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice include the choice of medium of instruction. The parental role in deciding the child's education was treated as integral to this freedom, and the Court also relied on the constitutional protection against denial of admission on the ground of language.

Conclusion: The right to choose the medium of instruction is a fundamental right of the child, the parent, the citizen, and educational institutions, subject to lawful regulation that does not destroy the right.

Issue (ii): Whether the State can compel students and recognised educational institutions to adopt mother tongue or the regional language as the medium of instruction.

Analysis: The Court distinguished between a permissible regulation and an impermissible restriction. It held that while the State may frame educational policy and regulate standards, curriculum, affiliation, and other matters advancing educational excellence, it cannot compel recognised schools or parents to accept a particular medium of instruction. The impugned clauses were found to go beyond regulation and to operate as a restriction on constitutional rights, and Article 350-A was held to impose an obligation on the State in favour of linguistic minorities rather than a power to compel all students to study only in mother tongue or Kannada.

Conclusion: The State cannot compel the medium of instruction to be only mother tongue or regional language in recognised schools other than Government or aided schools to the extent protected by the decision; the impugned clauses were invalid insofar as they imposed such compulsion.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded in part, the compulsory features of the policy were struck down for recognised schools to the extent they infringed constitutional rights, while the remaining language policy was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A State educational policy is valid only so long as it remains regulatory and does not compel a medium of instruction in a manner that infringes the constitutional right to choose the medium of instruction.

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