2011 (9) TMI 951 - SC - Indian Laws

Special Judge's refusal to accept closure report under Section 169 CrPC is binding, not casual remarks about challan proceedings

Arun Kumar Aggarwal Versus State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

The SC held that a Special Judge's order refusing to accept a closure report under Section 169 CrPC constituted the ratio decidendi, while remarks about ... Legality and jurisdiction of the Special Judge's Order - Sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) - closure report is filed under Section 169 of the CrPC - meaning of expression “Direction” - Concept of 'Obiter dicta' Or “Dicta” - Whether the Special Judge's Order constituted a direction to the sanctioning authority to prosecute the accused or was merely an observation? HELD THAT:- It is well settled that obiter dictum is a mere observation or remark made by the court by way of aside while deciding the actual issue before it. The mere casual statement or observation which is not relevant, pertinent or essential to decide the issue in hand does not form the part of the judgment of the Court and have no authoritative value. The expression of the personal view or opinion of the Judge is just a casual remark made whilst deviating from answering the actual issues pending before the Court. These casual remarks are considered or treated as beyond the ambit of the authoritative or operative part of the judgment. we are of the opinion that the refusal of the learned Special Judge, vide its Order dated 26.4.2005, to accept the final closure report submitted by Lokayukta Police is the only ratio decidendi of the Order. The other part of the Order which deals with the initiation of Challan proceedings cannot be treated as the direction issued by the learned Special Judge. The relevant portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge dealing with Challan Proceeding reads as . The wordings of this Order clearly suggest that it is not in the nature of the command or authoritative instruction. This Order is also not specific or clear in order to direct or address any authority or body to perform any act or duty. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, this Order can be considered or treated as the direction issued by the learned Special Judge. The wholistic reading of this Order leads to only one conclusion, that is, it is in the nature of ‘Obiter Dictum’ or mere passing remark made by the learned Special Judge, which only amounts to expression of his personal view. Therefore, this portion of the Order dealing with Challan proceeding, is neither relevant, pertinent nor essential, while deciding the actual issues which were before the learned Special Judge and hence, cannot be treated as the part of the Judgment of the learned Special Judge. Thus, we are of the opinion that, the portion of the Order of the learned Special Judge which deals with the Challan proceedings is a mere observation or remark made by way of aside. In view of this, the High Court had grossly erred in considering and treating this mere observation of the learned Special Judge as the direction of the Court. Therefore, there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with the Order of the learned Special Judge. In the result, the appeals are allowed. Issues Involved:1. Legality and jurisdiction of the Special Judge's Order.2. Nature of the Special Judge's Order - whether it is a direction or an observation.3. High Court's interpretation of the Special Judge's Order.4. Sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA).Detailed Analysis:1. Legality and Jurisdiction of the Special Judge's Order:The appeals challenge the High Court's decision to quash the Special Judge's Order dated 26.4.2005, which had rejected the closure report submitted by the Lokayukta Police and sought sanction for prosecution. The High Court found the Special Judge's Order illegal and without jurisdiction, referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra that a Magistrate cannot direct the police to change their opinion when a closure report is filed under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C.2. Nature of the Special Judge's Order - Whether it is a Direction or an Observation:The central issue is whether the Special Judge's Order constituted a direction to the sanctioning authority to prosecute the accused or was merely an observation. The Supreme Court examined the nature and scope of the term 'direction' and distinguished it from 'sanction,' emphasizing that a direction is a command or authoritative instruction, whereas a sanction is a permission. The Court cited various precedents, including Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam and Rajinder Nath v. CIT, to elucidate the meaning of 'direction.'3. High Court's Interpretation of the Special Judge's Order:The High Court treated the Special Judge's remarks about seeking sanction for prosecution as a direction, which it deemed illegal and without jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court found that the operative portion of the Special Judge's Order, which suggested seeking sanction, was not a command or authoritative instruction. Instead, it was an obiter dictum or mere observation, not binding or enforceable. The Court cited definitions and interpretations of obiter dicta from various legal dictionaries and precedents, such as Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur and State of Haryana v. Ranbir, to support this conclusion.4. Sanction for Prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA):The necessity of obtaining government sanction under Section 19 of the PCA for prosecuting government servants was a crucial aspect of the case. The Supreme Court reiterated that the sanctioning authority must apply its independent mind and not be influenced by external pressures, as established in Mansukh Lal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat. The Court found that the Special Judge's Order did not direct the sanctioning authority but merely suggested seeking sanction, which did not amount to a legal directive.Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the Special Judge's Order was not a direction but an observation, and the High Court had erred in treating it as a directive. Therefore, the appeals were allowed, the High Court's decision was set aside, and the Special Judge's Order was restored. Respondents were directed to comply with the Trial Court's Order within two months.