Right to livelihood under Article 21 and reasonable eviction powers shape treatment of pavement dwellers.

Article 21 was interpreted to include the means of livelihood, so eviction that destroys survival can implicate the right to life. Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 was read as a discretionary enabling power, not a mandatory rule for eviction without notice, and its exercise must satisfy fair, just and reasonable procedure with natural justice ordinarily applying unless urgency justifies departure. Occupation of footpaths, pavements and other public places was treated as unauthorised, but limited protective directions were recognised for affected dwellers in line with recorded assurances, including phased eviction, alternative accommodation where promised, and postponement of removal until after the monsoon.

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Issues: (i) whether the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and whether eviction from slums and pavements would infringe that right; (ii) whether Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which permits removal of encroachments without notice, is constitutionally valid and can be read as an enabling provision exercisable reasonably; (iii) whether persons occupying footpaths, pavements and an accessory road have any right to continue such occupation, and what protective directions, if any, should follow.

Issue (i): whether the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and whether eviction from slums and pavements would infringe that right.

Analysis: The right to life was held to be more than mere animal existence and to include the means of living. The deprivation of livelihood was treated as a deprivation of life where eviction would in fact destroy the means by which the affected persons survived. The Directive Principles, especially the guarantees of adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, were used to illuminate the content of Article 21.

Conclusion: Yes. The right to life includes the right to livelihood, and eviction that deprives persons of their livelihood falls within Article 21.

Issue (ii): whether Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which permits removal of encroachments without notice, is constitutionally valid and can be read as an enabling provision exercisable reasonably.

Analysis: The provision was construed as discretionary and not as a mandatory command to remove encroachments without notice in every case. The Court held that the procedure under Article 21 must be fair, just and reasonable, and that the principles of natural justice ordinarily apply unless excluded by urgency or similar necessity. On that construction, the provision was upheld as valid, while recognising that the power must be exercised reasonably and sparingly where notice is dispensed with.

Conclusion: Yes. Section 314 is valid, but it is only an enabling power and must be exercised reasonably in accordance with fair procedure.

Issue (iii): whether persons occupying footpaths, pavements and an accessory road have any right to continue such occupation, and what protective directions, if any, should follow.

Analysis: No person was held to have a right to encroach upon public footpaths, pavements or other public places reserved for public use. The occupation of pavements for dwelling was treated as unauthorised. At the same time, the Court gave effect to the State's assurances concerning censused pavement dwellers and slum dwellers, and directed phased eviction, alternative pitches or accommodation where promised, and postponement of removals until after the monsoon.

Conclusion: No right to occupy public footpaths or pavements was recognised, but limited protective relief was granted in accordance with the recorded assurances and the directions issued.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded only in part: the challenged statutory scheme was upheld, the claim to occupy public pavements was rejected, but the petitioners obtained constitutional protection in the form of delayed eviction and resettlement-related directions for affected dwellers.

Ratio Decidendi: The right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, but the deprivation of that right may be lawful if effected by a fair and reasonable procedure; a statute authorising removal of encroachments is valid if construed as conferring a discretionary power that must be exercised consistently with natural justice and constitutional reasonableness.

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