Natural justice and reasonable likelihood of bias in selection disputes: split views on notice, impleadment, and curative proceedings.

The article examines whether non-impleadment of identifiable selected candidates and denial of notice before the Collector breached audi alteram partem, and whether later revision and writ proceedings could cure that defect. It also considers whether participation of relatives of the selection committee created a reasonable likelihood of bias and vitiated the selection. The discussion notes competing views: one treats the original denial of hearing as a complete procedural breach not cured by later limited proceedings, while the other considers subsequent hearings sufficient to remove prejudice. On bias, the article applies the principle that actual proof is unnecessary where circumstances show a real danger of bias.

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Issues: (i) whether the non-impleadment of the selected candidates and denial of notice before the Collector violated audi alteram partem; (ii) whether the alleged breach of natural justice was cured by the revisional proceedings and the writ proceedings; (iii) whether the participation of relatives of the selection committee vitiated the selection on the ground of reasonable likelihood of bias.

Issue (i): whether the non-impleadment of the selected candidates and denial of notice before the Collector violated audi alteram partem.

Analysis: The record shows that the selected candidates were specifically identifiable and that adverse civil consequences followed from the Collector's order. One view in the judgment treats the failure to implead and hear them at the original stage as a complete denial of opportunity in breach of the express procedural framework, while the other view regards the subsequent opportunity before the revisional authority and the High Court as sufficient on the facts because no prejudice was shown. The issue turns on the scope of the statutory appellate and revisional process and on whether the facts were disputed or admitted.

Conclusion: The judges took differing views on this issue.

Issue (ii): whether the alleged breach of natural justice was cured by the revisional proceedings and the writ proceedings.

Analysis: The revision under the applicable rules was confined to questions of law, and one view holds that such a limited revisional jurisdiction could not cure a total denial of notice and hearing before the Collector. The contrary view treats the later proceedings, including inspection of records and hearing before the revisional and writ courts, as adequate to dispel prejudice and make remand unnecessary. The answer depends on whether the later forum had an amplitude sufficient to redress the original defect.

Conclusion: The judges took differing views on this issue.

Issue (iii): whether the participation of relatives of the selection committee vitiated the selection on the ground of reasonable likelihood of bias.

Analysis: The judgment discusses the doctrine that justice must be seen to be done and that actual proof of bias is unnecessary where there is a reasonable likelihood or real danger of bias. One view holds that the admitted relationships, the select committee's role in interviewing and awarding marks, and the pattern of marks awarded were sufficient to vitiate the selection. The other view emphasises the recusal resolution, the absence of denial of relationship, and the closeness of the ties as showing bias and no reason to interfere.

Conclusion: The judges took differing views on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The judgment records no single operative result because the opinions diverge on the validity of the appointments, the effect of non-impleadment, and the curing of natural justice defects.

Ratio Decidendi: No single ratio can be identified because the case ended in a split view without a common majority rule.

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