1980 (9) TMI 280 - SC - Indian Laws

Court finds supersession order invalid for lack of natural justice, declines to reinstate Committee due to term expiry.

SL. KAPOOR Versus JAGMOHAN & ORS.

The court held that the order of supersession dated February 27, 1980, was vitiated by the failure to observe the principles of natural justice. However, ... - Issues Involved:1. Whether the rule of Audi Alteram Partem is applicable under Section 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act.2. Whether the New Delhi Municipal Committee was given an opportunity to make its representation against the allegations leading to its supersession.3. Whether the failure to observe natural justice vitiates the order of supersession.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Applicability of Audi Alteram Partem:The court analyzed whether the rule of Audi Alteram Partem (the right to be heard) is applicable under Section 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act. The court referred to various sections of the Punjab Municipal Act, emphasizing the powers, duties, and rights of the Municipal Committee and its members. The court noted that the old distinction between judicial and administrative acts has diminished, and even administrative orders that involve civil consequences must adhere to the principles of natural justice. The court cited precedents such as State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi and Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, which established that civil consequences cover a broad range of impacts on a citizen's civil life. The court concluded that the status, office, rights, and responsibilities of the Municipal Committee create sufficient interest, and their loss due to supersession entails civil consequences, thus justifying the application of natural justice principles.2. Opportunity to Make Representation:The court examined whether the New Delhi Municipal Committee was given an opportunity to make its representation against the allegations leading to its supersession. The court reviewed the four grounds mentioned in the order of supersession:- First Ground (Mobilisation Advance): The court found that the correspondence regarding the mobilisation advance was between the Government of India and the New Delhi Municipal Committee, not the Delhi Administration, which was the competent authority. There was no indication of any proposed action under Section 238, and the Committee was not put on notice.- Second Ground (Re-employment of B. K. Mittal): The court noted that a letter from the Delhi Administration reprimanded the Committee but did not provide an opportunity for the Committee to offer its explanation or indicate any further action.- Third Ground (Minor Penalty for V. P. Sangal): The High Court had already found that the Committee had no opportunity to meet this allegation, and the Supreme Court did not need to reconsider this point.- Fourth Ground (Creation of Posts): The court found that the correspondence between the Committee and the Delhi Administration regarding the creation of posts did not reveal any proposed action against the Committee.The court concluded that the Committee was never put on notice of any proposed action under Section 238, and no opportunity was given to explain any fact or circumstance based on the proposed action.3. Impact of Failure to Observe Natural Justice:The court addressed the question of whether the failure to observe natural justice matters if the observance would have made no difference. The court emphasized that the non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudicial and that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done. The court rejected the argument that the failure to observe natural justice could be excused if the result would have been the same. The court cited various cases, including Ridge v. Baldwin and Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Cooperative Society v. Secretary, to support its view that the denial of natural justice cannot be justified by the inevitability of the outcome.Conclusion:The court held that the order of supersession dated February 27, 1980, was vitiated by the failure to observe the principles of natural justice. However, given that the term of the Committee was due to expire shortly, the court did not quash the notification or reinstate the Committee. Instead, the court acknowledged the invalidity of the notification and allowed the appeal, granting costs to the appellant.