Arbitration clause and impartiality rules prevent a decision-maker from arbitrating disputes over his own acts or decisions.

An arbitration clause may be valid even if it does not use the word "arbitration", provided it shows an intention to refer present or future disputes to a private tribunal in writing and to be bound by its decision. However, a contractual reference to a named decision-maker cannot be enforced where that person is asked to adjudicate upon his own acts or decisions. Impartiality is an essential attribute of arbitration, and the rule against a person being a judge in his own cause applies where real or apparent bias exists. In that situation, the defect goes to jurisdiction and cannot be cured by waiver or estoppel.

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Issues: (i) whether clause 60 of the contract constituted an arbitration agreement; (ii) whether the Managing Director, whose own decision and conduct were in issue, could act as arbitrator in view of bias and the rule against a judge deciding his own cause.

Issue (i): whether clause 60 of the contract constituted an arbitration agreement.

Analysis: An arbitration agreement need not use the word "arbitration" if the clause discloses the essential elements of a reference of present or future disputes to a private tribunal in writing, with an intention to be bound by its decision. On the facts, the clause was treated as falling within that broad description, but that was not sufficient by itself to compel a reference if the named decision-maker was otherwise disqualified.

Conclusion: Clause 60 was not available to sustain a reference to the Managing Director as arbitrator in the circumstances of the case.

Issue (ii): whether the Managing Director, whose own decision and conduct were in issue, could act as arbitrator in view of bias and the rule against a judge deciding his own cause.

Analysis: An arbitrator must be impartial, and a person cannot be a judge in his own cause. Where the decision-maker's own action is directly under challenge, the situation gives rise to real and apparent bias and goes to the root of jurisdiction. In such a case, waiver or estoppel does not cure the defect, and the authority's action is a nullity.

Conclusion: The Managing Director was disqualified from acting as arbitrator because of bias and lack of jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the arbitration reference failed, and the refusal to refer the dispute to the Managing Director was upheld on the ground that the decision-maker was not impartial.

Ratio Decidendi: A contractual reference to a named decision-maker cannot be enforced as an arbitration reference where that person is called upon to adjudicate upon his own acts or decisions, because impartiality is an essential attribute of arbitration and bias vitiates jurisdiction.

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