Government employee's compulsory retirement order invalid due to biased inquiring officer and denial of natural justice

The SC held that a government employee's compulsory retirement order was invalid due to bias of the inquiring officer who had a history of animosity with the appellant. The inquiry violated natural justice principles as the officer was not properly authorized to conduct the inquiry and the appellant was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself, particularly regarding access to relevant files from 1951 proceedings that were relied upon in the charges. The SC applied the test of real likelihood of bias and reasonable suspicion, finding both present. The HC judgment was set aside and the trial court's decree favoring the appellant was restored, entitling him to arrears and damages.

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Issues Involved
1. Bias of the inquiring officer.
2. Authority of the inquiring officer to conduct the inquiry.
3. Denial of reasonable opportunity to defend.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

1. Bias of the Inquiring Officer
The appellant argued that the inquiring officer, Manvi, was biased against him. The trial court found that Manvi had a history of animosity towards the appellant, citing several instances where Manvi had taken disciplinary actions against the appellant, including memos and threats of disciplinary action. The High Court, however, found no material evidence to show bias, stating that complaints against the appellant were from various officers and not solely from Manvi. The Supreme Court, however, opined that the cumulative effect of the circumstances was sufficient to create a "real likelihood" of bias. It emphasized that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, and that the impression of bias in the mind of a reasonable person was enough to quash the decision.

2. Authority of the Inquiring Officer to Conduct the Inquiry
The appellant contended that Manvi had no authority to conduct the inquiry. Initially, Manvi, as Director-in-charge, appointed Siddiqui as the inquiring officer. Later, the Government directed that the Director himself should conduct the inquiry, but Manvi continued the inquiry even after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge. The trial court held that Manvi had no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge. The High Court, however, found that the Government had authorized the Director-in-charge to conduct the inquiry and that the Director had authorized the Deputy Director to continue the inquiry. The Supreme Court concluded that even if Manvi was initially authorized, his authority ended when he ceased to be the Director-in-charge. The subsequent Government order allowing Manvi to continue the inquiry was not retrospective and thus did not validate his actions.

3. Denial of Reasonable Opportunity to Defend
The appellant argued that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as he was denied access to several files and documents. The trial court agreed, stating that the appellant was not given the facility to inspect relevant files. The High Court found that the appellant was not denied reasonable opportunity as he was not denied access to any file that had a material bearing on his defense. The Supreme Court, however, found that the refusal to allow the appellant to inspect files from 1951, which were relied upon by the inquiring officer to substantiate charges, was unjustified. It was unreasonable to assume that the appellant would remember the details of the proceedings from 1951 during the inquiry.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restored the decree passed by the trial court, which declared the compulsory retirement order null and void and entitled the appellant to arrears of salary. The Supreme Court made no order as to costs.

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