1973 (9) TMI 101 - SC - Indian Laws

Government employee's compulsory retirement order invalid due to biased inquiring officer and denial of natural justice

S. PARTHASARATHI Versus STATE OF A.P.

The SC held that a government employee's compulsory retirement order was invalid due to bias of the inquiring officer who had a history of animosity with ... Bias of the inquiring officer - history of animosity towards the appellant - No reasonable opportunity to defend - Validity of order of the Government compulsorily retiring him from service - Entitlement to arrears of salary and damages - tests of 'real likelihood' and 'reasonable suspicion' - whether the inquiring officer was authorised to conduct the enquiry - HELD THAT:- As there was real likelihood of bias in the sense explained above, think that the inquiry and the orders based on the inquiry were bad. The decision of this Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh [1957 (9) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT], makes it clear that if an inquiring officer adopts a procedure which is contrary to the rules of natural justice, the ultimate decision based on his report of inquiry is liable to be quashed. We see no reason for not applying the same principle here as we find that the inquiring officer was biased. No doubt, the Government could have changed that order. But in this case when it changed the order and authorized Manvi to continue the enquiry by its order dated December 3, 1959, Manvi had already completed the enquiry and drawn up the report. As we said, the order dated December 3, 1959 was not retrospective in character and, therefore' it did not invest Manvi with authority to conduct the inquiry from an anterior date. Nor do we think that when the Director alone was invested with power to conduct the inquiry by Ex. B- I read in the light of Ex.B-4, he could have delegated that power to Manvi, as we think,that the Government had manifested its intention in Ex-B-4 that the Director alone should conduct the enquiry and so any delegation by the Director of that power would have been contrary to the intention of the Government. The trial court was of the view that the appellant was not given a reasonable opportunity of defending himself as the inquiring officer did not give him facility for inspecting the relevant files. The High Court found that although the appellant was not allowed to inspect the confidential record of some of the witnesses for the purpose of enabling the appellant to cross-examine them, that would not be a denial of reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the, enquiry. The High Court also found that Exhibits 3 and 4 (R.D. File No. Estt/89 of 1951 Pt. II p.17 and H.D. File No. Est/89 of 1951 Pt-11 paras 253 to 258 pp.55 also found that Exhibits 3 and 4 (R.D. File No. Estt/89 of 1951 Pt. II were not material for the purpose of defence, that the appellant was made aware of the contents of those, proceedings and therefore, the inquiring officer was justified in not giving copies of these proceedings or in not acquainting the delinquent of them. Ex. 3 relates to a file regarding the transfer of the appellant in 1951 from the Secretariat to the Information Department. Ex.4 relates to a proceeding against the appellant which resulted in a censure on the basis of a complaint in 1951. Whatever night be said in justification of the refusal of the inquring officer to give access to the appellant of the confidential records relating to the witnesses we see no justification for not granting the prayer of the appellant to inspect the files containing the proceedings on the ground that the appellant was appraised of the proceedings in 1951, especially when it is seen that these proceedings have been relied upon by the inquiring officer in his report to sub- stantiate one of the charges against the appellant. it was too much to assume that the appellant would be remembering the details of the proceedings of 1951 at the time of the inquiry. We set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restore the decree passed by the trial court, but in the circumstances, we make no order to costs. Issues Involved1. Bias of the inquiring officer.2. Authority of the inquiring officer to conduct the inquiry.3. Denial of reasonable opportunity to defend.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis1. Bias of the Inquiring OfficerThe appellant argued that the inquiring officer, Manvi, was biased against him. The trial court found that Manvi had a history of animosity towards the appellant, citing several instances where Manvi had taken disciplinary actions against the appellant, including memos and threats of disciplinary action. The High Court, however, found no material evidence to show bias, stating that complaints against the appellant were from various officers and not solely from Manvi. The Supreme Court, however, opined that the cumulative effect of the circumstances was sufficient to create a 'real likelihood' of bias. It emphasized that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, and that the impression of bias in the mind of a reasonable person was enough to quash the decision.2. Authority of the Inquiring Officer to Conduct the InquiryThe appellant contended that Manvi had no authority to conduct the inquiry. Initially, Manvi, as Director-in-charge, appointed Siddiqui as the inquiring officer. Later, the Government directed that the Director himself should conduct the inquiry, but Manvi continued the inquiry even after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge. The trial court held that Manvi had no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry after he ceased to be the Director-in-charge. The High Court, however, found that the Government had authorized the Director-in-charge to conduct the inquiry and that the Director had authorized the Deputy Director to continue the inquiry. The Supreme Court concluded that even if Manvi was initially authorized, his authority ended when he ceased to be the Director-in-charge. The subsequent Government order allowing Manvi to continue the inquiry was not retrospective and thus did not validate his actions.3. Denial of Reasonable Opportunity to DefendThe appellant argued that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as he was denied access to several files and documents. The trial court agreed, stating that the appellant was not given the facility to inspect relevant files. The High Court found that the appellant was not denied reasonable opportunity as he was not denied access to any file that had a material bearing on his defense. The Supreme Court, however, found that the refusal to allow the appellant to inspect files from 1951, which were relied upon by the inquiring officer to substantiate charges, was unjustified. It was unreasonable to assume that the appellant would remember the details of the proceedings from 1951 during the inquiry.ConclusionThe Supreme Court set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and restored the decree passed by the trial court, which declared the compulsory retirement order null and void and entitled the appellant to arrears of salary. The Supreme Court made no order as to costs.