Regulatory fees in insolvency may form process costs when expressly authorised and broadly connected to regulatory functions.
Regulation 31A validly imposes a regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022. The Board's express power to levy fees for carrying out the Code's purposes, together with its regulation-making power over process costs, supports inclusion of the fee within the residuary category of insolvency resolution process costs. The levy remains a regulatory fee, rather than a tax, where it has a broad nexus with regulatory functions; direct payer-specific quid pro quo is unnecessary. The fee is not excessive, arbitrary, retrospective, colourable, or based on excessive delegation where statutory guidance and legislative oversight apply.
Issues: (i) Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A; (ii) Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs; (iii) Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo; (iv) Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (v) Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively; (vi) Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.
Issue (i): Whether the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India has statutory authority to levy the regulatory fee under Regulation 31A.
Analysis: Section 196(1)(c) authorises the Board to levy fees or other charges for carrying out the purposes of the Code; this authority is not confined to registration and renewal fees payable by insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies and information utilities. Sections 196 and 240 disclose the Board's broad executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative role across the corporate insolvency resolution process, including matters concerning the committee of creditors, voting, resolution plans and process costs.
Conclusion: Regulation 31A was made within the Board's statutory authority; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (ii): Whether Regulation 31A is ultra vires the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 because regulatory fee cannot form part of insolvency resolution process costs.
Analysis: Section 5(13)(e) is a residuary provision permitting costs specified by the Board, and Section 240(2)(d) expressly authorises regulations concerning such other costs. The distinct categories in Section 5(13)(a) to (d) do not constitute a common genus. Consequently, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis cannot restrict Section 5(13)(e). Regulation 31(ba), read with Regulation 31A, validly includes the regulatory fee within insolvency resolution process costs.
Conclusion: Regulation 31A is not ultra vires the Code; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (iii): Whether the regulatory fee is a tax disguised as a fee for want of quid pro quo.
Analysis: For a regulatory fee, direct and arithmetically precise quid pro quo is unnecessary; a broad, general nexus between the levy and regulatory services is sufficient. The Board's regulation of insolvency service providers and its regulation-making, information, oversight and process-related functions provide an integrated regulatory framework benefiting corporate insolvency resolution process stakeholders, including resolution applicants. The levy supports the Board's regulatory functions and financial self-sufficiency.
Conclusion: The levy is a valid regulatory fee and not a tax; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (iv): Whether the regulatory fee is excessive, disproportionate and arbitrary under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: A regulatory fee need not correspond exactly to annual expenditure or yield no surplus. The audited figures showed that the levy enabled the Board to meet its expenditure after earlier deficits, and did not establish an excessive, confiscatory or disproportionate collection. The amounts remain available for the Board's regulatory functions rather than forming part of the general revenues of the State.
Conclusion: The regulatory fee is neither excessive nor arbitrary and does not violate Article 14; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (v): Whether the proviso to Regulation 31A operates retrospectively.
Analysis: The proviso expressly applies to resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022 and is prospective in operation. Approval by the committee of creditors binds the committee and the resolution applicant as to commercial terms, but does not reduce the adjudicating authority to a ministerial role. The adjudicating authority must ensure compliance with Section 30(2), including priority payment of insolvency resolution process costs, and may require rectification or reconsideration in limited circumstances. No vested right was disturbed while approval remained pending.
Conclusion: The proviso is prospective and valid; the issue is against the petitioners.
Issue (vi): Whether Regulation 31A involves a colourable exercise of power or excessive delegation.
Analysis: The regulatory fee at 0.25 per cent of realisable value was not shown to be confiscatory or unreasonable. Sections 5(13)(e), 196(1)(c) and 240(2)(d) provide statutory guidance for the levy and its inclusion as a process cost. The challenged regulation is also subject to parliamentary laying under Section 241. The relevant enabling provisions and Regulation 31(ba) were not independently challenged.
Conclusion: Regulation 31A is neither a colourable exercise of power nor an instance of excessive delegation; the issue is against the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: Regulation 31A validly imposes regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory regulator may levy a non-excessive regulatory fee under an express power to carry out the purposes of the governing code where the levy bears a broad nexus to its regulatory functions; direct quid pro quo with each payer is not indispensable.