Land acquisition compensation: transitional limits confined the 12% additional amount to specified pending cases under the amendment scheme.

Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was construed as creating a substantive right whose operation is limited by the transitional scheme in Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The majority held that the additional 12% amount is payable only in the cases specifically covered by Section 30(1)(a) and (b), and that a pending reference before the civil court on 24-9-1984 does not by itself extend the benefit beyond those categories. The dissent considered the provision prospective and applicable to all pending references, treating Section 30(1) as not curtailing the main benefit.

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Issues: Whether the additional amount of 12% per annum under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is payable in every reference pending before the civil court on 24-9-1984, or only in the cases covered by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.

Analysis: The majority held that Section 23(1-A) creates a substantive right and, read with the transitional scheme in Section 30(1), its operation is confined to the categories expressly covered by clauses (a) and (b). Section 30(1) was treated as the governing provision for acquisitions initiated before the amendment, and the words used there were held to indicate a limited extension of the new benefit. The Court further held that a pending reference alone does not enlarge the statutory reach beyond the specific transitional categories, and that the provision cannot be applied to cases outside those limits by treating it as independently retrospective.

Conclusion: The additional amount under Section 23(1-A) is payable only in the cases falling within Section 30(1)(a) and Section 30(1)(b), and not in every pending reference on 24-9-1984.

Dissenting Opinion: The dissenting Judges held that Section 23(1-A) is a prospective substantive provision that applies to all references pending before the civil court on the commencement date, and that Section 30(1) does not cut down the width of the main provision. They would have treated the benefit as available in every pending reference under Section 18, subject to the separate transitional limits for the Collector's stage.

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