Issues: (i) Whether bail in a commercial quantity NDPS could be sustained without considering the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act; (ii) whether the respondent's period of custody warranted bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether bail in a commercial quantity NDPS matter could be sustained without considering the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

Analysis: The offences arose from recovery of commercial quantity contraband, attracting the statutory bar under Section 37. The High Court's order did not record satisfaction on the twin requirements that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail. In such cases, consideration of these conditions is mandatory and cannot be bypassed by a liberal approach to bail.

Conclusion: The bail order could not be sustained and was rightly interfered with, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent's period of custody warranted bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The respondent had undergone about 1 year and 7 months of custody in a case carrying a maximum sentence of twenty years, and the Court held that this period did not constitute such prolonged incarceration as to override the statutory restrictions applicable to the case. The existence of similar antecedents further weighed against satisfaction of the requirement that he was not likely to commit an offence while on bail.

Conclusion: No bail was warranted on the ground of prolonged incarceration, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the grant of regular bail was set aside, and the respondent was denied bail under the governing NDPS bail standard.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases involving commercial quantity under the NDPS Act, courts must strictly apply Section 37 and record satisfaction of the twin conditions before granting bail, and custody of a relatively short duration does not by itself justify release where those conditions are not met.

Issues: (i) Whether persistent delay in pronouncing reserved High Court judgments requires binding uniform safeguards; (ii) Whether delayed uploading of reasoned judgments after pronouncement of operative orders requires binding timelines and transparency measures.

Issue (i): Whether persistent delay in pronouncing reserved High Court judgments requires binding uniform safeguards.

Analysis: Delay after final hearing leaves litigants, particularly persons in custody, without a decision affecting their liberty and remedies. The protection of life and personal liberty under Article 21 extends to every stage of judicial proceedings, including timely pronouncement of reserved judgments. Existing directions did not sufficiently address widespread and prolonged delays. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, a comprehensive framework was formulated for prompt pronouncement, enhanced priority for matters of personal liberty, administrative monitoring, reassignment after continued default, and remedies enabling litigants to seek early judgment or transfer for fresh hearing.

Conclusion: Binding directions were issued requiring High Courts to endeavour to pronounce reasoned reserved judgments within three months, with specified accountability measures and litigant remedies where delay persists.

Issue (ii): Whether delayed uploading of reasoned judgments after pronouncement of operative orders requires binding timelines and transparency measures.

Analysis: Pronouncement of only an operative part without timely availability of reasons undermines transparency and may affect parties whose rights or status are immediately altered. A reasoned judgment ordinarily must be uploaded within 24 hours of open-court pronouncement; where urgent circumstances warrant an operative order, reasons must be uploaded within seven days, extendable to fifteen days for practical difficulty. The framework also requires website status updates, automated communication to advocates, administrative escalation, and a remedy for parties if reasons remain unavailable.

Conclusion: High Courts must ensure prompt uploading and transparent disclosure of reasoned judgments, with mandatory monitoring and corrective measures where reasons are not uploaded within the prescribed period.

Final Conclusion: A nationwide, enforceable framework was established to secure timely, reasoned, and transparent High Court adjudication while preserving the deliberative quality of judicial decision-making.

Ratio Decidendi: The guarantee of life and personal liberty includes protection against unreasonable delay in pronouncement of reserved judgments, justifying binding procedural safeguards for timely delivery and publication of reasoned decisions.

Issues: Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to an appeal filed under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.

Analysis: Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies Sections 4 to 24, including Section 5, to a special or local law prescribing a distinct limitation period unless their operation is expressly excluded or excluded by necessary implication. Section 9 of the Adhiniyam prescribes a thirty-day period for appeal but contains no restrictive expression barring extension, no prescribed outer limit for condonation, and no self-contained limitation mechanism. Its provision for excluding time taken to obtain a certified copy indicates that the general law of limitation is not wholly excluded. Given the serious consequences of an externment order, the appellate remedy must be preserved unless exclusion of condonation power is clearly established.

Conclusion: Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to appeals under Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990; delay may be condoned on sufficient cause being shown.

Issues: (i) Whether the constitutional power to grant bail survives the statutory restraint under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 when prolonged incarceration and delay in trial are relied upon under Article 21 of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether the perceived divergence between coordinate Benches on the application of the binding three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb warrants reference to a Bench of appropriate strength; and (iii) whether interim bail should be granted pending authoritative resolution of the legal issue.

Issue (i): Whether the constitutional power to grant bail survives the statutory restraint under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 when prolonged incarceration and delay in trial are relied upon under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The order treats the three-Judge Bench ruling in K.A. Najeeb as preserving the constitutional force of Article 21 while recognising the legislative policy behind restrictive bail provisions in special statutes. It holds that Section 43D(5) does not wholly exclude bail where continued detention becomes constitutionally unjustifiable, but equally rejects a mechanical rule that delay alone must automatically result in release. The proper approach is contextual and must account for the nature of allegations, role attributed, prima facie material, stage and trajectory of trial, causes of delay, and the competing concerns of liberty, fair trial, societal security, and statutory restraint.

Conclusion: The constitutional power to grant bail survives the statutory embargo and must be applied in a structured, case-specific manner; prolonged incarceration is a relevant but not solitary factor.

Issue (ii): Whether the perceived divergence between coordinate Benches on the application of the binding three-Judge Bench decision in K.A. Najeeb warrants reference to a Bench of appropriate strength.

Analysis: The order records that reservations expressed by a coordinate Bench about another coordinate Bench's understanding of a binding three-Judge Bench ruling cannot be resolved through counter-observations of equal strength. Judicial discipline requires that where the issue goes to the root of the legal principle and affects pending cases under the special statute, the matter should be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench. This is presented as necessary to secure clarity, consistency, and institutional fidelity in the administration of bail jurisprudence.

Conclusion: A reference to a Bench of appropriate strength was warranted.

Issue (iii): Whether interim bail should be granted pending authoritative resolution of the legal issue.

Analysis: The order notes substantial incarceration, the likelihood that trial will not conclude immediately, and the need to avoid continued detention merely because an important legal question requires settlement. Without expressing any opinion on the merits, and subject to stringent safeguards, the Court considered interim release appropriate pending further orders.

Conclusion: Interim bail was granted for six months on specified conditions.

Final Conclusion: The matter was referred for authoritative resolution of the legal controversy, while the appellants were enlarged on interim bail pending further orders and subject to conditions, without any adjudication on the merits of the prosecution case.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory restrictions on bail under a special law do not extinguish constitutional liberty under Article 21, and the effect of prolonged incarceration must be assessed contextually rather than mechanically, with judicial discipline requiring reference where coordinate Benches perceive conflict on a binding larger-Bench ruling.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could continue to operate where the accused had undergone prolonged incarceration and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time; (ii) whether, on the material placed, the appellant had made out a case for grant of bail pending trial.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory restrictions on bail under Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could continue to operate where the accused had undergone prolonged incarceration and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.

Analysis: The statutory embargo on bail under special enactments was held to be subordinate to the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The earlier three-Judge Bench ruling in K.A. Najeeb was treated as binding, and it was held that where timely conclusion of trial is not realistically possible and incarceration has become unduly prolonged, the rigour of Section 43D(5) of the UAPA melts down. The narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb in later two-Judge decisions was not accepted as controlling law. The principle that bail remains the norm and jail the exception was reiterated even in prosecutions under stringent special statutes.

Conclusion: The statutory restrictions did not bar grant of bail in the facts of the case, and the constitutional court could intervene in favour of the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the material placed, the appellant had made out a case for grant of bail pending trial.

Analysis: The appellant had been in custody since 11.06.2020, more than 350 witnesses were still to be examined, and early conclusion of the trial was found to be well-nigh impossible. The Court also noted the absence of recovery from the appellant or from premises under his use, the essentially police-statement-based nature of the incriminating material, the absence of prior antecedents shown on record, and the fact that the appellant had not misused the earlier medical interim bail. These circumstances, taken together, were found sufficient to justify release on bail during pendency of the trial.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to bail pending trial.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the appellant was directed to be released on bail on terms to be fixed by the Special NIA Court, with ancillary conditions including deposit of passport and periodic appearance before the local police station.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under special anti-terror and narcotics statutes, statutory bail restrictions cannot override Article 21 where prolonged incarceration and unrealistic prospects of trial completion would make continued detention constitutionally unjustifiable; in such cases, a constitutional court may grant bail on the facts and material before it.

Issues: (i) Whether the Delhi and Haryana FIRs arising from the Brahma City/Krrish World transactions should be consolidated for a single investigation; (ii) Whether a blanket restraint against coercive action in respect of future FIRs based on the same transactions should be granted.

Issue (i): Whether the Delhi and Haryana FIRs arising from the Brahma City/Krrish World transactions should be consolidated for a single investigation.

Analysis: The FIRs disclosed a common thread of allegations concerning acceptance of money from homebuyers, failure to deliver promised properties, and related alleged diversion of funds. The prohibition on a second FIR in respect of the same occurrence or transaction requires a single comprehensive investigation; further material may be addressed through further investigation and supplementary reports rather than overlapping investigations in separate jurisdictions. Parallel investigations would cause multiplicity, potential conflicting findings, and prejudice to the petitioners. The subsequent Haryana FIR was found to arise from the same transaction as the Delhi EOW FIR.

Conclusion: FIR No. 30/2019 registered at the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi shall be transferred and clubbed with FIR No. 439/2024 registered at Police Station Sector-65, Gurugram, Haryana for investigation in accordance with law. This issue is in favour of the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether a blanket restraint against coercive action in respect of future FIRs based on the same transactions should be granted.

Analysis: A general prospective restraint against coercive action concerning FIRs that may be registered in future is neither appropriate nor legally permissible. The petitioners may pursue remedies available in law if any such FIR is registered.

Conclusion: The request for a blanket prospective restraint against coercive action is declined. This issue is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: The same-transaction allegations are required to be investigated in one coordinated proceeding, while future complaints remain subject to ordinary legal remedies.

Ratio Decidendi: Multiple FIRs and parallel investigations cannot be maintained for the same occurrence or transaction; subsequent information must be dealt with through a comprehensive investigation and, where necessary, further investigation or supplementary reports.

Issues: Whether a writ petition can be disposed of by declining to entertain it on the ground of an efficacious alternative remedy while still granting interim protection to the petitioner; and whether such a course is permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The order reiterates that once the High Court, after applying its mind, refuses to entertain a writ petition because an efficacious alternative remedy is available and has not been pursued, the writ proceeding comes to an end. In that situation, no final relief survives for grant in the writ petition. Interim protection by way of stay of the impugned order or maintenance of status quo cannot be granted merely to facilitate recourse to the alternate forum, because such relief is only ancillary to substantive relief on merits. The order treats this position as controlled by the settled principle that interim relief cannot be used as the only and final relief under Article 226.

Conclusion: Such interim protection is impermissible when the writ petition itself is not entertained on the ground of availability of an efficacious alternative remedy, and the writ proceedings must terminate upon that refusal.

Final Conclusion: The special leave petition was not entertained, and the judgment affirms the limited reach of Article 226 where the High Court declines writ jurisdiction in favour of an alternative statutory remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim relief cannot be granted as the sole or final relief under Article 226 after the Court declines to entertain the writ petition for availability of an efficacious alternative remedy; such relief must be merely ancillary to substantive adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the High Court's order granting bail was legally sustainable; (ii) Whether the completed investigation warranted transfer to a special agency; (iii) Whether bail applicants must make full disclosure of material particulars and criminal antecedents.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court's order granting bail was legally sustainable.

Analysis: An appellate challenge to grant of bail is distinct from cancellation based on post-bail misconduct. A bail order may be annulled where it is perverse, legally untenable, based on irrelevant material, or overlooks material considerations including the gravity of accusations, criminal antecedents and societal impact. The bail order relied upon documents whose genuineness formed the subject of the prosecution, despite prima facie material that the purported institution lacked affiliation to conduct a law course and that the marksheet had not been issued by the University. The respondent's suppression of multiple criminal antecedents materially vitiated the exercise of bail discretion.

Conclusion: The bail order was legally unsustainable and was set aside; bail was cancelled in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the completed investigation warranted transfer to a special agency.

Analysis: Transfer of an investigation to an independent or special agency after filing of the chargesheet is an exceptional measure, requiring cogent material showing bias, mala fides, improper investigation, extraneous influence, or a credible need to restore public confidence. The investigation had concluded, cognizance had been taken, and no substantiated material established that the State investigation was tainted or influenced.

Conclusion: Transfer of the investigation to a special agency was declined.

Issue (iii): Whether bail applicants must make full disclosure of material particulars and criminal antecedents.

Analysis: Suppression or selective disclosure of material facts in bail proceedings amounts to abuse of process and undermines informed judicial discretion. Bail applicants must disclose criminal antecedents, earlier and pending bail applications, coercive processes, custody details, procedural status and other material particulars, supported by affidavit. An illustrative, recommendatory disclosure framework was issued to promote transparency and uniformity, with circulation to High Courts and the district judiciary for appropriate consideration.

Conclusion: Full and candid disclosure of material particulars by bail applicants was reaffirmed, and a recommendatory disclosure framework was issued.

Final Conclusion: The invalid grant of bail was annulled, while the request to transfer the concluded investigation was rejected; institutional measures for transparent bail disclosures were directed.

Ratio Decidendi: A superior court may annul a bail order without proof of supervening circumstances where the order is perverse, relies on suspect or irrelevant material, or ignores material considerations such as criminal antecedents and the gravity of the accusations.

Issues: Whether the writ petition could be entertained in Delhi when the award, the pending challenge under Section 34, and the recovery proceedings all had their substantial connection with Agra, and whether the doctrine of forum conveniens required relegation to the court having the dominant territorial nexus.

Analysis: The territorial reach under Article 226 depends not on any isolated or slender fact, but on whether the pleaded facts form a material, essential, and integral part of the cause of action. Even where some consequence of the impugned action is felt within the forum, the High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction if another forum is more appropriately connected with the lis. The decision-making authority, the underlying arbitral proceedings, the pending Section 34 proceedings, and the recovery steps were all centred at Agra, while the Delhi connection was only incidental. The writ remedy, being discretionary, could not be treated as available merely because a recovery notice was received within Delhi.

Conclusion: The petition was not fit to be entertained in Delhi and the petitioner was required to pursue remedies before the court of competent jurisdiction at Agra.

Issues: Whether the writ petition seeking a mandamus to direct issuance of an OTS sanction letter was maintainable when the petitioner disputed the existence of the attachment said to have accompanied the email communication.

Analysis: The relief sought was for issuance of an OTS sanction letter. The communication relied upon by the petitioner stated that the sanction communication was attached, but the petitioner's grievance was that no attachment was found. In such a situation, the dispute was not one for determination in writ jurisdiction, and the appropriate remedy, if the sanction letter was not attached, lay elsewhere.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable and the relief was declined.

Issues: Whether the arrest and remand of the arrestee were illegal for failure to disclose the grounds of arrest and comply with the mandatory arrest-memo requirements, and whether habeas corpus relief was maintainable.

Analysis: The arrest memo was tested against the requirements flowing from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the statutory safeguards under Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Court found that the memo did not substantially contain the grounds and supporting material required by the prescribed format, and that mere intimation of the offence, sections invoked, and arrest-related formalities did not amount to compliance with the mandate to communicate full particulars of the grounds of arrest. Non-compliance with these requirements was treated as a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards governing arrest and detention.

Conclusion: The arrest and consequent remand were held illegal, and habeas corpus relief was granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to communicate the grounds of arrest and to comply with the mandatory arrest-memo safeguards required by Article 22(1) and Sections 47 and 48 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 renders the arrest illegal and justifies release in habeas corpus proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are mandatorily required in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years; (ii) Whether, in the absence of the conditions in Section 35(1)(b)(i) and Section 35(1)(b)(ii), an arrest in such cases is legally justified.

Issue (i): Whether notices under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are mandatorily required in cases involving offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years

Analysis: Section 35(3) is a safeguard provision meant to operate where arrest is not required under Section 35(1). In cases punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, the provision has to be read harmoniously with Section 35(1)(b), which makes arrest discretionary and conditions it on both reason to believe and satisfaction as to necessity. The statutory scheme shows that issuance of notice is the normal course, and the notice requirement cannot be treated as optional merely because arrest power exists in exceptional situations.

Conclusion: Yes. A notice under Section 35(3) is the rule in such cases.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the absence of the conditions in Section 35(1)(b)(i) and Section 35(1)(b)(ii), an arrest in such cases is legally justified

Analysis: Arrest under Section 35(1)(b) requires the simultaneous existence of reason to believe and at least one statutory necessity under clause (ii), and even then arrest is not automatic. Where a notice has been issued and complied with, Section 35(5) prohibits arrest unless recorded reasons show that arrest is still necessary. If notice is not complied with, arrest remains a matter of discretion and must be based on materials justifying the need for custody, not on routine or subjective convenience.

Conclusion: No. In the absence of the statutory conditions, arrest is not legally justified.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme under Section 35 treats notice as the ordinary course and arrest as a narrowly confined exception, controlled by recorded necessity and constitutional safeguards of liberty.

Ratio Decidendi: In offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, arrest is not mandatory; it is permissible only when the police officer satisfies the statutory preconditions of reason to believe and necessity, and notice under Section 35(3) ordinarily governs the process unless recorded reasons justify the exceptional course of arrest.

Issues: (i) whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 justified bail on Article 21 grounds notwithstanding Section 43D(5); (ii) whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, satisfied the prima facie true standard under Section 43D(5) qua each accused; and (iii) whether the role attributed to each appellant, including parity claims, warranted a uniform result.

Issue (i): whether prolonged pre-trial incarceration in a prosecution under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 justified bail on Article 21 grounds notwithstanding Section 43D(5).

Analysis: The Court held that delay and prolonged custody are serious constitutional concerns, but they do not automatically override the statutory restraint in special-statute prosecutions. The inquiry must be contextual and must consider the nature of the allegations, the stage of the proceedings, the causes of delay, the role attributed to the accused, and the legitimacy of continued detention. Prolonged incarceration can justify intervention only where it becomes demonstrably disproportionate and constitutionally impermissible on a cumulative assessment of the record.

Conclusion: Prolonged custody was not, by itself, sufficient to secure bail for all appellants; Article 21 did not mechanically displace Section 43D(5).

Issue (ii): whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, satisfied the prima facie true standard under Section 43D(5) qua each accused.

Analysis: The Court reiterated that Section 43D(5) requires a limited but real threshold inquiry, not a mini-trial. The material must disclose, on its face, a prima facie nexus between the accused and the alleged unlawful activity. The assessment is accused-specific and must be made on a cumulative reading of the prosecution case, without weighing evidence or deciding credibility. The statutory embargo operates where the prosecution material, accepted as it stands, reasonably indicates a prima facie true accusation.

Conclusion: The prima facie threshold was held to be attracted for Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, but not for the appellants whose roles were found to be operational, facilitative, or local in nature.

Issue (iii): whether the role attributed to each appellant, including parity claims, warranted a uniform result.

Analysis: The Court held that the prosecution itself differentiated between principal conspirators and local or executory participants. Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam were treated as occupying central, formative and strategic roles, while Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed were found to be associated with site-level mobilisation, funding, logistics, or execution. Parity could not be invoked mechanically; it depends on similarity of role and material. On the facts, the latter group was held entitled to bail subject to stringent conditions, while the former group remained within the statutory bar.

Conclusion: Bail was declined to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam and granted to Gulfisha Fatima, Meeran Haider, Shifa-ur-Rehman, Mohd. Saleem Khan and Shadab Ahmed.

Final Conclusion: The Court applied an accused-specific and cumulative approach under the special bail regime, balancing Article 21 against the statutory restrictions, and ultimately granted bail only to those appellants whose roles were found to be non-central and operational, while refusing bail to the two appellants found to have prima facie central roles in the alleged conspiracy.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under a special statute, prolonged incarceration is only a trigger for heightened scrutiny and does not by itself displace the statutory bar on bail; the deciding factor remains whether, on a cumulative and accused-specific assessment of the material, the prosecution case is prima facie true.

Issues: (i) Whether prolonged custody and the improbability of early conclusion of trial justified grant of bail notwithstanding the seriousness of the alleged economic offences. (ii) Whether Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 could be construed as a mandate to continue incarceration until completion of trial in a case involving grave charges.

Issue (i): Whether prolonged custody and the improbability of early conclusion of trial justified grant of bail notwithstanding the seriousness of the alleged economic offences.

Analysis: The right to personal liberty and speedy trial under Article 21 remains available to an undertrial, and pre-trial incarceration cannot be allowed to become punishment. Seriousness of the allegation is relevant, but it does not by itself justify continued detention where the investigation is complete, the case is documentary in nature, the charge has not yet been framed, and the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable time. The long custody already undergone and the voluminous record, together with the large number of witnesses, weighed in favour of release on bail.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the appellants and bail was warranted on the facts.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 could be construed as a mandate to continue incarceration until completion of trial in a case involving grave charges.

Analysis: Section 479 was construed as a liberty-enhancing provision intended to decongest prisons, not as a restrictive mandate forbidding bail until the accused completes one-half or one-third of the sentence in every case. Its operation does not exclude the ordinary bail jurisdiction of constitutional courts, and it must be read consistently with the protection of personal liberty under Article 21. The provision therefore could not be used to deny bail merely because the alleged offences carried severe punishment.

Conclusion: The contention based on Section 479 was rejected and did not bar grant of bail.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the appellants were directed to be released on bail subject to conditions, without any expression on the merits of the prosecution case.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an undertrial has undergone substantial incarceration and the trial is not likely to conclude within a reasonable time, continued detention offends Article 21, and even in serious economic offences the constitutional courts may grant bail notwithstanding stringent statutory thresholds.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 30 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 permits reopening a finally settled dispute to alter the location of a plot in the revenue map; (ii) Whether the High Court's remand for fresh consideration warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether Section 30 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 permits reopening a finally settled dispute to alter the location of a plot in the revenue map.

Analysis: Section 30 requires maintenance of village maps and field books, recording of subsequent changes, and correction of detected errors or omissions. Its correction power does not extend to changing the location of land merely to secure a more advantageous position. The identical map-correction claim had been rejected in earlier proceedings and had attained finality; no error or omission in the revenue record was established.

Conclusion: Section 30 does not permit reopening the settled map dispute or relocating the plot; the finding is in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court's remand for fresh consideration warranted interference.

Analysis: Although remand orders are ordinarily interlocutory, intervention was justified because the remand rested on an erroneous interpretation of Section 30 and would generate an unnecessary further round of litigation over an issue already conclusively settled.

Conclusion: The remand order was unsustainable and was liable to be set aside; the finding is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: A concluded revenue-map dispute cannot be revived under the statutory power to correct genuine errors or omissions, and an erroneous remand that prolongs such litigation must be corrected.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power to correct errors or omissions in revenue records cannot be used to reopen a final adjudication or to alter a plot's settled location in the absence of a demonstrable record error.

Issues: (i) Whether the public interest litigation challenging the revision of property tax was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy and the petitioner's individual grievance; (ii) Whether judicial review could invalidate the municipal corporation's policy decision revising property-tax rates.

Issue (i): Whether the public interest litigation challenging the revision of property tax was maintainable despite the statutory appellate remedy and the petitioner's individual grievance.

Analysis: The petition did not establish that the petitioner represented the city's residents, and substantially raised an individual objection to the revised assessment. Section 406 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 provided a statutory mechanism to challenge municipal decisions. The use of a public interest proceeding to bypass that remedy was impermissible.

Conclusion: The public interest litigation was not maintainable in the circumstances. This issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether judicial review could invalidate the municipal corporation's policy decision revising property-tax rates.

Analysis: Revision of property-tax rates, following a prolonged period without revision, concerned municipal revenue generation necessary for statutory functions and financial autonomy. Judicial review of an economic or fiscal policy is confined to illegality, constitutional infirmity, perversity, arbitrariness, or patent breach of the governing procedure; it does not permit reassessment of the policy's merits or substitution of judicial views. No material established such infirmity in the revision exercise.

Conclusion: The municipal corporation's property-tax revision could not be invalidated through judicial review on the facts established. This issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's interference with the municipal tax-revision resolutions was legally unsustainable, and those resolutions remain effective.

Ratio Decidendi: Courts cannot substitute their assessment for a competent municipal body's fiscal-policy decision unless the decision is shown to be unconstitutional, illegal, perverse, arbitrary, or in patent breach of statutory procedure.

Issues: (i) Whether bail could be granted solely on the ground of parity with a co-accused. (ii) Whether a bail order that does not disclose relevant reasons or consider material factors can be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether bail could be granted solely on the ground of parity with a co-accused.

Analysis: Parity is not a standalone entitlement to bail. It operates with reference to the role, position, and factual similarity of the accused in relation to the offence. Mere participation in the same occurrence does not establish parity where the roles are different. Bail decisions must consider the nature of the accusation and the specific role attributed to the applicant.

Conclusion: Bail cannot be granted solely on the basis of parity when the accused does not stand on the same footing as the co-accused.

Issue (ii): Whether a bail order that does not disclose relevant reasons or consider material factors can be sustained.

Analysis: An order granting bail must reflect application of mind and consideration of relevant factors such as the gravity of the offence, the role of the accused, and other circumstances bearing on the exercise of discretion. An order bereft of reasons, or one that fails to engage with the material considerations, cannot be allowed to stand. Where the defect is confined to the order of grant of bail and the matter requires reconsideration, remand to the High Court is appropriate.

Conclusion: A bail order lacking relevant reasons and consideration of material factors is unsustainable and may be set aside, with the bail question remitted for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The appeal concerning one accused was allowed and bail was set aside, while the connected appeal was set aside and remitted for fresh consideration on proper principles. The overall effect is that parity alone is insufficient for bail and reasoned consideration remains essential.

Ratio Decidendi: Parity in bail depends on comparable role and position in the offence, and a bail order must show application of mind to the relevant factors before it can be sustained.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether an Investigating Agency has power under Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to attach or debit freeze a bank account merely because amounts suspected to be linked to a cyber fraud are credited to that account.

(ii) Whether, and in what manner, debit-freezing/attachment of a bank account suspected to contain "proceeds of crime" is required to be undertaken under the BNSS, including the role of Section 107 and the Magistrate's authority.

(iii) Whether banks may debit freeze accounts on their own or upon investigative communications not amounting to a competent freezing/attachment order, and what is the permissible course indicated by the Court.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Power of Investigating Agency to debit freeze/attach under Section 106 BNSS

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 106 of the BNSS (treated as akin to the earlier seizure provision) and contrasted it with Section 107 BNSS (dealing with attachment/forfeiture/restoration). The Court relied on, and applied, the reasoning adopted in an identical context that Section 106 concerns "seizure" during investigation and does not confer authority to attach/debit freeze an account as proceeds of crime.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the distinction that seizure under Section 106 is meant to secure evidence and can be done by the police with an ex post facto report to the Magistrate, whereas attachment (including measures aimed at securing "proceeds of crime" by preventing disposal) falls within Section 107 and requires Magistrate's order. The Court treated debit freezing of a bank account as an attachment-type measure rather than a mere investigative seizure.

Conclusion: The Court conclusively held that debit freezing/attachment of a bank account is not permissible under Section 106 BNSS; therefore, the Investigating Agency has no power under Section 106 to attach or debit freeze accounts.

Issue (ii): Proper route under BNSS for debit freezing/attachment of accounts suspected to contain proceeds of crime

Legal framework: The Court examined Section 107 BNSS as the provision enabling attachment of property believed to be derived directly or indirectly from criminal activity or commission of an offence, upon approaching the jurisdictional Magistrate.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court endorsed the mechanism that the investigating officer must move the jurisdictional Magistrate for attachment; the Magistrate may order attachment after hearing parties or may issue an interim attachment order where notice would defeat the purpose. The Court accepted that subsequent steps concerning confirmation of proceeds of crime and distribution/restoration are to follow the Magistrate's process contemplated under Section 107.

Conclusion: The Court held that the Investigating Agency may proceed under Section 107 BNSS to debit freeze or attach a bank account, i.e., only through Magistrate-authorised attachment, not by unilateral action under Section 106.

Issue (iii): Legality of banks debit freezing accounts without a competent freezing/attachment order; permissible course

Legal framework: The Court took note of the "Citizen Financial Cyber Frauds Reporting and Management System" and its guidance indicating that banks/intermediaries may place the disputed amount on lien on the basis of acknowledgement details, enabling later refund after investigation, but this does not equate to debit freezing the entire account. The Court also considered the factual position that in several matters there was no clear investigative communication placed showing an instruction to debit freeze, making it unclear how the banks debit froze the accounts.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that banks should not proceed to debit freeze accounts merely upon communications that do not specifically require debit freezing by a competent authority, particularly when the lawful framework differentiates between lien on disputed amounts and account-wide debit freeze/attachment requiring appropriate authority. The Court recognized that wrongful debit freezing can cause day-to-day losses and expressly permitted affected persons to seek compensation through appropriate proceedings, to be decided on merits.

Conclusion: The Court directed that banks should act in terms of the stated management system unless there is a specific debit-freezing order by a competent authority; and it left open compensation claims to be pursued separately on merits.

Final operative determination (material to outcome): Since the impugned debit freezes were imposed under Section 106 BNSS, the Court held them unlawful and quashed and set aside the Investigating Agency's orders debit freezing the concerned accounts, allowing the petitions to that extent.

Issues: Whether the High Court's grant of bail in a prosecution under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could be sustained without a proper consideration of the statutory restrictions under Section 37 and the prosecution material relied upon to show the accused's role and prior involvement.

Analysis: The bail orders were found to rest principally on absence of knowledge, absence of antecedents, length of custody, and likely delay in trial. The Court held that the High Court did not meaningfully consider the prosecution's material alleging that the respondent ordered the consignments, supervised their movement, coordinated with the overseas supplier, and was present at the time of opening of the container. The orders also failed to address the allegation of an earlier seizure allegedly linked to the same network. In cases involving commercial quantity, the Court reiterated that Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes a statutory embargo on bail and requires a reasoned satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and will not commit an offence while on bail. Those requirements cannot be bypassed by reliance on general considerations such as delay or custody alone.

Conclusion: The impugned bail orders were set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of bail in accordance with Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The respondent was, however, allowed to continue on the existing bail terms until the High Court decides afresh.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions involving commercial quantity under the NDPS Act, bail can be sustained only after a reasoned application of the twin statutory conditions under Section 37 to the prosecution material; a bail order that omits such consideration is liable to be interfered with and remitted for fresh decision.

Issues: (i) Whether a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 must be duly served and pursued to a final notification to sustain vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 on the basis of Section 2(f)(iii); (ii) Whether, in the absence of proof of service, a final notification, and contemporaneous statutory steps, revenue mutations and declarations treating the lands as private forests could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 must be duly served and pursued to a final notification to sustain vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 on the basis of Section 2(f)(iii).

Analysis: The statutory scheme treats issuance and service of the Section 35(3) notice as integral to the process, because service alone enables objections, hearing, and consideration before any final action under Section 35(1). A bare or unserved notice cannot by itself trigger vesting under Section 2(f)(iii). The expression "issued" in that provision comprehends due service, and the notice must be part of a live process capable of culminating in a lawful notification. A notice that remains dormant for decades lapses into desuetude and cannot be revived to create vesting.

Conclusion: The requirement of a duly served and live Section 35(3) notice was mandatory, and mere issuance without service was insufficient.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the absence of proof of service, a final notification, and contemporaneous statutory steps, revenue mutations and declarations treating the lands as private forests could be sustained.

Analysis: The record disclosed no proof of service of any Section 35(3) notice on the then owners, no final notification under Section 35(1), no taking of possession under Section 5 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975, and no contemporaneous action under Sections 4, 6, or 7. Mutation entries are ministerial and cannot create title or perfect an otherwise unproven acquisition. Post-hoc material and later revenue annotations could not cure the absence of mandatory preconditions, and strict compliance was required before deprivation of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The High Court could not sustain vesting on grounds not forming the original basis of action.

Conclusion: The mutations and declarations treating the lands as private forests could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgment was set aside, the writ petitions were allowed, and the lands were held not to have validly vested in the State on the basis asserted. The State was left at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: For vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 on the footing of Section 2(f)(iii), a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 must be duly served and form part of a live statutory process culminating in lawful action; revenue mutations are only ministerial and cannot substitute for the mandatory statutory prerequisites.