Reasonable apprehension of bias and waiver by acquiescence shaped the challenge to a statutory inquiry committee.

A challenge to the composition of a statutory inquiry committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 turned on whether a jurist's prior public opposition to a judge's elevation created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The applicable test was the perception of a fair-minded, informed observer, and the discussion notes that the jurist's seminar participation and public stance could raise such an apprehension in the abstract, though not enough on these facts to invalidate the inquiry. The text also explains that a judge who knows of the committee's composition and remains silent for a substantial period may waive the objection by acquiescence; the delayed challenge was treated as waived.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether participation of a jurist in a public seminar opposing the judge's elevation and his prior public stance created a disqualifying bias for inclusion in the statutory Inquiry Committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; (ii) whether the judge, having knowledge of the committee's composition and having remained silent for a substantial period, had waived the right to object to that member's appointment.

Issue (i): whether participation of a jurist in a public seminar opposing the judge's elevation and his prior public stance created a disqualifying bias for inclusion in the statutory Inquiry Committee under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Article 124(5) of the Constitution and Sections 3 to 6 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 contemplates an investigation by a committee chosen from specified constitutional and professional categories. The rule against bias applies where a fair-minded and informed person would reasonably apprehend a real likelihood of prejudice. The jurist's participation in the seminar, his speech, and his role in drafting a resolution against elevation could create such an apprehension at the threshold, even though no actual bias was established and the committee itself thought otherwise. The relevant standard is the perception of a reasonable, objective and informed observer, not the subjective view of the judge or the committee.

Conclusion: The objection disclosed a reasonable apprehension of bias in the abstract, but it did not justify invalidating the inquiry proceedings on the facts of this case.

Issue (ii): whether the judge, having knowledge of the committee's composition and having remained silent for a substantial period, had waived the right to object to that member's appointment

Analysis: The judge was aware, from an early stage and certainly by the time of his own written representation, that the jurist was a member of the committee, yet he raised no objection until after service of the statement of charges and witnesses. On the record, the delayed challenge appeared tactical rather than bona fide. A personal right of objection, where no overriding public policy is infringed, may be waived by conduct and acquiescence. The prolonged silence, despite full knowledge of the relevant facts, supported an inference of waiver.

Conclusion: The judge waived the right to object to the jurist's inclusion in the committee.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed. The Court declined to set aside the impugned inquiry order, while requesting that another distinguished jurist be nominated in place of the objected member so that the inquiry could continue from the stage already reached.

Ratio Decidendi: In a statutory inquiry requiring an impartial committee, a challenge based on bias must satisfy the test of real likelihood or reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a fair-minded informed observer, and such a personal objection may be lost by knowing silence and acquiescence amounting to waiver.

---