Inherent jurisdiction and open court limits: publication restraint during trial may be ordered to protect justice, with no direct rights breach.

Public trials remain the norm, but a court may in exceptional cases regulate publicity or order proceedings in camera where necessary to protect the administration of justice. The text states that this inherent jurisdiction extends to restraining publication of a witness's evidence during trial, and such an order does not itself amount to a direct infringement of rights under Article 19(1), because any impact on speech, movement or profession is only incidental to a judicial order made in aid of justice. It further explains that certiorari under Article 32 is not ordinarily available to challenge a judicial order of a superior court made within its jurisdiction; the proper recourse is appeal or other appropriate proceedings.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court possessed inherent jurisdiction to restrain publication of a witness's evidence during the pendency of the trial; (ii) whether such an order infringed the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; and (iii) whether a writ of certiorari under Article 32 of the Constitution of India lay to challenge the order of the High Court.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court possessed inherent jurisdiction to restrain publication of a witness's evidence during the pendency of the trial.

Analysis: The governing principle is that public trials are the norm because publicity promotes fair administration of justice, but the rule is not absolute. Where the court is satisfied that the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated, it may, in exceptional cases, regulate publicity or even hold a part of the proceedings in camera. That power is treated as part of the court's inherent jurisdiction and is supported by the recognition in statutory provisions preserving the court's power to make orders necessary for the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The High Court had inherent jurisdiction to make an appropriate order restraining publication in a suitable case.

Issue (ii): Whether such an order infringed the petitioners' fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: A judicial order made by a court of competent jurisdiction in the course of deciding a cause does not, by itself, amount to an infringement of fundamental rights. Even if the order incidentally affects the petitioners' ability to report proceedings, that effect is only indirect. The controlling principle is the distinction between a direct abridgment of a guaranteed freedom and an incidental consequence of a judicial order passed to secure the administration of justice. The open court principle remains important, but it yields where the court finds that justice itself requires protection from excessive publicity.

Conclusion: The order did not infringe the petitioners' fundamental rights under Article 19(1).

Issue (iii): Whether a writ of certiorari under Article 32 of the Constitution of India lay to challenge the order of the High Court.

Analysis: Certiorari is a supervisory remedy directed against jurisdictional defect or procedural illegality in the limited sense recognised for such writs. A judicial order passed by a superior court of record in a matter pending before it, and passed in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, is not ordinarily amenable to correction under Article 32 merely because a stranger to the proceedings claims to be affected. The proper remedy against such an order lies in appeal or other appropriate proceedings, not in a writ petition under Article 32.

Conclusion: A writ of certiorari under Article 32 did not lie against the High Court's order.

Final Conclusion: The petitions failed because the impugned order was treated as a judicial order made in aid of the administration of justice, not as a direct invasion of fundamental rights, and it was not open to be quashed in writ jurisdiction under Article 32.

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