Natural justice in land acquisition withdrawal requires notice to an affected beneficiary before withdrawal under Section 48(1).

Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was held not to exclude natural justice, so a beneficiary substantially involved in the acquisition process was entitled to notice and hearing before withdrawal. Because the beneficiary had deposited acquisition costs and faced prejudice from the withdrawal, the impugned notification was invalid for breach of natural justice. The stated grounds for withdrawal also failed: objections to public purpose and the society's status had already been rejected, the Section 6 declaration had become conclusive evidence of public purpose, and the Government could not justify the order with new affidavit reasons. The withdrawal was therefore quashed.

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Issues: (i) whether the beneficiary of an acquisition had a right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act; (ii) whether the withdrawal notification could be sustained on the ground that the acquisition was not supported by a valid public purpose or prior approval.

Issue (i): whether the beneficiary of an acquisition had a right to be heard before withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act.

Analysis: Section 48(1) confers liberty on the Government to withdraw from acquisition before possession is taken, but it does not expressly exclude the principles of natural justice. The Court held that the owner's position is protected by compensation under Section 48(2), whereas the beneficiary has no similar statutory safeguard and may suffer substantial prejudice if the acquisition is withdrawn without notice. Since the acquisition had progressed through the statutory stages and the appellant had deposited substantial amounts towards the acquisition cost, the beneficiary's right to a hearing was held to be attracted.

Conclusion: The beneficiary was entitled to be heard before withdrawal under Section 48(1), and the impugned withdrawal was invalid for breach of natural justice.

Issue (ii): whether the withdrawal notification could be sustained on the ground that the acquisition was not supported by a valid public purpose or prior approval.

Analysis: The stated basis for withdrawal was that acquisition in favour of the society was not permissible. The Court held that the reason was unsustainable because the objections regarding the society's registration and the public purpose character of the acquisition had already been examined and rejected, the declaration under Section 6 had become conclusive evidence of public purpose, and the Government could not supplement the impugned notification with new reasons in affidavit. The Court further held that the material on record showed a housing scheme, that prior approval had in substance been granted, and that there was no legal basis to treat the acquisition as invalid on the supposed absence of approval.

Conclusion: The withdrawal could not be justified on the stated or subsequently supplied grounds, and it was quashed.

Final Conclusion: The acquisition in favour of the appellant remained legally sustainable, and the impugned withdrawal of the acquisition was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: When a statutory withdrawal of acquisition will prejudicially affect a beneficiary who has already been substantially involved in the acquisition process, and the statute does not clearly exclude it, the principles of natural justice require notice and hearing before withdrawal; the legality of the withdrawal must also stand or fall on the reasons recorded in the impugned order itself.

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