Pavement encroachment and eviction procedure: reasonable notice is sufficient, and alternative housing is not automatic.

Footpaths and pavements are public property for pedestrian passage, so there is no right to occupy them for private use. The municipal power to remove such encroachments was described as necessary for public safety, traffic flow and sanitation, while fairness under Article 21 was held to require only reasonable notice adapted to the facts; a mandatory prior hearing was rejected. The text also recognises shelter as a constitutional value, but states that alternative accommodation is not an automatic condition precedent to eviction. Relief depends on schemes, eligibility and income criteria, with eligible original encroachers considered under existing relocation arrangements.

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Issues: (i) Whether pavement encroachers could be removed only after observance of natural justice, and what procedure was required; (ii) whether the encroachers were entitled to alternative accommodation before eviction.

Issue (i): Whether pavement encroachers could be removed only after observance of natural justice, and what procedure was required.

Analysis: Footpaths and pavements are public property meant for free passage of pedestrians and traffic, and there is no right to encroach upon them for private use. The statutory power of the municipal authority to remove such encroachments was treated as essential to maintain public safety, traffic flow, and sanitation. At the same time, the requirement of fairness under Article 21 was held to depend on the facts. Where encroachment is recent, prior hearing may be unnecessary; where it has continued for long, reasonable notice and service of notice in a practicable manner are sufficient to satisfy fairness. An inflexible rule of pre-decisional hearing was rejected.

Conclusion: The action for removal was held not to violate natural justice, and reasonable notice before ejectment was treated as sufficient.

Issue (ii): Whether the encroachers were entitled to alternative accommodation before eviction.

Analysis: The right to shelter and a meaningful right to life were recognised as constitutional values, and the State and local bodies were said to have an obligation to evolve housing schemes for the poor and weaker sections. However, no absolute rule was laid down that every encroacher on public property must be provided alternative accommodation before removal. Relief was held to depend on the facts, the applicable schemes, eligibility, and income criteria. In the present case, existing municipal schemes for relocation and allotment were considered adequate for eligible original encroachers, while those who entered later or by purchase were denied such benefit. The High Court's blanket direction preventing removal until accommodation was provided was disapproved.

Conclusion: The Court held that alternative accommodation was not an automatic precondition to eviction, though eligible original encroachers could be considered under the existing schemes.

Final Conclusion: The municipal authority was permitted to remove the encroachments in accordance with reasonable notice, and the High Court's injunction was modified by limiting relief to eligible original encroachers under the identified accommodation schemes.

Ratio Decidendi: No person has a right to encroach upon footpaths or pavements, and while the State and local bodies have a constitutional obligation to advance shelter for the poor, alternative accommodation is not an invariable condition precedent to the removal of public encroachments; the required procedure is one of fairness adapted to the facts, ordinarily satisfied by reasonable notice.

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