Criminal limitation under the Code runs from complaint filing, not from the Magistrate's later cognizance, preserving diligent prosecution.

For limitation under Section 468 of the Code, the relevant date is filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, not the Magistrate's later act of taking cognizance. Chapter XXXVI was treated as a complete scheme, to be read with the provisions on exclusion of time, continuing offences, and extension of limitation in the interests of justice, so court delay cannot defeat a diligent complainant. The earlier special-statute decision in Krishna Pillai was confined to its own facts, while Bharat Kale, as followed in Japani Sahoo, was held to state the correct law on criminal limitation.

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Issues: (i) Whether, for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, or the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. (ii) Which of the conflicting decisions, Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale as followed in Japani Sahoo, lays down the correct law.

Issue (i): Whether, for computing limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, or the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.

Analysis: Chapter XXXVI of the Code was construed as a complete scheme on limitation, requiring Sections 467 to 473 to be read together. Section 467 defines limitation by reference to Section 468 for taking cognizance, but the scheme also includes exclusions under Sections 470 and 471, continuing offence under Section 472, and overriding power under Section 473 to condone delay in the interests of justice. The Court held that taking cognizance is an act of the Magistrate and may be delayed for reasons beyond the complainant's control; if limitation were linked to the date of cognizance, a diligent complainant could be prejudiced by court delay. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the purpose of the provision and would create anomaly. The Court relied on harmonious and purposive construction, the need to avoid arbitrariness, and the principle that the act of court should prejudice no one.

Conclusion: The relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.

Issue (ii): Which of the conflicting decisions, Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale as followed in Japani Sahoo, lays down the correct law.

Analysis: Krishna Pillai was confined to its own facts because it arose under Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, a special provision with its own language and without consideration of the scheme of Chapter XXXVI or Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo, on the other hand, correctly read the limitation provisions in light of the statutory scheme, legislative history, and the need to prevent prejudice caused by delay attributable to the court. The Court held that the earlier special-law decision could not govern interpretation of Section 468 of the Code in the general scheme of criminal limitation.

Conclusion: Bharat Kale, as followed in Japani Sahoo, lays down the correct law, and Krishna Pillai is confined to its own facts.

Final Conclusion: The law of criminal limitation under Chapter XXXVI of the Code turns on filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, subject to the statutory exclusions and extension of time, and not on the later act of cognizance by the Magistrate.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purposes of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, limitation is computed with reference to the filing of the complaint or institution of prosecution, because Chapter XXXVI is a composite scheme that must be read with its exclusion and condonation provisions, and court delay in taking cognizance cannot defeat a diligent complainant.

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