Special law prevails over general land-abolition law when temple properties are already vested under the governing temple statute.

A special statute governing the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri prevails over a later general land-abolition regime where both operate in the same field, so the conflicting proviso treating temple lands as trust estates could not displace the Temple Act's vesting of the properties in the Temple Managing Committee. The related vesting notification was therefore ineffective to that extent. The text also notes that settlement claims under the abolition law had to be pursued by the intermediary before the Collector within time, and that such quasi-judicial power could not be exercised by a Tahsildar administratively. On that basis, the Math's settlement claim was unsustainable and the settlement order was set aside.

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Issues: (i) Whether the lands belonging to the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri could be brought within the operation of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 despite the special scheme of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955; (ii) Whether the Respondent Math could validly claim settlement of the suit lands under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 and whether the settlement order passed by the Tahsildar was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the lands belonging to the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri could be brought within the operation of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 despite the special scheme of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955.

Analysis: The Temple Act, 1955 is a special enactment dealing specifically with the administration, governance, properties and endowments of the Lord Jagannath Temple. Sections 5 and 33 statutorily vest the Temple and its endowments in the Temple Managing Committee. The later amendment to the OEA Act inserting the proviso to Section 2(oo), and the vesting notification issued under Section 3A, could not be read so as to nullify the special statute governing the Temple. Where two enactments operate in the same field and are irreconcilable, the special law must prevail and the general law must yield to the extent of conflict. The first part of the proviso to Section 2(oo), insofar as it treated Temple lands as trust estates for the purpose of vesting under the OEA Act, directly contradicted the Temple Act and could not survive.

Conclusion: The Temple lands were held not to be governed by the conflicting part of the OEA Act, and the proviso to Section 2(oo) as applied to the Temple properties was struck down. The vesting notification under Section 3A was quashed to that extent, in favour of the Temple.

Issue (ii): Whether the Respondent Math could validly claim settlement of the suit lands under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 and whether the settlement order passed by the Tahsildar was sustainable.

Analysis: Under Section 8A, claims for settlement had to be filed by the intermediary before the Collector within the prescribed time. The proceedings were quasi-judicial in nature, and the Tahsildar could not validly exercise that adjudicatory power as an administrative authority. On the facts, the Respondent Math had not established a legally sustainable basis for claiming intermediary status in the manner contemplated by the Act. Since the Temple lands were already vested under the special Temple Act, no fresh claim under the OEA Act was necessary or competent. The settlement made in favour of the Math was therefore contrary to law and could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The Respondent Math had no valid right to secure settlement under the OEA Act, and the Tahsildar's settlement order was set aside in favour of the Temple.

Final Conclusion: The judgment gives primacy to the special statutory regime governing the Lord Jagannath Temple, invalidates the conflicting application of the later OEA amendment to Temple properties, and restores the Temple Committee's entitlement over the disputed lands.

Ratio Decidendi: When a special enactment expressly vests temple properties in a designated managing body, a later general law cannot be applied to divest that statutory vesting in the absence of a clear legislative intent, and any conflicting provision must yield to the special law.

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