TaxTMI Login
Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
of 
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
All Case Laws
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
All Case Laws
Join Channel
Note
Bookmark
Share
Don't have an account? Register Here
of Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether dismissal on merits of a writ petition under Article 226 bars a subsequent petition under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same relief by res judicata; (ii) whether dismissal of the earlier writ petition for laches, alternative remedy, withdrawal, or in limine without a speaking order creates such a bar; (iii) whether a High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is sufficiently concurrent with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 for the rule of res judicata to apply.
Issue (i): Whether dismissal on merits of a writ petition under Article 226 bars a subsequent petition under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same relief by res judicata.
Analysis: The jurisdiction under Article 32 is an original constitutional remedy, but it is not immune from the principle of finality embodied in res judicata. The rule is founded on public policy, namely that there must be an end to litigation and that a party should not be vexed twice over the same matter. Where a High Court has heard a writ petition as a contested matter and has dismissed it on merits, the judgment remains binding between the parties unless reversed or modified in the manner known to law. A subsequent petition under Article 32 cannot be used as an original substitute for an appeal against that adjudication.
Conclusion: A dismissal of a writ petition under Article 226 on the merits operates as res judicata against a subsequent petition under Article 32 on the same cause and relief.
Issue (ii): Whether dismissal of the earlier writ petition for laches, alternative remedy, withdrawal, or in limine without a speaking order creates such a bar.
Analysis: A dismissal based only on laches or on the availability of an alternative remedy does not amount to a decision on the merits and therefore ordinarily does not bar a later petition under Article 32. Likewise, where the earlier petition was withdrawn, there is no adjudication capable of operating as res judicata. If a petition is dismissed in limine without a speaking order, the absence of recorded reasons makes it unsafe to treat the dismissal as one on merits. Only where the in limine order itself discloses a decision on the merits can it found a bar.
Conclusion: Dismissal for laches, alternative remedy, withdrawal, or by a non-speaking in limine order does not ordinarily create a bar of res judicata.
Issue (iii): Whether the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is sufficiently concurrent with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32 for the rule of res judicata to apply.
Analysis: The scope of writ relief available under Article 226 and Article 32 is substantially concurrent in relation to claims for enforcement of fundamental rights. The fact that Article 32 is itself a fundamental right to move the Supreme Court does not prevent the application of res judicata where the same issue has already been adjudicated by a competent court in a contested proceeding. The High Court's decision on the existence, breach, or constitutional justification of the alleged fundamental right is therefore capable of binding the parties in a later Article 32 proceeding.
Conclusion: The High Court's decision in a contested writ petition under Article 226 can operate as res judicata in a later petition under Article 32.
Final Conclusion: The judgment affirms that res judicata can bar a later Article 32 petition when the earlier writ petition under Article 226 was decided on merits, while excluding dismissals that were not adjudications on the merits; on that basis, some petitions were rejected as barred and others were allowed to proceed.
Ratio Decidendi: A contested writ petition under Article 226, once dismissed on the merits by a competent court, conclusively determines the parties' rights on that issue and bars a subsequent Article 32 petition on the same facts and relief, but a dismissal not on the merits does not.
TaxTMI 
