1960 (12) TMI 77 - SC - Indian Laws

Supreme Court dismisses employers association appeal challenging termination of watch and ward staff under clause 5(a)

JK. COTTON SPINNING & WEAVING MILLS CO. LTD. Versus STATE OF UP.

The SC dismissed an appeal by an employers association challenging termination of watch and ward staff. The Labour Appellate Tribunal correctly held that ... Maintainability of an application made by the Employers' Association of Northern India, Kanpur on behalf of, the J. K. Cotton and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd., a member of the Association in connection with the proposed termination of service of certain members of its Watch and Ward Staff challenged Held that:- The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India rightly held that the application under cl. 5(a) filed on June 13, 1950 was not maintainable and rightly set aside the awards of the Conciliation Board and the Industrial Court. The appeal against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India is therefore dismissed. As already pointed out the order made by the appellate Bench of the High Court in the writ petition was based on its acceptance of the preliminary objection that the records of the Labour Appellate Tribunal being in Calcutta could not be reached by any writ of the Allahabad High Court. In view of our conclusion that the application under cl. 5(a) was not maintainable, the appellant was on merits not entitled to any writ and on that ground the appeal against the High Court's order must also be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe core legal questions considered by the Court were:(a) Whether an application under clause 5(a) of the Government Order dated March 10, 1948, as amended, made by an employers' association on behalf of a member company seeking permission to terminate certain workmen was maintainable.(b) Whether an industrial dispute arises at the moment an employer decides to dismiss workmen and proposes to give effect to such dismissal, or only when the workmen object to the dismissal.(c) Whether clause 23 of the Government Order, which prohibits dismissal or discharge of workmen during the pendency of an inquiry or appeal without written permission from the Regional Conciliation Officer, bars an application under clause 5(a) during such pendency.(d) The interplay and potential conflict between clauses 5(a) and 23 of the Government Order and the proper rule of construction to resolve this conflict.(e) The jurisdictional and procedural propriety of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and High Court in entertaining or refusing to entertain writ petitions and appeals related to the matter.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISIssue (a): Maintainability of the application under clause 5(a)Legal framework and precedents: Clause 5(a) of the Government Order provides that an employee, recognised association of employers, registered trade union of workmen, or elected representatives of workmen may apply in writing to the Conciliation Board to inquire into any industrial dispute. Clause 23 prohibits dismissal during the pendency of inquiry or appeal without written permission. Clause 24 declares all orders final and conclusive, and clause 26 prescribes penalties for contravention.Court's reasoning: The Court noted that the application was made on June 13, 1950, while an inquiry was pending before a Conciliation Officer. The Court emphasized the importance of clause 23, which prohibits dismissal without permission during such pendency, and that contravention attracts severe penalties including imprisonment.Application of law to facts: Since an inquiry was pending, clause 23 applied, barring dismissal without permission. The Court held that an application under clause 5(a) seeking permission to dismiss during such pendency was not maintainable. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had correctly so held.Treatment of competing arguments: The appellant argued that clause 23 should not apply when an application under clause 5(a) is made, invoking harmonious construction. The Court rejected this, holding that harmonious construction does not mean destroying a provision and that clause 23's purpose would be defeated if clause 5(a) applications were allowed during pendency.Conclusion: The Court concluded that clause 5(a) applications are barred during pendency of inquiry or appeal under clause 23, and thus the application was not maintainable.Issue (b): When does an industrial dispute arise for the purpose of clause 5(a)Rs.Legal framework: Clause 5(a) requires an application to state the industrial dispute to be inquired into. The question was whether an industrial dispute arises upon the employer's decision to dismiss or only upon objection by workmen.Court's reasoning: The Court noted two views: one that a dispute arises only when workmen object, and the other that it arises at the stage of proposed dismissal. The Court refrained from deciding this issue since the maintainability question under clause 23 was dispositive.Conclusion: The Court did not decide this issue as it was unnecessary given the ruling on clause 23.Issue (c): Effect of clause 23 prohibiting dismissal during pendency of inquiry or appealLegal framework: Clause 23 prohibits dismissal or discharge during the continuance of inquiry or appeal without written permission from the Regional Conciliation Officer or Additional Officer. Clause 26 prescribes penalties for breach.Court's reasoning: The Court emphasized the legislative intent behind clause 23 was to prevent fresh disputes during ongoing proceedings. It equated clause 23 to similar provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act and underscored the heavy penalties to ensure compliance.Application of law to facts: Since an inquiry was pending, clause 23 applied, barring dismissal without permission. The Court held that clause 5(a) applications could not be used to circumvent clause 23.Conclusion: Clause 23 applies strictly during pendency, barring dismissal without permission, and clause 5(a) applications are not maintainable in such circumstances.Issue (d): Harmonious construction and conflict between clauses 5(a) and 23Legal framework and precedents: The Court examined the rule of harmonious construction and the principle that specific provisions prevail over general ones. It cited authorities including Pretty v. Solly and others, which hold that where a specific and a general provision conflict, the specific provision governs.Court's reasoning: The Court rejected the appellant's argument that clause 23 should be read down to allow clause 5(a) applications during pendency. It reasoned that clause 23 is a special provision intended to prevent fresh disputes and that clause 5(a) is a general provision for commencement of proceedings. Therefore, clause 23 prevails over clause 5(a) during pendency.Application of law to facts: Applying this principle, the Court held clause 5(a) does not apply where clause 23 is applicable, i.e., during inquiry or appeal pendency.Conclusion: Clause 23 is a special provision that overrides the general provision of clause 5(a) during pendency of inquiry or appeal, rendering clause 5(a) applications not maintainable in such cases.Issue (e): Jurisdiction of Labour Appellate Tribunal and High Court writ jurisdictionLegal framework: The Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside awards on the ground of maintainability. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on delay grounds and on a preliminary objection that it lacked jurisdiction to call for records located in Calcutta.Court's reasoning: The Supreme Court held that since the application under clause 5(a) was not maintainable on merits, the appellant was not entitled to the writ relief. Therefore, the appeal against the High Court's order was dismissed without deciding the jurisdictional question.Conclusion: The Labour Appellate Tribunal rightly set aside the awards, and the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition on procedural grounds. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals accordingly.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS'We must hold that cl. 5(a) has no application in a case where the special provisions of cl. 23 are applicable.''The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect.''The heavy punishment provided for contravention of the order shows the importance attached by the legislating authority to the directions given by the Order.''The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India rightly held that the application under cl. 5(a) filed on June 13, 1950 was not maintainable and rightly set aside the awards of the Conciliation Board and the Industrial Court.'The Court established the core principle that during the pendency of an inquiry or appeal under the Government Order, no dismissal or discharge of workmen can be effected without written permission from the Regional Conciliation Officer, and any attempt to circumvent this by invoking clause 5(a) applications is barred. The specific prohibition in clause 23 overrides the general provision in clause 5(a).Final determinations:(a) The application under clause 5(a) made during pendency of inquiry was not maintainable.(b) Clause 23 bars dismissal without permission during pendency and prevails over clause 5(a).(c) The Labour Appellate Tribunal's decision to set aside the awards was correct.(d) The High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was appropriate on procedural grounds.