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Issues: (i) whether the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 applies retroactively to ongoing projects and whether such application is constitutionally valid; (ii) whether complaints seeking refund under Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 lie before the Regulatory Authority or exclusively before the Adjudicating Officer; (iii) whether the Authority can delegate to a single member the hearing of complaints under Section 31; (iv) whether the pre-deposit requirement under the proviso to Section 43(5) is valid; (v) whether amounts refundable under the Act can be recovered under Section 40(1).
Issue (i): whether the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 applies retroactively to ongoing projects and whether such application is constitutionally valid.
Analysis: The Act was enacted to regulate an earlier unregulated real estate sector, protect homebuyers, ensure accountability, and bring ongoing projects without completion certificates within its fold. The proviso to Section 3(1) expressly covers ongoing projects, while completed projects or those with completion certificates are excluded. The operation of the Act is therefore based on antecedent facts but applies to future conduct and obligations, which makes it retroactive rather than truly retrospective. Such application does not destroy vested rights, because the legislature was competent to impose new regulatory obligations in the public interest.
Conclusion: The Act applies retroactively to ongoing projects and the challenge based on Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) fails.
Issue (ii): whether complaints seeking refund under Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19 lie before the Regulatory Authority or exclusively before the Adjudicating Officer.
Analysis: The statutory scheme draws a clear distinction between refund and compensation. Sections 18 and 19 confer an immediate right to refund on demand where possession is not delivered, while Section 71 is confined to adjudging compensation under Sections 12, 14, 18 and 19. Rules 33 and 34 reinforce this separation by prescribing different forms and procedures for regulatory complaints and compensation claims. The Authority can decide refund and related interest, whereas compensation falls within the exclusive domain of the Adjudicating Officer.
Conclusion: Refund claims lie before the Regulatory Authority, while compensation claims are exclusively triable by the Adjudicating Officer.
Issue (iii): whether the Authority can delegate to a single member the hearing of complaints under Section 31.
Analysis: Section 81 expressly permits the Authority to delegate its powers and functions by general or special order, except the power to make regulations. Section 31 complaints are quasi-judicial in nature, but the statute does not prohibit delegation of such matters, and the Authority's composition provision does not prescribe a mandatory bench strength for complaint adjudication. Section 29 concerns meetings and policy decisions, not complaint adjudication. The special order delegating hearing of Section 31 complaints to a single member was therefore within statutory power.
Conclusion: The delegation to a single member was valid and orders passed by the single member were not without jurisdiction.
Issue (iv): whether the pre-deposit requirement under the proviso to Section 43(5) is valid.
Analysis: The right of appeal is statutory and can validly be conditioned by reasonable pre-deposit requirements. The impugned proviso treats promoters as a distinct class, reflecting the Act's protective scheme for allottees and ensuring that money determined as refundable is secured during the appeal. Comparable pre-deposit provisions have been upheld in other statutes, and the condition is neither arbitrary nor so onerous as to make the appeal illusory.
Conclusion: The pre-deposit condition under Section 43(5) is valid and enforceable.
Issue (v): whether amounts refundable under the Act can be recovered under Section 40(1).
Analysis: Section 40(1) speaks of recovery of interest, penalty or compensation as arrears of land revenue, but the Act's scheme makes refund under Section 18 part of a composite monetary liability consisting of principal plus interest. A strict reading limiting recovery only to penalty or compensation would defeat the statute's remedial purpose. By harmonious construction, amounts determined as refundable to allottees by the Authority or the Adjudicating Officer are recoverable under Section 40(1).
Conclusion: The refundable principal amount, along with the quantified monetary liability, is recoverable under Section 40(1).
Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on all substantive challenges and the statutory scheme was upheld, including retroactive application to ongoing projects, the Authority's jurisdiction over refund claims, valid delegation to a single member, the mandatory pre-deposit for promoter appeals, and recovery of refundable amounts as arrears of land revenue.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a regulatory statute governing a beneficial consumer regime expressly extends to ongoing projects, courts will give effect to that retroactive operation; refund and compensation may be assigned to different forums when the statute so delineates; and statutory appeal conditions and recovery mechanisms are valid if they are reasonable and consistent with the object of the enactment.
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