Administrative requisition power: public-purpose satisfaction was treated as executive, so certiorari did not lie on the merits.

Where the Ordinance left requisition to the Provincial Government's opinion that it was necessary or expedient for a public purpose, the majority treated the power as executive and the resulting requisition order as an administrative act. Because the statute did not impose a duty to act judicially and the public-purpose assessment formed part of the Government's subjective satisfaction, certiorari would not lie merely on the ground that the decision was wrong. The dissent considered public purpose a jurisdictional fact requiring judicial determination and would have allowed certiorari, but the governing effect is that the requisitioning power was not subject to merits review on that issue.

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Issues: Whether an order of requisition made by the Provincial Government under section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance, 1947, was a quasi-judicial order amenable to certiorari, and whether the existence of a public purpose was a jurisdictional fact requiring judicial determination.

Analysis: The majority held that the power conferred by section 3 was an executive power exercisable if the Provincial Government formed the requisite opinion that requisition was necessary or expedient for a public purpose. The words of the Ordinance, read with its scheme and the permissive enquiry provisions in sections 10 and 12, did not impose a duty to act judicially. The determination of public purpose was treated as part of the Government's subjective satisfaction, not as a lis or adjudication between contesting parties. On that view, the requisition order was an administrative act, and certiorari could not issue merely because the decision was alleged to be wrong. The majority therefore also regarded the other objections as unnecessary to decide.

Conclusion: The requisition order was not quasi-judicial, and certiorari did not lie; the appeal succeeded.

Dissenting Opinion: Mahajan J. held that the existence of a public purpose was an objective jurisdictional fact which had to be determined judicially and that the Ordinance contemplated an enquiry capable of affecting valuable rights. On that view, certiorari was maintainable against the Provincial Government and the appeal should have been dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The governing legal effect of the decision is that, under this Ordinance, the Provincial Government's requisitioning power depended on its own administrative satisfaction and was not subject to certiorari review on the merits of the public-purpose determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute leaves the existence of a public purpose and the necessity or expediency of requisition to the subjective opinion of the executive authority, the resulting requisition order is an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial determination amenable to certiorari.

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