Taxability of donations and Mass stipends turned on whether the receipts were income, not merely on deleted exemption wording.

Donations received for construction of a college and Mass stipends were held not to be taxable income because the authorities first had to determine whether the receipts were income at all; they wrongly treated deletion of an exemption for voluntary contributions as making every such receipt taxable. The receipts were characterised as specific gifts or capital receipts, casual and non-recurring in nature, and the Mass stipends were misconceived as payments to the monastery rather than stipends attached to the priest's duty to say Mass. The writ court could intervene under article 226 because the errors went to the root of jurisdiction, and alternative remedies did not bar certiorari in these circumstances.

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Issues: (i) Whether donations received for the construction of the college and Mass stipends constituted taxable income under the Cochin Income-tax Act, and whether the authorities erred in treating them as voluntary contributions taxable merely because an exemption clause was deleted. (ii) Whether the writ court should interfere under article 226 on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record despite the existence of other statutory remedies.

Issue (i): Whether donations received for the construction of the college and Mass stipends constituted taxable income under the Cochin Income-tax Act, and whether the authorities erred in treating them as voluntary contributions taxable merely because an exemption clause was deleted.

Analysis: The charging provision could operate only if the receipts were income. The authorities proceeded on the mistaken assumption that, once the exemption for voluntary contributions was deleted, all such receipts automatically became taxable, without first deciding whether the receipts were income at all. The donations were made for a specific object, depended on the donors' goodwill, were in the nature of gifts or capital receipts, and lacked the character of periodical income. They were also receipts of a casual and non-recurring nature within the exemption provision. Mass stipends were further misconceived as payments to the Monastery, when they were in substance stipends attached to the priest's obligation to say Mass.

Conclusion: The receipts were not taxable income on the reasoning adopted by the authorities, and their assessment on that basis was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ court should interfere under article 226 on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record despite the existence of other statutory remedies.

Analysis: Certiorari lies where an inferior authority acts without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or commits a patent error on the face of the record. The authorities failed to address the fundamental question whether the receipts were income, misconstrued the exemption provision, and misunderstood the nature of Mass stipends. Those were not mere errors within jurisdiction but patent errors going to the root of the matter. The existence of alternative remedies did not bar interference in the circumstances, particularly where the petitioner had no clear and effective remedy to correct the impugned orders.

Conclusion: The case was fit for interference under article 226, and certiorari could issue.

Final Conclusion: The assessment orders were quashed because the income-tax authorities proceeded on a fundamental misapprehension of the statute and of the true character of the receipts, resulting in a patent jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ of certiorari may be issued where an inferior authority, while acting within its general jurisdiction, commits a patent error by failing to decide the fundamental issue before it and by misconstruing the governing statutory provision, especially when the impugned receipt is not income in law.

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