Inherent jurisdiction survives second revision bar; internal government authorisation cannot extend limitation for filing a prosecution.
The High Court held that the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC remains available despite the bar on a second revision under Section 397(3), so the maintainability objection failed. It further held that the period taken for the Central Government's internal consideration before authorising filing of the complaint was not excludable under Section 470(3) CrPC, because the Companies Act provisions involved no statutory previous sanction or consent. As the complaint was filed beyond limitation and no sufficient cause for condonation was shown under Section 473, the complaint was time-barred and rejection of the condonation application was upheld.
Issues: (i) Whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable despite the bar against a second revision under Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether the period between the submission of the SFIO report and the Central Government's communication to file the complaint could be excluded under Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (iii) Whether the complaint was barred by limitation and the application for condonation of delay was liable to be rejected.
Issue (i): Whether a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was maintainable despite the bar against a second revision under Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is not eclipsed by the prohibition on a second revision. The bar under Section 397(3) is intended to prevent repetitive revisional challenges, but it does not create an absolute embargo on invoking Section 482 in an appropriate case. The maintainability objection therefore failed.
Conclusion: The petition under Section 482 was maintainable.
Issue (ii): Whether the period between the submission of the SFIO report and the Central Government's communication to file the complaint could be excluded under Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Exclusion under Section 470(3) applies where a prosecution requires previous consent or sanction of the Government or another authority. Sections 242 and 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 did not require previous sanction or consent for institution of the prosecution. The Central Government's internal consideration and decision to authorise filing of the complaint was administrative in character and could not be equated with statutory sanction or consent. The delay during that period was therefore not excludable.
Conclusion: The period could not be excluded under Section 470(3).
Issue (iii): Whether the complaint was barred by limitation and the application for condonation of delay was liable to be rejected.
Analysis: Once the report was submitted, limitation commenced from the date of knowledge of the offence. The complaint was filed beyond the prescribed period, and the application for condonation did not disclose any legally sustainable basis for exclusion of time or sufficient cause under Section 473. The complaint was therefore time-barred.
Conclusion: The complaint was barred by limitation and the application for condonation of delay was rightly rejected.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the orders of the subordinate courts failed, as the prosecution could not claim exclusion of the disputed period and the complaint remained barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: Administrative approval or internal authorisation for filing a prosecution is not the same as statutory previous consent or sanction for the purpose of excluding time under Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; where no such statutory sanction is required, delay during governmental consideration cannot be excluded from limitation.
TaxTMI 
AI Drafter ✕
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
