Limitation for defamation complaints runs from the date of the offence, and late filing cannot be saved without statutory exclusion.

Limitation for cognizance of a defamation complaint under Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs from the date of the offence, not from a later acquittal or subsequent event. On the facts, the allegedly defamatory statement was contained in an earlier complaint filed on 15 March 1972, so the three-year period had expired when the defamation complaint was filed on 11 February 1976. Exclusion of time under Section 470(1) was unavailable because the statutory conditions were not met. The complaint was therefore time-barred and the Magistrate lacked authority to take cognizance; the summons order was quashed.

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Issues: Whether the complaint for defamation was barred by limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and whether the complainant was entitled to exclusion of time under the provision governing exclusion of periods spent in other prosecutions.

Analysis: The period of limitation for an offence punishable with imprisonment not exceeding three years is three years under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under Section 469(1)(a), that period begins on the date of the offence. Since the defamatory matter was alleged to have been contained in the earlier complaint filed on 15 March 1972, that date was the date of the offence for purposes of limitation. The complaint under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was instituted only on 11 February 1976, after expiry of the three-year period. The argument that limitation should run from the date of acquittal was rejected because the statutory scheme fixes the starting point by reference to the offence, not a subsequent cause of action. The plea for exclusion of time under Section 470(1) also failed because there was no prior prosecution by the complainant against the accused relating to the same facts in a manner satisfying the statutory requirements.

Conclusion: The complaint was time-barred, and the Magistrate had no authority to take cognizance of the offence.

Final Conclusion: The order issuing summons was quashed and the challenge to cognizance succeeded on the ground of limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, limitation for cognizance begins on the date of the offence, and a complaint instituted after expiry of the prescribed period cannot be saved unless a specific statutory exclusion or extension applies.

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