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Issues: (i) Whether the summoning order was liable to be quashed for want of proof of service of the statutory orders/notices under section 234 of the Companies Act, 1956; (ii) Whether cognizance was barred by limitation.
Issue (i): Whether the summoning order was liable to be quashed for want of proof of service of the statutory orders/notices under section 234 of the Companies Act, 1956.
Analysis: The record did not show prima facie proof that the statutory orders issued under section 234 of the Companies Act, 1956 were served on the company. Mere reply to an earlier inquiry letter could not amount to acknowledgement of service of the statutory orders. Service of such orders was necessary before alleging non-compliance, and the absence of documentary proof of delivery showed that prosecution had been initiated without affording an opportunity to respond.
Conclusion: The complaint was not maintainable for want of proof of service of the statutory orders, and the summoning order could not be sustained.
Issue (ii): Whether cognizance was barred by limitation.
Analysis: The alleged offence was not a continuing offence. Limitation for cognizance commenced when the prosecuting agency acquired knowledge of the offence, and there was no application for condonation of delay before the trial court. The complaint and cognizance were taken beyond the permissible period.
Conclusion: Cognizance was barred by limitation.
Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction was rightly invoked to prevent injustice, and the summoning order was set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Where service of mandatory statutory orders is not prima facie proved and cognizance is taken beyond limitation in a case that is not a continuing offence, the criminal proceeding and summoning order are liable to be quashed under the Court's inherent powers.