Limitation under CrPC cannot be extended by administrative permission where statutory sanction is not required

Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only where the statute itself requires consent or sanction; administrative permission obtained separately does not extend limitation. In a prosecution for alleged default in appointing a whole-time Company Secretary under the Companies Act, the Court noted that the post had remained vacant and that the relevant appointment was shown only on 01.11.2005. On that footing, the complaint had to be filed within six months from that date. The time taken to obtain Central Government permission was therefore not excludable, and the complaint was barred by limitation.

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Issues: Whether the period taken to obtain administrative permission from the Central Government could be excluded under Section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for a prosecution under Section 383(1A) of the Companies Act, 1956, and whether the complaint was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The complaint concerned alleged default in having a whole-time Company Secretary. The Court found that the post had been vacant from 26.09.2002 and that, on the petitioner's own document, the relevant appointment was shown only on 01.11.2005. On that basis, the complaint ought to have been filed within six months from that date. The Court held that Section 470(3) applies only where a consent or sanction is required under the statute itself. In the present prosecution, no statutory consent or sanction from the Central Government was required; the permission obtained on the administrative side could not be treated as statutory sanction for exclusion of time.

Conclusion: The time taken to obtain Central Government permission was not excludable, and the complaint was barred by limitation.

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