Limitation for Industrial Disputes prosecutions turned on authorisation, not sanction, so time exclusion was unavailable.

A complaint for an offence punishable under the Industrial Disputes Act was subject to the limitation period under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held that section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act requires only that the complaint be made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government; it does not require prior consent or sanction for prosecution. As a result, the time taken to obtain authorisation could not be excluded under section 470(3) of the Code, because that provision applies only where sanction or consent is legally required. The complaint was therefore barred by limitation and the process order was liable to be quashed.

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Issues: Whether the complaint for an offence under the Industrial Disputes Act was barred by limitation and whether the period spent in obtaining authorisation under section 34(1) could be excluded under section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The offence alleged was punishable under section 31(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the prosecution was therefore subject to the limitation period under section 468(2)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that section 34(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not require previous consent or sanction for institution of prosecution; it only requires that the complaint be made by or under the authority of the appropriate Government. Since section 470(3) applies only where prior consent or sanction is required for institution of prosecution, the time taken to obtain authorisation could not be excluded. The Court also followed the view that such authorisation does not amount to sanction within the meaning of section 470(3).

Conclusion: The complaint was barred by limitation, section 470(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had no application, and the order issuing process was liable to be quashed.

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