Post-commencement supply liability under the 1993 Act is prospective, time-barred claims remain subject to limitation, and interest-only suits can lie.

Liability under the 1993 Act arises from supply made after commencement and the buyer's default in payment, not from the date of the underlying contract, so the Act applies prospectively to post-commencement supplies. The Act is therefore not retrospective or retroactive. A suit for recovery of interest under the Act remains subject to the Limitation Act; limitation runs when the right to sue accrues, and a claim filed beyond three years is time-barred, with section 14 unavailable on the facts stated. A suit confined to interest alone is maintainable where interest remains due. In the review matter, an appeal against the review order was not maintainable, and equitable interest at 9% was sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the 1993 Act applies where the supply contract was entered into before 23.09.1992 but the supplies were made after the Act came into force; (ii) whether the Act can be treated as retrospective or retroactive; (iii) whether the money suit for recovery of interest was barred by limitation; (iv) whether a suit for recovery of only interest is maintainable; (v) whether the appeal against the review order in the Trusses and Towers matter was maintainable and whether 9% interest could be awarded in review.

Issue (i): Whether the 1993 Act applies where the supply contract was entered into before 23.09.1992 but the supplies were made after the Act came into force.

Analysis: The statutory liability under Sections 3 and 4 is triggered by supply of goods or rendering of services and the consequent default in payment, not by the date of the underlying agreement. The Act is a beneficial legislation intended to ensure prompt payment to small scale industries. The date of the supply order or contract is not treated in the statutory scheme as the incidence for fastening liability. If supplies are made after commencement of the Act, the buyer's liability to pay interest arises under the Act even if the agreement pre-dated it.

Conclusion: The Act applies to supplies made after its commencement notwithstanding that the contract was entered into earlier, in favour of the appellants on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Act can be treated as retrospective or retroactive.

Analysis: The Act does not attach liability to completed past transactions; it governs the buyer's default in payment for supplies made after commencement. The provisions operate prospectively on post-commencement supplies and payments. The statutory scheme does not require the Act to be characterised as retroactive in order to apply to such transactions.

Conclusion: The Act is prospective and not retrospective or retroactive.

Issue (iii): Whether the money suit for recovery of interest was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 10 does not override the Limitation Act, 1963. A suit for interest under the 1993 Act is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, and limitation begins when the right to sue accrues. On the facts, the right to sue accrued when payment became due after the last supply and the appointed day expired. The suit filed thereafter was beyond three years. Section 14 of the Limitation Act was not available on the facts pleaded.

Conclusion: The suit was barred by limitation, against the appellants.

Issue (iv): Whether a suit for recovery of only interest is maintainable.

Analysis: Section 6 permits recovery of the amount due together with interest, and the provision must be construed to advance the object of the Act. A claim confined to interest alone does not become non-maintainable merely because the principal has already been paid, if interest remains due under Sections 4 and 5.

Conclusion: A suit for interest alone is maintainable, in favour of the appellants on this issue.

Issue (v): Whether the appeal against the review order in the Trusses and Towers matter was maintainable and whether 9% interest could be awarded in review.

Analysis: The earlier withdrawal of the special leave petition without liberty confined the later challenge to the grounds on which review had been permitted. The High Court, even after holding that the 1993 Act was inapplicable, could award simple interest on equitable principles. Award of 9% interest was not erroneous on the facts of that matter.

Conclusion: The appeal against the review order was not maintainable, and the award of 9% interest was sustained, against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The Court upheld dismissal of the principal claims, held the relevant suit to be time-barred, affirmed the sustainment of equitable interest in the review matter, and ultimately dismissed all the appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: Liability under the 1993 Act depends on post-commencement supply and default in payment, but enforcement of that statutory right remains subject to the Limitation Act and to the expiry of the period when the right to sue accrues.

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