1992 (4) TMI 251 - HC - Indian Laws

High Court's Jurisdiction on Disciplinary Punishments Clarified

The High Court held that it does not have the jurisdiction to set aside a punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority, even if it deems the punishment ... Judicial review of disciplinary punishment - Prohibition on High Court substituting punishment after full fledged enquiry - Disproportionate punishment and Article 14 - Second proviso to Article 311(2) - Clause (a) - Scope of appellate/equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 versus writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - High Court inherent power to do 'complete justice' in writ jurisdictionJudicial review of disciplinary punishment - Prohibition on High Court substituting punishment after full fledged enquiry - High Court's power to set aside or substitute punishment imposed after a full fledged departmental enquiry - HELD THAT: - On the material before it the Court held that where punishment has been imposed pursuant to a full fledged departmental enquiry, the High Court exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 has no jurisdiction to set aside the punishment as arbitrary, grossly excessive or disproportionate and substitute any other punishment in its place. The Court relied on and followed the reasoning in Parma Nanda which, after considering earlier decisions, enunciated that the power to impose or substitute punishment as a matter of equitable jurisdiction is within the Supreme Court's province under Article 136 and is not a power conferred on the High Court in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. Consequently the view taken in earlier two Judge unreported orders of this Court to the contrary was held not to be correct in cases arising from a full enquiry. The Court expressly confined the exception noted in Parma Nanda to cases under Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) (i.e., dismissal, removal or reduction of rank simpliciter on conviction) and made clear that Tulsiram Patel's observations (paragraph 127) do not avail the petitioner in a case following a full inquiry. [Paras 18]High Court cannot set aside or substitute punishment awarded after a full fledged departmental enquiry; the reference is answered accordingly.Disproportionate punishment and Article 14 - Second proviso to Article 311(2) - Clause (a) - Per incuriam doctrine - Whether Parma Nanda is to be treated as per incuriam and whether Tulsiram Patel (paragraph 127) displaces Bidya Bhusan in permitting High Courts to substitute punishment - HELD THAT: - The Court examined the contention that Parma Nanda ignored Bhagatram (which held that disproportionate penalty may violate Article 14) and thus was per incuriam. Applying authoritative explanations of per incuriam, the Court found that Parma Nanda was not rendered per incuriam since no binding statutory provision or authority was overlooked that would render its conclusion demonstrably wrong. The Court further observed that paragraph 127 of Tulsiram Patel, though speaking of substitution of punishment in certain contexts, does not have the effect of displacing the principle in Parma Nanda or the continued applicability of Bidya Bhusan in respect of punishments imposed after full enquiry; Parma Nanda's reading confines substitution powers to the narrow context of Clause (a) of the second proviso and to the appellate/equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Paras 10, 14, 16, 17]Parma Nanda is not per incuriam; Tulsiram Patel's paragraph 127 does not entitle High Courts to substitute punishment in cases following a full fledged enquiry and does not displace the principle applied in Parma Nanda.High Court inherent power to do 'complete justice' in writ jurisdiction - Scope of High Court's inherent jurisdiction to review its orders and to pass orders necessary to do 'complete justice' - HELD THAT: - The Court noted, as a considered observation, that High Courts possess inherent jurisdiction to review their judgments pronounced in writ petitions and that Article 226 has been flexibly applied to enable High Courts to pass orders necessary to do 'complete justice' in appropriate cases. While recognising that Article 142 expressly confers wide powers on the Supreme Court, the Court observed practical and policy reasons why High Courts should be able to grant effective relief to secure complete justice in many matters, and cited authorities where the High Court exercised its writ jurisdiction to achieve complete justice. However, this observation was expressed as a parting thought and does not constitute a holding that the High Court may, contrary to Parma Nanda, substitute punishment awarded after a full enquiry. [Paras 20, 21]High Courts have inherent jurisdiction to review their writ orders and may, in appropriate circumstances, pass orders to do 'complete justice', but this observation does not displace the holding that they cannot substitute punishment imposed after a full enquiry.Final Conclusion: Reference answered: the High Court has no jurisdiction to set aside or substitute punishment awarded pursuant to a full fledged departmental enquiry even if the punishment appears arbitrary or grossly excessive; Parma Nanda is not per incuriam and limits substitution powers to the narrow context recognised therein; the Court observed separately that High Courts possess inherent review jurisdiction and may, in proper cases, pass orders to do 'complete justice', without effecting the principal holding. Issues Involved:1. Whether the High Court in a writ proceeding can set aside an order of punishment if it is arbitrary, grossly excessive, or out of all proportion to the offence committed.2. Whether the High Court can substitute any other punishment in place of the one imposed by the disciplinary authority.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Whether the High Court in a writ proceeding can set aside an order of punishment if it is arbitrary, grossly excessive, or out of all proportion to the offence committed:The judgment begins by addressing the question of whether a High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority if it finds the punishment to be arbitrary, grossly excessive, or out of all proportion to the offence committed. The court notes that previous decisions by two-judge benches of the Orissa High Court had allowed such interference, relying on Supreme Court decisions in Bhagatram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1983 SC 454, and Shankar Das v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 772.However, another bench of the Orissa High Court in Y. Venkatrao v. South-Eastern Railway, (1991) 71 Cut LT 512, disagreed with this view, citing the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185, which held that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice. The court also referred to the Constitution Bench decision in State of Orissa v. Bidya Bhusan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779, which stated that the High Court cannot interfere with the punishment once the misdemeanour is found and proved.The court further examines whether the observations in paragraph 127 of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416, which suggested that the High Court can substitute a punishment if it finds the original punishment to be arbitrary or grossly excessive, would apply to the present case. The court concludes that these observations were made in the context of Clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution and do not apply to cases where the punishment was imposed following a full-fledged departmental enquiry.2. Whether the High Court can substitute any other punishment in place of the one imposed by the disciplinary authority:The court discusses the contention that the High Court can substitute a punishment if it finds the original punishment to be disproportionate, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Bhagatram's case. However, it notes that this view was not considered binding in Parma Nanda's case, which held that the High Court does not have the power to substitute a punishment, a power that the Supreme Court can exercise under Article 136 of the Constitution.The court also addresses the argument that the decision in Parma Nanda's case is per incuriam (given in ignorance of a binding authority) because it did not consider the observation in Bhagatram's case that disproportionate penalties violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The court rejects this argument, stating that the decision in Parma Nanda's case is not per incuriam as it did not ignore any binding authority or statutory provision.The judgment concludes that, based on the current state of law, the High Court does not have the jurisdiction to set aside a punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority, even if it finds the punishment to be arbitrary or grossly excessive, in cases where the punishment was imposed following a full-fledged enquiry. The court also notes that the power to pass orders to do 'complete justice' is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 142 of the Constitution, and there is no similar provision for the High Courts.Separate Judgments:A.K. Padhi, J. and K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J. concurred with the judgment delivered by B. Hansaria, CJ, without delivering separate judgments.