Statutory transfer limits and 12-year execution limitation govern debt recovery proceedings under the special recovery regime

Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 permits transfer only of suits or proceedings pending immediately before the Tribunal's establishment; an execution petition filed later cannot be transferred under that provision. The commentary also notes that inherent powers, consent, or Companies Act provisions cannot expand jurisdiction beyond the special statutory scheme, so such a transfer is without jurisdiction. On limitation, Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies through Section 24, giving a 12-year period from enforceability of the decree; once that period expires, recovery proceedings are time-barred and equity cannot override the statutory bar.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could transfer an execution petition to the Debt Recovery Tribunal after the Tribunal had already been established, by invoking Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 or inherent powers. (ii) Whether the execution/recovery proceedings were barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could transfer an execution petition to the Debt Recovery Tribunal after the Tribunal had already been established, by invoking Section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 or inherent powers.

Analysis: Section 31 permits transfer only of suits or proceedings that were pending before a court immediately before the Tribunal's establishment. The execution petition in question was filed long after the Tribunal came into existence, so it did not fall within the transfer provision. The Act contained no other enabling provision for such a transfer. The Court also held that inherent powers could not be used to create a transfer mechanism contrary to the express statutory scheme, and that consent could not confer jurisdiction where the statute withheld it. The Companies Act provisions relied upon could not override the special regime of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Conclusion: The transfer order was without jurisdiction and illegal. The issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the execution/recovery proceedings were barred by limitation.

Analysis: By applying Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 through Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the period for execution was held to be 12 years from the date the decree became enforceable. On the facts, that period had expired before the impugned transfer order and before the later execution attempt could validly proceed. The Court further held that equitable considerations could not override the plain statutory bar.

Conclusion: The claim was time-barred. The issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The impugned transfer order was set aside and the appeals were allowed because the statutory transfer provision did not permit the reference to the Tribunal and the recovery claim had become barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the language of a statute is plain, courts must give effect to it as written; inherent powers, equity, or consent cannot be used to enlarge jurisdiction or override an express statutory scheme.

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