Civil suit transfer to a Debt Recovery Tribunal is impermissible without express statutory authority, and Article 142 cannot enlarge jurisdiction.

A civil suit cannot be transferred to a Debt Recovery Tribunal unless the statute expressly authorises it. The 1993 Act confines the Tribunal's jurisdiction to bank and financial institution recovery applications, and section 31 allows transfer only of specified pending cases already within the statutory scheme; it does not permit transfer of an independent civil suit from another court. The Tribunal is not a civil court, and the Code of Civil Procedure does not supply a general transfer power or expand Tribunal jurisdiction. Article 142 also cannot be used to rewrite the statute, enlarge jurisdiction, or deprive a litigant of substantive and appellate rights.

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Issues: (i) whether a High Court or the Supreme Court has power, under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to transfer a suit pending in a civil court to a Debt Recovery Tribunal in another State; (ii) whether the earlier view permitting such transfer could stand in the face of the contrary view that the Tribunal is not a civil court and that a debtor's independent suit cannot be converted into a counterclaim without consent; and (iii) whether Article 142 of the Constitution of India could be invoked to direct such transfer in aid of complete justice.

Issue (i): whether a High Court or the Supreme Court has power, under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to transfer a suit pending in a civil court to a Debt Recovery Tribunal in another State.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of the 1993 Act confines the Tribunal's original jurisdiction to applications by banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts. Section 31 permits transfer only of pending suits or proceedings that were already before a court when the Tribunal was established and only if the cause of action would have fallen within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. The Act contains no general power authorising transfer of an independent civil suit from a civil court to a Tribunal. The Tribunal is not a civil court, is not in the hierarchy of civil courts under the Code, and does not conduct a full civil trial or pass decrees; it issues recovery certificates. A transfer from civil court to Tribunal would also alter substantive rights, including the plaintiff's forum, procedure, and vested appellate rights. Sections 22 to 25 of the Code do not supply such power, and Section 24 of the Code cannot be used to enlarge jurisdiction contrary to the statute.

Conclusion: No such power existed on the facts of the case, and the transfer ordered from the civil court to the Tribunal was impermissible.

Issue (ii): whether the earlier view permitting such transfer could stand in the face of the contrary view that the Tribunal is not a civil court and that a debtor's independent suit cannot be converted into a counterclaim without consent.

Analysis: The earlier decision holding that an independent borrower's suit could, in appropriate circumstances, be treated as a counterclaim was read in the context of the amended Section 19 and the need for inextricably connected claims. However, the later contrary view could not override the binding coordinate-bench ruling that the Tribunal is not a civil court and that independent civil proceedings are not transferable merely because a bank has filed recovery proceedings. The Court held that the later view had not correctly posed or answered the jurisdictional question and could not displace the earlier binding ratio. Consent remains essential where a borrower's independent suit is sought to be treated as a cross-action in Tribunal proceedings, and the existence of counterclaim provisions does not create a new transfer power.

Conclusion: The contrary view was not accepted as governing law, and the transfer could not be justified on the basis of counterclaim principles.

Issue (iii): whether Article 142 of the Constitution of India could be invoked to direct such transfer in aid of complete justice.

Analysis: Article 142 is an extraordinary constitutional power, but it cannot be used to rewrite a statute, enlarge a Tribunal's jurisdiction, or deprive a litigant of substantive rights and appellate remedies conferred by law. Since adequate remedies existed under the statutory framework, and since the dispute raised complex jurisdictional and contractual questions, the case was not treated as one warranting constitutional intervention to compel transfer. Exercising Article 142 in the manner sought would have indirectly achieved what the statute did not permit directly.

Conclusion: Article 142 was not invoked to sustain the transfer.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's jurisdiction remained confined to the statutory scheme, the civil suit could not be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, and the impugned transfer order was set aside while the appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A civil suit cannot be transferred to a Debt Recovery Tribunal unless the statute expressly authorises such transfer, and neither the 1993 Act nor the Code of Civil Procedure confers a general power to do so; Article 142 cannot be used to enlarge that jurisdiction or to take away substantive rights.

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