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Issues: Whether an arbitral tribunal that has terminated proceedings under Section 25(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for non-filing of the statement of claim retains jurisdiction to recall that order on sufficient cause being shown.
Analysis: Section 25(a) requires termination where the claimant, without sufficient cause, fails to file the statement of claim, but the provision does not use the language found in Section 32(3) that the mandate of the tribunal terminates upon termination of proceedings. The statutory scheme indicates that if sufficient cause is later shown, the tribunal may accept the claim and permit the proceedings to continue. The tribunal is not rendered functus officio merely because an order under Section 25(a) has been passed. The principle of procedural review, as recognised in judicial precedent, applies to a quasi-judicial tribunal where recall is sought to cure a procedural default and ensure that the matter is heard on merits. The principles underlying Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can inform the tribunal's power in this context.
Conclusion: The arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to recall an order passed under Section 25(a) and to re-commence the proceedings when sufficient cause is shown. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral tribunal retains an implied procedural power to recall an order terminating proceedings under Section 25(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where the claimant demonstrates sufficient cause, because such termination does not extinguish the tribunal's mandate in the manner contemplated by Section 32(3).