Tenth Schedule disqualification and antidefection law: Speaker's decisions reviewable for mala fides and procedural failure.

Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule is severable; the remainder of the Schedule stands without it. Paragraph 2 is upheld as a constitutional means to deter unprincipled defections, without nullifying members' freedom of conscience. The Speaker/Chairman functions as a tribunal under the Schedule, and their decisions are subject to judicial review for constitutional violations, mala fides, noncompliance with natural justice, or perversity-Paragraph 6(1) does not bar such review. Paragraph 6(2) confers limited immunity akin to protection against procedural irregularities. Judicial intervention before a Speaker's decision is confined to narrow interlocutory situations with grave, irreversible consequences. The term "any direction" is confined to major party policies and programs.

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Issues: (i) Whether Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule (ouster of courts' jurisdiction) attracts the proviso to Article 368(2) and if so whether Paragraph 7 is severable from the rest of the Tenth Schedule; (ii) Whether Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection grounds) is constitutionally valid; (iii) Whether Paragraph 6(1) (finality of Speaker/Chairman decision) and Paragraph 6(2) (deeming provision) exclude judicial review and, if not, the scope of judicial review; (iv) Whether vesting adjudicatory power in the Speaker/Chairman violates the basic structure by denying an independent adjudicatory machinery.

Issue (i): Whether Paragraph 7 brings about a change in Articles 136, 226 and 227 attracting the proviso to Article 368(2) and whether Paragraph 7 is severable from the remainder of the Tenth Schedule.

Analysis: Paragraph 7's language effectuates a total exclusion of court jurisdiction "in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification" including final orders; this extinguishes the remedy of judicial review (not the substantive right) and thus changes the effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 within the meaning of the proviso to Article 368(2). The proviso requires prior ratification by not less than one-half of the State Legislatures as a condition precedent; non-compliance with that procedure renders the amendment defective as to provisions requiring ratification. The doctrine of severability applies to composite constitutional amendments where parts do not attract the proviso; the majority finds Paragraph 7 severable because the remaining provisions are workable and the main purpose (curbing defections) can stand without Paragraph 7.

Conclusion: Paragraph 7 attracts the proviso to Article 368(2) (requires State ratification). Paragraph 7 is unconstitutional for non-compliance with the proviso and is severable from the remaining Tenth Schedule (majority view). (Conclusion in favour of Respondent on validity of Paragraph 7 being invalid; severability in favour of maintaining other provisions.)

Issue (ii): Validity of Paragraph 2 (grounds of disqualification for defection).

Analysis: Paragraph 2's provisions were examined against freedom of speech, vote and conscience and Articles 105/194. The provisions are construed harmoniously with the Schedule's object - to curb unprincipled defections - and confined in scope (e.g., "any direction" limited by object and context). Exceptions (prior permission, condonation) and construction limiting disqualification to serious votes affecting government stability mitigate interference with core parliamentary freedoms.

Conclusion: Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule is constitutionally valid. (Conclusion in favour of Respondent.)

Issue (iii): Whether Paragraph 6(1) finality clause and Paragraph 6(2) deeming provision exclude judicial review; if not, delineate scope of review.

Analysis: A statutory finality clause does not operate as a legislative "magical incantation" to oust judicial review. Paragraph 6(2) creates a limited fiction analogous to Articles 122(1)/212(1) protecting proceedings from mere procedural irregularities but does not extend immunity to jurisdictional errors. The Speaker/Chairman acting under Paragraph 6(1) exercises a judicial function (a tribunal) and is amenable to review for jurisdictional error, mala fides, breach of natural justice and perversity. Pre-decision (quia timet) and interlocutory interference are generally precluded except where interlocutory disqualification/suspension would cause grave, immediate and irreversible harm.

Conclusion: Paragraph 6(1) and 6(2) do not completely exclude judicial review; review is limited to jurisdictional errors (violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, breach of natural justice, perversity). No quia timet or routine interlocutory relief except in exceptional cases. (Conclusion partly in favour of Appellant insofar as judicial review preserved; partly in favour of Respondent insofar as scope is limited.)

Issue (iv): Whether vesting adjudicatory power in the Speaker/Chairman violates the basic structure (independence of adjudicatory machinery).

Analysis: The constitutional scheme for other disqualifications envisages resolution by an independent authority outside the House (President/Governor with Election Commission opinion). The office of Speaker carries high tradition and expectation of impartiality; majority finds vesting jurisdiction in the Speaker/Chairman not per se violative of basic structure given safeguards and limited judicial review; minority holds that Speaker's dependence on House majority and lack of institutional independence renders the scheme violative.

Conclusion: Majority: vesting adjudicatory power in Speaker/Chairman is not itself a violation of the basic structure. Minority (dissent): it is violative and would invalidate the Schedule. (Majority conclusion in favour of Respondent; dissent recorded.)

Final Conclusion: The majority allows the transfer, upholds the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule except for Paragraph 7 which is struck down for want of required State ratification; Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 6 (subject to limited judicial review) are held valid; factual matters remitted to the High Court for application of these principles. The minority would have declared the entire Fifty-Second Amendment and Tenth Schedule invalid. (Overall majority outcome: Tenth Schedule operative except Paragraph 7; judicial review preserved in limited form.)

Ratio Decidendi: Paragraph 7 effected a change in the operative effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 and thus attracted the proviso to Article 368(2); non-compliance with the proviso renders Paragraph 7 invalid, but the remaining provisions of the Tenth Schedule are severable and valid; decisions under Paragraph 6 are judicial in nature and remain amenable to limited judicial review for jurisdictional errors, mala fides, violation of natural justice and perversity.

Dissenting Opinion: The minority (Sharma and Verma, JJ.) concluded that Paragraph 7's invalidity for lack of ratification rendered the entire Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 (and the Tenth Schedule) unconstitutional and not severable; further, vesting adjudicatory power in the Speaker violates the requirement of an independent adjudicatory authority and breaches a basic feature of the Constitution.

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