Basic structure limits constitutional amendment power; exclusion of judicial review and supremacy of Directive Principles were held impermissible.

Parliament's amending power under Article 368 is limited by the basic structure doctrine and cannot be expanded into an unlimited power free from judicial review; an amendment that excludes review of constitutional amendments or denies any limit on constituent power is unconstitutional. The majority also held that the amended Article 31C, by giving Directive Principles overriding effect over Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 19, ed the basic structure because it destroyed the balance between Parts III and IV and weakened equality and liberty guarantees. Section 55 was therefore void, and section 4 was also struck down by the majority, subject to one dissent on that issue.

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Issues: (i) Whether sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 were within Parliament's amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution of India. (ii) Whether the amended Article 31C, which gave primacy to Directive Principles over the rights under Articles 14 and 19, damaged the basic structure of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether sections 4 and 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 were within Parliament's amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The amending power under Article 368 is not unlimited. Parliament cannot, by amendment, enlarge that limited power into an absolute power or remove all judicial control over constitutional amendments. The power of judicial review is an essential feature of the constitutional scheme, and an amendment that excludes review of amendments on any ground, or that declares there to be no limitation whatever on constituent power, strikes at the very foundation of the controlled Constitution and the basic structure doctrine.

Conclusion: Section 55 was unconstitutional and void.

Issue (ii): Whether the amended Article 31C, which gave primacy to Directive Principles over the rights under Articles 14 and 19, damaged the basic structure of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The amendment substituted a very wide immunity for laws said to give effect to Directive Principles, thereby withdrawing the protection of Articles 14 and 19 from a broad class of legislation. The majority held that the balance and harmony between Part III and Part IV is part of the basic structure, and that making Directive Principles wholly superior to Fundamental Rights destroys that balance and emasculates the essential guarantees of equality and liberty. It was therefore beyond the amending power. A separate opinion agreed that section 55 was invalid but differed and held the amended Article 31C valid on the view that it only gave precedence to laws genuinely enacted to implement Directive Principles.

Conclusion: Section 4 was unconstitutional and void by the majority, though one Judge dissented on this issue.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional amendment was struck down to the extent that it removed judicial review of amendments and destroyed the limited nature of Parliament's amending power, while the majority also invalidated the provision subordinating Fundamental Rights to Directive Principles.

Ratio Decidendi: Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is limited by the basic structure doctrine, and neither exclusion of judicial review nor obliteration of the essential balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is permissible.

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