Judicial Independence in Tribunal Governance: defective age, tenure and service rules cannot be reenacted without curing constitutional defects.
Tribunal-governance provisions imposing a minimum-age bar, a two-candidate recommendation panel, four-year tenure, and executive-controlled salary and service conditions are unconstitutional where they replicate defects that impair judicial independence. Legislative responses to judicial invalidation must cure the identified constitutional defect; reenactment or repackaging of the same vice violates constitutional supremacy, separation of powers, equality and the rule of law. Pending compliant legislation, binding directions on tribunal appointments, qualifications, tenure and service conditions continue to govern. Selections or recommendations completed before the impugned regime commenced retain protection under the earlier framework, and an independent National Tribunals Commission must be established.
Issues: (i) Whether the request to refer the tribunal-reforms challenge to a larger Bench warranted acceptance; (ii) Whether the impugned provisions governing minimum age eligibility, recommendation of a panel of candidates, tenure, and salary and allowances of tribunal members were constitutionally valid; (iii) Which regime governs tribunal appointments and service conditions pending conforming legislation, and whether appointments selected before commencement of the impugned Act are protected.
Issue (i): Whether the request to refer the tribunal-reforms challenge to a larger Bench warranted acceptance.
Analysis: The governing constitutional questions concerning tribunal composition, appointments, tenure, service conditions, separation of powers, and judicial independence had already been conclusively settled by binding larger-Bench precedents. No new or unresolved substantial constitutional question was shown. A belated reference would also prolong uncertainty affecting tribunal vacancies, serving members, aspirants, and access to justice.
Conclusion: The request for reference to a larger Bench was rejected.
Issue (ii): Whether the impugned provisions governing minimum age eligibility, recommendation of a panel of candidates, tenure, and salary and allowances of tribunal members were constitutionally valid.
Analysis: Constitutional supremacy, judicial review, separation of powers, judicial independence, equality, and the rule of law impose enforceable limits on legislation concerning bodies performing judicial functions. Parliament may cure the constitutional defect identified in an earlier ruling through valid curative legislation, including retrospective legislation where otherwise permissible, but cannot merely reenact or repackage provisions already invalidated without removing their underlying vice. The impugned age bar, two-name panel requirement, four-year tenure, and executive-controlled service-condition framework substantially reproduced provisions previously invalidated for impairing institutional independence and permitting an impermissible legislative override.
Conclusion: The impugned provisions were struck down as unconstitutional, in favour of the petitioners.
Issue (iii): Which regime governs tribunal appointments and service conditions pending conforming legislation, and whether appointments selected before commencement of the impugned Act are protected.
Analysis: Security of tenure and protection of vested service rights are integral to judicial independence. Until constitutional concerns are fully cured through appropriate legislation, the binding directions governing tribunal appointments, qualifications, tenure, service conditions, and allied matters continue as the controlling framework. The executive remains obliged to establish an independent National Tribunals Commission. Appointments for which selection or recommendation was completed before the impugned Act commenced cannot be subjected to its truncated tenure or altered service conditions.
Conclusion: Earlier binding tribunal directions continue to govern; pre-commencement selections and the identified tribunal appointments were protected under the prior governing regime, in favour of the petitioners.
Final Conclusion: The constitutional safeguards governing independent tribunal adjudication remain operative, with a four-month direction to establish a National Tribunals Commission and preservation of protected appointments under the prior framework.
Ratio Decidendi: A legislature may respond to a judicial invalidation only by curing the constitutional defect identified; reenactment of the same defective tribunal-governance measures violates constitutional supremacy, separation of powers, judicial independence, and the rule of law.