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Issues: (i) Whether the amended provision enabling a public servant to approach the Tribunal only against an order, and not expressly against omission or inaction, was unconstitutional; (ii) Whether the restrictions in section 5 on grant of interim orders in matters of suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, compulsory retirement, reversion and adverse entries were arbitrary or violative of fundamental rights; (iii) Whether the composition and appointment provisions in section 3, including appointment of an Administrative Member as Vice-Chairman and consultation with the Chief Justice, were constitutionally valid.
Issue (i): Whether the amended provision enabling a public servant to approach the Tribunal only against an order, and not expressly against omission or inaction, was unconstitutional.
Analysis: The provision was read in the context of the service remedy scheme and the Court held that inaction or omission is itself an independent cause of action. In the absence of an express statutory clarification, the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 remained available to address non-action by the authority. The existence of that remedy meant the employee was not left without redress.
Conclusion: The provision was not unconstitutional, and the challenge failed.
Issue (ii): Whether the restrictions in section 5 on grant of interim orders in matters of suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, compulsory retirement, reversion and adverse entries were arbitrary or violative of fundamental rights.
Analysis: The Court applied the settled distinction between final and interim relief and held that staying such service orders at the interlocutory stage would often amount to granting the very final relief sought. It accepted that where the impugned order is found unsustainable, appropriate moulding of final relief can compensate the employee, whereas allowing interim continuation in office after an apparently valid termination or dismissal may cause irreversible consequences. The same reasoning was extended to adverse entries, which may be challenged ultimately but need not be stayed as interim relief.
Conclusion: The restrictions on interim relief were upheld and were not violative of Articles 14 or 16.
Issue (iii): Whether the composition and appointment provisions in section 3, including appointment of an Administrative Member as Vice-Chairman and consultation with the Chief Justice, were constitutionally valid.
Analysis: The Court held that the State Legislature was competent under its legislative field to enact and restructure the Tribunal. The amended appointment mechanism requiring consultation with the Chief Justice aligned with the earlier judicial directions and with the scheme of comparable tribunal legislation. The inclusion of an Administrative Vice-Chairman did not by itself render the structure unconstitutional, and the amendments were not shown to be arbitrary or contrary to the basic structure.
Conclusion: The composition and appointment provisions were valid.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal Act as amended was sustained in all material respects, and the constitutional challenge failed.
Ratio Decidendi: A tribunal legislation regulating service remedies is constitutionally sustainable where the Legislature is competent, the affected employee is not left without judicial review, and restrictions on interim relief are confined to situations where such relief would effectively grant the final relief and create irreversible consequences.