Judicial review and tribunal independence define the constitutional limits on replacing High Court service jurisdiction.

Judicial review was treated as part of the basic structure, so Parliament could replace High Court service jurisdiction only with an alternative tribunal that is effective, independent and efficacious. The article explains that exclusion of High Court jurisdiction may stand if the Tribunal functions as a real substitute for constitutional review, but its composition and appointment process must avoid executive dominance. It also notes that judicially trained leadership, meaningful consultation and a proper selection mechanism are necessary to preserve competence and public confidence. The discussed directions therefore upheld the tribunal scheme in principle while requiring stricter safeguards for appointments and qualifications.

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Issues: (i) Whether exclusion of the High Court's jurisdiction in service matters and vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal under Article 323-A is constitutionally valid if an effective alternative mechanism for judicial review is provided; (ii) whether the provisions relating to the Tribunal's composition and appointment process preserve judicial independence and make the Tribunal an efficacious substitute for the High Court; (iii) whether the challenged qualification and appointment provisions, including the Chairman's eligibility clause, required correction or invalidation.

Issue (i): Whether exclusion of the High Court's jurisdiction in service matters and vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal under Article 323-A is constitutionally valid if an effective alternative mechanism for judicial review is provided.

Analysis: Judicial review was treated as an integral part of the basic structure and therefore incapable of abrogation. At the same time, Parliament was recognised as competent to substitute the High Court with another institutional mechanism, provided the substitute was no less effective in protecting constitutional limitations and enforcing the rule of law. The exclusion of High Court jurisdiction could therefore stand only if the Tribunal was made an effective and efficacious alternative forum.

Conclusion: The exclusion of the High Court's jurisdiction was upheld in principle, subject to the Tribunal functioning as an effective substitute for judicial review.

Issue (ii): Whether the provisions relating to the Tribunal's composition and appointment process preserve judicial independence and make the Tribunal an efficacious substitute for the High Court.

Analysis: The Tribunal, as a substitute for the High Court, had to command confidence, reflect judicial competence, and remain insulated from executive influence. Provisions allowing appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and administrative members without meaningful consultation or an independent selection process were held capable of undermining independence and objectivity. The composition and manner of appointment had to be restructured so that the Tribunal would be as effective and impartial as the High Court.

Conclusion: The appointment structure was found constitutionally infirm to the extent it left appointments to unfettered executive discretion; safeguards through meaningful consultation or a high-powered selection process were required.

Issue (iii): Whether the challenged qualification and appointment provisions, including the Chairman's eligibility clause, required correction or invalidation.

Analysis: A person with judicial training and experience was considered necessary for the office of Chairman, and the clause permitting appointment of a Secretary-level officer without legal or judicial experience was found unacceptable. The reasoning also supported broader eligibility for Vice-Chairman and a selection process that would preserve competence, confidence and institutional acceptability. The directions were framed prospectively and were intended to preserve the Act by bringing its working into conformity with constitutional requirements.

Conclusion: Section 6(1)(c) was held invalid and the remaining impugned provisions were left to operate subject to the indicated constitutional safeguards and prospective directions.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge succeeded only in part: the Tribunal scheme was broadly upheld as a valid substitute for High Court judicial review, but the Act had to be read and implemented with stricter safeguards for judicial independence, competent composition and non-arbitrary appointments.

Ratio Decidendi: Judicial review forms part of the basic structure, yet Parliament may replace High Court jurisdiction with an alternative tribunal only if the substitute is an effective, independent and efficacious forum manned and appointed in a manner that preserves judicial confidence and constitutional control.

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