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Issues: (i) Whether Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1991, by deleting consultation with the High Court and the District Judge in the process of appointing public prosecutors and district government counsel, was ultra vires, arbitrary and repugnant to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly Section 25-A of that Code. (ii) Whether the orders refusing renewal and removal of the petitioner from the post of Additional District Government Counsel could be sustained when the competent consultative procedure under the Legal Remembrancer Manual was not followed.
Issue (i): Whether Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1991, by deleting consultation with the High Court and the District Judge in the process of appointing public prosecutors and district government counsel, was ultra vires, arbitrary and repugnant to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly Section 25-A of that Code.
Analysis: The consultative requirement was treated as a structural safeguard intended to secure an independent prosecuting agency and to prevent arbitrary appointments. The reasoning proceeded on the basis that the Indian Constitution does not embody a rigid separation of powers and that judicial review can correct legislative and executive measures that transgress constitutional limits. The Court held that the State amendment removed the checks built into the principal enactment and the earlier legal framework, ignored the Law Commission material relied upon for the original scheme, and created an unfettered executive discretion inconsistent with the object of the criminal procedure law. It further held that Section 25-A, which establishes a Directorate of Prosecution under the control of a Director appointed with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, reflected the legislative policy of prosecutorial independence, making the State amendment irreconcilable with the Central law and violative of Article 14.
Conclusion: The amendment was declared unconstitutional, ultra vires and void to the extent it amended Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Issue (ii): Whether the orders refusing renewal and removal of the petitioner from the post of Additional District Government Counsel could be sustained when the competent consultative procedure under the Legal Remembrancer Manual was not followed.
Analysis: The Court found that the rejection of renewal rested on material that was not shown to emanate from the competent authority under the Legal Remembrancer Manual, while the prescribed consultation with the District Judge was not properly undertaken. The Court also held that the impugned administrative action reflected arbitrariness and disregard of the statutory-consultative framework, and that the petitioner's case had to be reconsidered in accordance with the correct procedure.
Conclusion: The orders dated 22.3.2011, 28.3.2011 and 30.3.2011 were quashed and the matter was directed to be reconsidered afresh in accordance with law.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded, the State amendment affecting prosecutorial appointments was invalidated, and the petitioner was granted consequential relief with a direction for fresh consideration after following the proper consultative process.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory or executive measure that removes essential consultative safeguards in the appointment of government prosecutors, thereby enabling unfettered executive discretion and undermining prosecutorial independence, is arbitrary and unconstitutional under Article 14 and cannot stand where it is inconsistent with the scheme of the principal criminal procedure law.