Political funding transparency prevails over blanket anonymity as the Supreme Court invalidated electoral finance restrictions and uncapped corporate donations.

Political funding information was held essential to an informed electoral choice under Article 19(1)(a), extending beyond candidate disclosure to political parties and the sources of their funding. Blanket anonymity under the Electoral Bond Scheme and related disclosure exemptions was found to disproportionately restrict voter information, and neither the aim of curbing black money nor donor privacy justified the restriction when less intrusive alternatives existed; the scheme and exemptions were therefore held unconstitutional. Deletion of the statutory cap on corporate political contributions was also found arbitrary under Article 14, because corporate funding posed a materially greater risk of concentrated political influence and the amendment lacked an adequate principle to protect electoral equality and integrity.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments denying disclosure of political contributions violate the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and can be justified on the grounds of curbing black money or protecting donor privacy; (ii) Whether the deletion of the cap on corporate political contributions under the Companies Act is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Issue (i): Whether the Electoral Bond Scheme and the amendments denying disclosure of political contributions violate the voter's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) and can be justified on the grounds of curbing black money or protecting donor privacy.

Analysis: The voter's right to information was held to extend beyond candidate-centric disclosure and to include information necessary for an informed electoral choice. Political parties were treated as a central unit in the electoral process, and information on political funding was held to be essential because money affects both electoral outcomes and governmental decision-making. The blanket anonymity created by the Scheme and the amendments to the disclosure provisions was found to disproportionately suppress this right. The stated objective of curbing black money was not accepted as a sufficient justification for restricting the right to information, and the Scheme failed the least restrictive means test because other less intrusive alternatives were available. The asserted privacy interest in donor anonymity was also not accepted as overriding the voter's constitutional interest in transparency.

Conclusion: The Scheme and the impugned disclosure exemptions were held unconstitutional and against the voter's right to information.

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of the cap on corporate political contributions under the Companies Act is manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Analysis: Corporate political funding was held to stand on a materially different footing from individual political support because of the greater capacity of companies to influence politics and policy through concentrated financial power. Removing the statutory cap enabled unlimited corporate donations, including by loss-making and shell companies, without sufficient recognition of the different degrees of harm posed to free and fair elections. The amendment was therefore found to lack an adequate determining principle and to be inconsistent with the constitutional requirement of political equality and electoral integrity.

Conclusion: The deletion of the cap on corporate contributions was held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

Final Conclusion: The challenged electoral finance regime was struck down in material part, and consequential directions were issued to stop fresh electoral bond issuance and to disclose existing bond-related information.

Ratio Decidendi: Information on political funding is essential to the voter's freedom of choice in a democracy, and a measure that imposes blanket anonymity on such funding or permits unregulated corporate influence fails constitutional scrutiny when less restrictive alternatives exist.

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