Public order and free speech: broad penal restrictions without a proximate nexus were held unconstitutional and inseverable.

'Public order' in Article 19(2) was confined to public peace, safety and tranquillity, and did not extend to every breach of law or remote disturbance. A restriction on speech had to show a real and proximate nexus with public order; section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 was held to sweep too widely because it penalised broad forms of instigation without that necessary connection. The provision was therefore not a reasonable restriction under Article 19(1)(a). The offending part was also found inseverable, so the entire section failed and could not be sustained as a constitutional restraint on speech.

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Issues: (i) meaning of "public order" in Article 19(2) of the Constitution; (ii) whether section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 imposed a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order; (iii) whether the offending portion of section 3 was severable.

Issue (i): meaning of "public order" in Article 19(2) of the Constitution

Analysis: The expression was treated as referring to public peace, safety and tranquillity, distinguished from disorders of merely local significance and from grave disturbances affecting the security of the State. The phrase was read in the setting of Article 19(2) and its amendment, and the scope of permissible restrictions was held to depend upon the nature of the disorder sought to be prevented.

Conclusion: "Public order" means public peace, safety and tranquillity, not every breach of law or every remote disturbance.

Issue (ii): whether section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act, 1932 imposed a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order

Analysis: The section penalised wide forms of instigation, including spoken or written words, signs and representations, to prevent payment or defer payment of liabilities to Government, authorities or landholders. The Court held that the restriction must have a real and proximate nexus with public order and that a far-fetched or hypothetical connection would not suffice. The impugned provision was found to reach innocent as well as guilty speech without establishing the necessary proximity to public order.

Conclusion: Section 3 was not a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order and was invalid under Article 19(1)(a).

Issue (iii): whether the offending portion of section 3 was severable

Analysis: The Court applied the doctrine of severability and held that the vice of unconstitutionality ran through the section as a whole. The suggested reading down would still leave the provision overbroad and uncertain in its operation, and the different categories of instigation could not be cleanly separated so as to preserve a constitutional remainder.

Conclusion: The provision was not severable and the entire section had to fail.

Final Conclusion: The impugned penal provision could not be sustained as a constitutionally permissible restriction on speech, and the respondent could not be proceeded against under it.

Ratio Decidendi: A restriction on speech under Article 19(2) must have a real and proximate connection with public order; a law sweeping in wide and undefined categories of speech without such nexus is unconstitutional and, if not severable, must be struck down in toto.

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