Prima facie UAPA threshold for bail requires specific facts; vague protest-related allegations cannot trigger the special bar.

For section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act to bar bail, the charge-sheet must disclose specific facts giving reasonable grounds to believe the accusation is prima facie true. Vague allegations of protest-related coordination or ordinary criminality are insufficient to treat conduct as a terrorist act under sections 15, 17 and 18 or to invoke the special bail restriction. Once that bar is inapplicable, ordinary bail principles apply, including the stage of investigation, absence of trial commencement, risk of absconding or interference, and the impact of prolonged pre-trial custody. On those principles, regular bail was held appropriate, subject to conditions.

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Issues: (i) Whether the allegations in the charge-sheet prima facie disclosed offences under sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 so as to attract the restrictive bail bar under section 43D(5); (ii) Whether, on the facts and applicable bail principles, the appellant was entitled to regular bail.

Issue (i): Whether the allegations in the charge-sheet prima facie disclosed offences under sections 15, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 so as to attract the restrictive bail bar under section 43D(5).

Analysis: The statutory scheme required the Court to first see whether the materials showed reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation was prima facie true. A terrorist act under section 15 had to retain the essential character of terrorism and could not be casually equated with ordinary criminality or an unlawful protest merely because it involved serious disorder. The Court held that the allegations, even if taken at face value, did not disclose specific, particularised facts showing that the appellant had committed, conspired to commit, or prepared for a terrorist act within the meaning of sections 15, 17 and 18. The record showed at most participation in protest-related coordination and one specific act of passing on a SIM card, which was insufficient to invoke the special UAPA bail restriction. Since no reasonable grounds existed to believe the accusation was prima facie true, section 43D(5) did not apply.

Conclusion: The allegations did not prima facie establish offences under sections 15, 17 or 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, and the bar under section 43D(5) was not attracted.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the facts and applicable bail principles, the appellant was entitled to regular bail.

Analysis: Once the special UAPA restriction was found inapplicable, the matter had to be tested on ordinary bail principles, including the nature of accusation, likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence, and witness intimidation. The Court noted that investigation was complete, the charge-sheet had been filed, trial had not commenced, the number of cited witnesses was very large, and prolonged incarceration would seriously affect the appellant's liberty and trial rights. The Court also recognised the constitutional protection accorded to peaceful protest and held that the material did not justify continued pre-trial custody on the basis of the general bail considerations urged by the prosecution.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to bail on ordinary bail principles.

Final Conclusion: The impugned bail rejection was unsustainable, and the appellant was ordered to be released on regular bail subject to conditions, with no expression on the merits of the trial.

Ratio Decidendi: For section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 to operate, the materials must disclose specific facts giving reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is prima facie true; vague or generalized allegations that at most show protest-related conduct or ordinary criminality are insufficient to deny bail under the special UAPA regime.

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