Vague speech restrictions fail constitutional scrutiny, while narrowly tailored blocking and intermediary rules can survive with safeguards.

Speech-restrictive laws must have a proximate nexus with the grounds in Article 19(2); vague and overbroad penal wording that chills protected discussion and advocacy cannot be saved by interpretation or severability. On that basis, section 66A of the Information Technology Act and section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act were struck down. By contrast, section 69A of the Information Technology Act and the blocking rules were upheld because they were narrowly confined to Article 19(2) interests and contained procedural safeguards. Section 79 and the intermediary guidelines were also sustained, but only after reading down "actual knowledge" and the takedown obligation to valid court or governmental directions.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 violated the freedom of speech and expression and was saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India; (ii) whether section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 were constitutionally valid; (iii) whether section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 were valid or required reading down; and (iv) whether section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act was constitutionally valid.

Issue (i): Whether section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 violated the freedom of speech and expression and was saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India

Analysis: Section 66A penalised sending information that was grossly offensive, annoying, inconvenient, menacing, false, insulting or otherwise objectionable, but it did not require any proximate connection with public order, incitement to an offence, defamation, decency or morality, or any other ground in Article 19(2). The provision used open-ended and undefined expressions, created a chilling effect on protected speech, swept within its net discussion and advocacy, and was overbroad. It was also incapable of being saved by reading into it the grounds contained in Article 19(2) or by invoking severability, because the vice went to the whole provision.

Conclusion: Section 66A was unconstitutional and was struck down in its entirety.

Issue (ii): Whether section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 were constitutionally valid

Analysis: Section 69A was a narrowly drawn blocking power confined to the interests recognised by Article 19(2), and the Rules built in procedural safeguards, including written reasons, examination by a committee, notice and hearing to the originator where identifiable, and review. The absence of the additional safeguards available under the Code of Criminal Procedure did not render the scheme unconstitutional.

Conclusion: Section 69A and the 2009 Rules were upheld as constitutionally valid.

Issue (iii): Whether section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011 were valid or required reading down

Analysis: Section 79 was an exemption provision for intermediaries and had to operate consistently with the scheme of section 69A. The expression actual knowledge in section 79(3)(b) was too broad if left unqualified, so it was confined to knowledge through a court order or a valid governmental notification, and the unlawful act had to be one relatable to Article 19(2). Rule 3(4) was read down similarly so that intermediaries were not required to independently judge disputed takedown requests on a free-standing basis.

Conclusion: Section 79 was upheld subject to reading down section 79(3)(b), and the 2011 Rules were upheld subject to reading down Rule 3(4) accordingly.

Issue (iv): Whether section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act was constitutionally valid

Analysis: The provision criminalised causing annoyance in an indecent manner by statements, verbal comments, telephone calls or messages, but the expression used was vague and overbroad in the same manner as section 66A and lacked the narrow nexus required by Article 19(2). The State Legislature had competence to enact the provision, but the restriction itself could not survive constitutional scrutiny.

Conclusion: Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act was unconstitutional and was struck down.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional challenge substantially succeeded: the principal speech-restrictive penal provision was invalidated, the blocking regime under section 69A was sustained, and the intermediary safe-harbour provisions were preserved only after narrowly tailoring their operation to lawful and constitutionally cognisable takedown directions.

Ratio Decidendi: A law restricting speech must have a proximate nexus with a ground in Article 19(2), and a penal provision using vague and overbroad terms that suppresses protected discussion and advocacy cannot be saved by interpretative enlargement or by severability.

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